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    Perjashtuar Maska e BARAT
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    Mbledhja e 81 partive dhe qendrimi shqiptar

    PUBLIKOHET PAS 47 VJETĖSH FJALA E ENVER HOXHĖS MBAJTUR NĖ 16 NĖNTOR 1960 NĖ MBLEDHJEN E 81 PARTIVE KOMUNISTE NĖ MOSKĖ



    Arkivat ruse botojnė fjalimin e Enverit nė Mbledhjen e 81 Partive



    Udhėtimin e tij tė fundit jashtė, Enver Hoxha do ta mbyllte edhe me njė nga fjalimet mė tė rėndėsishme, jo vetėm tė tij, por edhe tė politikės shqiptare nė ato vite. Ishte nėntori i vitit 1960, kur Hoxha bashkė me Mehmet Shehun, Hysni Kapon dhe Ramiz Alinė, mori pjesė nė mbledhjen e 81 partive komuniste, e cila shėnoi prishjen e marrėdhėnieve me Bashkimin Sovjetik dhe de fakto daljen nga Traktati i Varshavės. De jure Shqipėria doli nga Traktati i Varshavės vetėm 8 vjet mė vonė. Divergjencat me kreun e BRSS-sė, Hrushovin, ishin shfaqur disa muaj mė parė qė nga Mbledhja e Bukureshtit. Por vula e ndarjes mes dy vendeve ishte pikėrisht Mbledhja e 81 Partive nė Moskė. Mė datė 16 nėntor, Enver Hoxha mbajti fjalimin prej 80 faqesh ku do tė dilte hapur kundėr politikės sė ndjekur nga Hrushovi dhe do mbronte politikėn e Partisė Komuniste Kineze. Gazeta "Tirana Observer" ka zbuluar tė plotė nė arkivat ruse fjalimin qė Enver Hoxha ka mbajtur nė mbledhjen e 81 partive nė Moskė. Vetėm pak kohė mė parė arkivat ruse kanė deklasifikuar dokumentet sekrete pėr Shqipėrinė ku nė tė bėnte pjesė fjalimi i gjatė i Enver Hoxhės qė ndau Shqipėrinė me Bashkimin Sovjetik. Fjalimi ėshtė publikuar i plotė dhe pa asnjė retushim nga ana e arkivave ruse. Nė numrin e sotėm gazeta "Tirana Observer" boton pjesėn e parė tė fjalimit prej 80 faqesh tė Enver Hoxhės. Nė kėtė pjesė ai denoncon marrėveshjet dhe takimet qė kishte kryer Nikita Hrushov me krerė tė vendeve perėndimore, midis tė cilėve dhe amerikanė si dhe shpreh rezervat ndaj kursit tė ri tė udhėheqjes sovjetike. Gjithashtu nė kėtė pjesė ish-udhėheqėsi komunist del edhe kundėr marrėveshjeve pėr ēarmatimin e armėve bėrthamore.


    Fjala e Enver Hoxhės e mbajtur nė emėr tė KQ tė PPSH nė mbledhjen e 81 Partive Komuniste dhe Punėtore nė Moskė me 16 nėntor 1960

    16 nėntor 1960

    Tė dashur shokė,

    Kjo mbledhje e Partive Komuniste dhe Punėtore ka njė rėndėsi historike pėr lėvizjen komuniste ndėrkombėtare, pse po i bėn njė analizė tė hollėsishme situatės politike ndėrkombėtare, po bėn bilancin e sukseseve dhe tė gabimeve qė mund tė jenė vėrtetuar nė rrugėn tonė dhe na ndihmon ne tė pėrcaktojmė mė qartė vijėn qė duhet tė ndjekim paskėtaj pėr tė korrur suksese tė reja nė dobi tė socializmit, tė komunizmit dhe tė paqes.

    Nė botė tashmė ekziston kampi i socializmit, me Bashkimin Sovjetik nė krye. Lėvizja komuniste nė pėrgjithėsi ėshtė zgjeruar, ėshtė forcuar dhe ėshtė kalitur. Partitė komuniste dhe punėtore nė tė gjithė botėn janė bėrė njė forcė kolosale, qė ēon njerėzimin pėrpara drejt socializmit, drejt paqes. Siē theksohet edhe nė projektdeklaratėn qė ėshtė pėrgatitur, kampi ynė i socializmit ėshtė shumė mė i fortė se kampi i imperializmit. Socializmi ēdo ditė forcohet dhe ngjitet, kurse imperializmi dobėsohet, kalbėzohet. Ne me tė gjitha mjetet dhe forcat duhet ta shpejtojmė kėtė proces. Kjo do tė ngjasė nė qoftė se i qėndrojmė besnikė tė patundur marksizėm-leninizmit dhe e zbatojmė atė drejt. Pėrndryshe, ne do ta frenojmė kėtė proces, pse kemi pėrpara armiq tė egėr, qė duhet t‘i mundim dhe t‘i shkatėrrojmė, kemi imperializmin, me imperializmin amerikan nė krye.

    Ne e duam paqen, kurse imperializmi nuk e do paqen dhe po pėrgatitet pėr njė luftė tė tretė botėrore. Ne duhet tė luftojmė me tė gjitha forcat qė tė shmanget lufta botėrore dhe tė triumfojė nė botė njė paqe e drejtė dhe demokratike. Kjo do tė arrihet kur imperializmin do ta detyrojmė tė ēarmatoset. Me vullnetin e tij imperializmi nuk i lėshon armėt. Tė besosh njė gjė tė tillė, ėshtė njėsoj si tė gėnjesh veten dhe tė tjerėt. Duhet t‘i vėmė, pra, imperializmit pėrballė forcėn kolosale ekonomike, ushtarake, moralo-politike dhe ideologjike tė kampit tė socializmit dhe njėkohėsisht forcėn e bashkuar tė popujve tė tė gjithė botės, pėr tė sabotuar me tė gjitha mėnyrat luftėn qė pėrgatitin imperialistėt.

    Partia e Punės e Shqipėrisė kėtė situatė dhe kėrcėnimin qė i turret njerėzimit paqedashės nga imperialistėt as nuk ia ka fshehur dhe as do t‘ia fshehe popullit tė vet. Populli shqiptar, i cili e urren luftėn, mund t‘ju sigurojmė se nuk ėshtė frikėsuar nga ky veprim i drejtė i Partisė sė tij: as pesimist nuk ėshtė bėrė, as nė vend nuk ka ngecur pėr sa i pėrket ndėrtimit tė socializmit. Perspektivat e sė ardhmes ai i ka tė qarta dhe punon me besim tė plotė, duke qenė kurdoherė vigjilent, duke mbajtur nė njėrėn dorė kazmėn dhe nė tjetrėn pushkėn.

    Pikėpamja jonė ėshtė se imperializmi, me imperializmin amerikan nė krye duhet demaskuar pa mėshirė, politikisht dhe ideologjikisht dhe asnjėherė nuk duhet lejuar t‘i bėhen lajka, pėrkėdhelje, lustrime imperializmit. Asnjė lėshim parimor nuk duhet t‘i bėhet imperializmit. Taktikat dhe kompromiset e lejueshme nga ana jonė duhet tė ndihmojnė ēėshtjen tonė dhe jo tė armikut.

    Pėrpara armikut tė egėr garanci pėr fitoren e ēėshtjes sonė ėshtė uniteti ynė i plotė, i cili do tė sigurohet duke zhdukur mosmarrėveshjet e thella ideologjike qė janė shfaqur, dhe duke e bazuar kėtė unitet nė bazat e marksizėm-leninizmit, nė barazi, nė vėllazėrim, nė frymėn shoqėrore dhe tė internacionalizmit proletar. Partia jonė mendon se jo vetėm nuk duhet tė ketė asnjė tė ēarė ideologjike, por rrjedhimisht duhet tė kemi edhe njė qėndrim politik unik pėr tė gjitha ēėshtjet. Taktika dhe strategjia jonė ndaj armiqve duhet tė jenė tė pėrpunuara prej tė gjitha partive tona, tė mbėshtetura nė parimet marksiste-leniniste, nė kritere tė drejta politike dhe qė t‘u pėrshtaten situatave konkrete dhe reale. . .

    Tė gjithė popujt e botės aspirojnė dhe luftojnė pėr liri, pėr pavarėsi, pėr sovranitet, pėr drejtėsi shoqėrore, pėr kulturė, pėr paqe. Kėto aspirata tė shenjta ua ka shtypur dhe po ua shtyp kapitalisti, feudali, imperialisti dhe ėshtė, pra, e natyrshme qė lufta e kėtyre popujve tė zhvillohet me rreptėsi tė madhe kundėr kapitalisteve, kundėr feudalėve, kundėr imperialistėve. Ėshtė gjithashtu e natyrshme qė popujt e botės tė kėrkojnė aleatėt e tyre nė kėtė luftė pėr jetėn, qė bėjnė kundėr xhelatėve tė tyre. .

    Prandaj, nė luftėn pėr paqen, pėr ēarmatimin, pėr pėrparimin shoqėror nė botė, kampi i socializmit nuk ėshtė i vetėm pėrballė kampit imperialist; ai ėshtė nė aleancė tė ngushtė me tė gjithė popujt pėrparimtarė tė botės, kurse imperialistėt ndodhen tė vetmuar pėrballė kampit tė socializmit.

    Po jetojmė nė njė kohė, kur shohim tė shkatėrrohet fund e krye kolonializmi, tė zhduket kjo murtajė qė shfaroste popujt nga faqja e dheut. Shtete tė reja po lindin nė Afrikė, nė Azi. Shtete ku sundonte kapitali, kėrbaēi dhe plumbi po zhdukin zgjedhėn e robėrisė dhe popujt po marrin nė dorė fatet e tyre. Kjo gjė u arrit dhe po arrihet nė sajė tė luftės sė kėtyre popujve dhe tė ndihmės morale qė u japin kėtyre popujve Bashkimi Sovjetik, Kina Popullore dhe vendet e tjera tė kampit tė socializmit.

    Tradhtarė tė marksizėm-leninizmit, agjentė tė imperializmit dhe intrigantė, si Josif Broz Titoja, pėrpiqen me njė mijė mėnyra, duke kurdisur plane djallėzore, pėr tė ēorientuar popuj dhe shtete tė reja, pėr t‘i shkėputur kėta nga aleatet e tyre tė natyrshėm, pėr t‘i lidhur kėta drejtpėrdrejt me imperializmin amerikan. Ne duhet tė vėmė tė gjitha forcat pėr t‘ua shpartalluar kėto plane kėtyre shėrbėtorėve tė imperializmit.

    Ne po asistojmė nė shthurjen e imperializmit, tė kalbėzimit tė tij, tė agonisė sė tij. Ne rrojmė dhe luftojmė nė epokėn qė karakterizohet nga kalimi i pandalshėm nga kapitalizmi nė socializėm. Po vėrtetohen tė gjitha mėsimet gjeniale tė Karl Marksit dhe tė Vladimir Iliē Leninit, tė cilat kurrė nuk janė vjetruar, siē pretendojnė revizionistėt.

    Imperializmi botėror po ha grushte tė rėnda, tė atilla qė tregojnė qartė se ai nuk ėshtė mė nė "moshėn e artė" tė tij, kur bėnte ligjin kur tė donte dhe si tė donte. Iniciativa i iku tani nga duart dhe kėtė nuk e la nga qejfi dhe me dėshirėn e vet. Kjo iniciativė nuk iu mor atij me fjalė dhe vetėm me fjalime, por iu mor pas njė procesi tė gjatė luftėrash dhe revolucionesh tė pėrgjakshme, qė kapitalizmi vetė provokoi kundėr proletariatit, kundėr forcės sė popujve qė po ngriheshin pėr tė shkatėrruar botėn e urisė dhe tė mjerimit, botėn e skllavėrisė. Kėtė faqe tė lavdishme e hapi Revolucioni i madh Socialist i Tetorit, e hapi Bashkimi i madh Sovjetik, e hapi Lenini i madh.

    Imperializmi botėror, me imperializmin amerikan nė krye, edhe tani, kur shikon se i afrohet vdekja, kur shikon se pėrpara tij ka kundėrshtarė tė fortė dhe tė vendosur, siē janė kampi i socializmit dhe aleanca e tij e madhe me tė gjithė popujt e botės, po pėrqendron, organizon dhe armatos forcat e tij tė sulmit. Ai pėrgatitet pėr luftė. Kush nuk e sheh kėtė ai ėshtė qorr. Kush e sheh, por e mbulon,ai ėshtė tradhtar nė shėrbim tė imperializmit. Partia e Punės e Shqipėrisė mendon se, me gjithė vėshtirėsitė e mėdha qė hasim nė rrugėn pėr vendosjen e paqes nė botė, pėr ēarmatimin dhe pėr zgjidhjen e problemeve tė tjera ndėrkombėtare, nuk ka pse tė jemi pesimistė. Vetėm armiqtė tanė, qė po pėsojnė humbje, janė dhe duhet tė jenė pesimistė. Ne kemi fituar, fitojmė dhe do tė fitojmė, prandaj kemi qenė dhe jemi optimistė dhe jemi tė bindur se pėrpjekjet tona do tė kurorėzohen me sukses.

    Por ne mendojmė se optimizmi i tepruar, jorealist, jo vetėm s‘ėshtė i mirė, por ėshtė i dėmshėm Kush mohon, kush zvogėlon, kush s‘ka besim nė forcėn tonė tė madhe ekonomike, politike, ushtarake, morale, ai ėshtė disfatist dhe s‘meriton tė quhet komunist. Por edhe ai, qė, i dehur nga forca jonė, i duken kundėrshtarėt miza, kujton se armiku ka humbur ēdo shpresė, se ai u bė i parrezikshėm dhe ėshtė plotėsisht nė mėshirėn tonė, ai nuk ėshtė realist dhe blofon, i vė nė gjumė njerėzit, vė nė gjumė popujt pėrpara kėtyre situatave tė ndėrlikuara dhe plot rreziqe, qė kėrkojnė prej tė gjithėve njė vigjilencė shumė tė madhe, qė kėrkojnė ngritjen e hovit revolucionar tė masave dhe jo uljen, shthurjen, dekompozimin dhe rehatinė. Populli ynė i vuajtur thotė: Uji fle, por armiku nuk fle.

    Le tė shohim drejt nė sy faktet. Imperializmi botėror, me repartin e tij mė agresiv, imperializmin amerikan nė krye, po drejton ekonominė e tij drejt pėrgatitjes sė luftės. Ai po armatoset deri nė dhėmbė. Imperializmi amerikan po armatos me ēfarėdo arme Gjermaninė e Bonit, Japoninė dhe tė gjithė aleatėt dhe satelitėt e tij. Ai ka organizuar dhe i pėrsos organizatat ushtarake agresive, ai ka krijuar dhe po krijon baza ushtarake nga tė katėr anėt rreth kampit tė socializmit. Ai po i shton stoqet e armėve bėrthamore, ai s‘pranon tė ēarmatoset, ai s‘pranon t‘i ndalojė provat e armėve bėrthamore, ai punon nė ethe pėr shpikje tė reja tė shfarosjes nė masė. Tė gjitha kėto pėrse i bėn? Pėr tė shkuar nė dasmė? Jo! Pėr tė shkuar nė luftė kundėr nesh, pėr tė zhdukur socializmin dhe komunizmin pėr tė skllavėruar popujt.

    Partia e Punės e Shqipėrisė mendon se po tė flasim dhe po tė mendojmė ndryshe, atėherė gėnjejmė veten dhe tė tjerėt. Ne nuk do tė quheshim komunistė, nė rast se do tė na trembnin vėshtirėsitė e jetės. Ne komunistėt e urrejmė luftėn, ne komunistėt do tė luftojmė deri nė fund qė t‘i shkatėrrojmė planet djallėzore dhe tė luftės, qė pėrgatit imperializmi amerikan, por po na shpalli ai luftė, ne duhet t‘i japim grushtin pėrfundimtar, qė imperializmi tė zhduket pėrgjithmonė nga faqja e dheut.

    Pėrpara kėrcėnimeve tė imperializmit botėror, tė kryesuar nga imperializmi amerikan, pėr luftė atomike, ne duhet tė jemi plotėsisht tė pėrgatitur si ekonomikisht, politikisht, moralisht, ashtu edhe ushtarakisht, pėr t‘i bėrė ballė ēdo eventualiteti. Luftėn botėrore ne duhet ta shmangim, ajo nuk ėshtė fatalisht e pashmangshme, por askush nuk do tė na falė kurrė nė rast se rrojmė me ėndrra dhe armiku na gjen nė befasi, sepse s‘ka ndodhur kurrė qė armiku tė jetė ose tė quhet loyal!, ndryshe s‘do tė quhej armik. Armiku ėshtė dhe qėndron armik dhe i pabesė. Kush i zė besė armikut, ai e humb shpejt ose vonė davanė...

    Politika paqėsore e vendeve tė kampit te socializmit ka ndikuar shumė nė demaskimin e qėllimeve agresive tė imperializmit, nė mobilizimin e popujve kundėr luftėnxitėsve, nė zhvillimin e luftės sė tyre tė lavdishme kundėr shtypėsve imperialistė dhe veglave tė tyre...

    Por, megjithėkėtė, shumė probleme konkrete, tė cilat janė shtruar nė tavolinė, si propozimet pėr ēarmatimin, konferenca e nivelit tė lartė etj, nuk janė zgjidhur dhe po sabotohen sistematikisht nga imperialistėt amerikanė.

    Ē‘konkluzione duhet tė nxjerrim nga kėto? Partia e Punės e Shqipėrisė mendon se imperializmi, dhe nė radhė tė parė imperializmi amerikan, s‘e ka ndėrruar lėkurėn, as qimen, as natyrėn. Ai ėshtė agresiv, ai do tė jetė agresiv, sikur edhe njė dhemb t‘i mbetet nė gojė. Dhe duke qenė agresiv, ai mund ta hedhė botėn nė luftė. Prandaj ne, ashtu siē theksuam edhe nė komisionin redaktues, vazhdojmė tė ngulim kėmbė se duhet t‘u bėhet e qartė popujve se garanci absolute qė nuk do tė ketė luftė botėrore, mund tė kemi vetėm pasi tė ketė triumfuar socializmi nė tė gjithė botėn, ose nė pjesėn mė tė madhe tė vendeve tė botės. Hapur flasin amerikanėt, ata s‘pranojnė ēarmatim, pėrkundrazi po i shtojnė armatimet, ata pėrgatitin luftėn, prandaj duhet tė jemi vigjilentė. Armiku s‘duhet t‘i bėjmė asnjė lėshim parimor, tė mos krijojmė asnjė iluzion pėr imperializmin, pse duke menduar se i vėmė vetulla, mund t‘i nxjerrim sytė ēėshtjes. Armiku jo vetėm po armatoset dhe po pėrgatit luftėn kundėr nesh, por zhvillon edhe njė propagandė tė shfrenuar pėr tė helmatisur shpirtrat, pėr t‘i hutuar njerėzit.

    Ai harxhon me miliona dollarė pėr tė blerė agjentė dhe spiunė, harxhon me miliona dollarė pėr tė organizuar nė vendet tona akte spiunazhi, diversioni dhe atentate. Imperializmi amerikan u ka dhėnė dhe po u jep miliarda dollarė agjentėve tė tij besnikė, bandės, tradhtare tė Titos. Tė gjitha kėto ai i bėn qė tė dobėsojė frontin tonė tė brendshėm, tė na pėrēajė ne, tė dobėsojė dhe tė organizojė prapavijat tona.

    Shumė diskutohet rreth ēėshtjes sė bashkekzistencės paqėsore, bile disa afirmojnė edhe absurditete tė atilla, sikur Kina Popullore dhe Shqipėria qenkan kundėr bashkekzistencės paqėsore. Me duket se duhen hedhur poshtė njė herė e mirė pikėpamje tė tilla tė dėmshme dhe tė gabuara. Nuk mund tė ketė shtet socialist, nuk mund tė ketė komunist qė tė jetė kundėr bashkekzistencės paqėsore, qė tė jetė luftėdashės. Lenini i madh ka shtruar i pari parimin e bashkekzistencės paqėsore tė shteteve me rende shoqėrore tė ndryshme si njė domosdoshmėri objektive, derisa nė botė krahas njėri-tjetrit, ekzistojnė si shtetet socialiste ashtu edhe ato kapitaliste. Partia jonė e Punės, duke i qėndruar besnike kėtij parimi tė madh tė Leninit, gjithnjė ka menduar dhe mendon se politika e bashkekzistencės paqėsore u pėrgjigjet interesave rrėnjėsore tė tė gjithė popujve, i pėrgjigjet qėllimit tė forcimit tė mėtejshėm tė pozitave tė socializmit, prandaj kėtė parim tė Leninit ajo e ka nė bazė tė politikės sė jashtme tė shtetit tonė popullor. Bashkekzistenca, paqėsore midis dy sistemeve tė kundėrta nuk do tė thotė, siē pretendojnė revizionistėt modernė se duhet hequr dorė nga lufta e klasave. Pėrkundrazi, lufta e klasave duhet tė vazhdojė, lufta politike dhe ideologjike kundėr imperializmit, kundėr ideologjisė borgjeze dhe asaj revizioniste duhet tė forcohet gjithnjė e mė shumė. Duke luftuar me konsekuencė pėr vendosjen e bashkekzistencės paqėsore leniniste, duke, mos i lėshuar aspak nė parimet imperializmit, duhet tė zhvillohet mė tej lufta e klasave nė vendet kapitaliste, si edhe lėvizja nacionalēlirimtare e popujve tė vendeve koloniale dhe tė varura. Sipas pikėpamjes sonė, partitė komuniste dhe punėtore tė vendeve kapitaliste duhet tė luftojnė qė tė vendoset bashkekzistenca paqėsore nė mes tė vendit tė tyre, qė ėshtė akoma me sistem kapitalist dhe vendeve tona socialiste... Por detyra e tyre s‘mbaron me kaq. Nė kėto vende duhet tė zhvillohet, tė rritet, tė forcohet, lufta e klasave, dhe masat punonjėse, tė udhėhequra nga proletariati vendės me partinė komuniste nė krye edhe nė aleancė me tė gjithė proletariatin botėror, t‘ia bėjnė jetėn tė pamundur imperializmit, t‘i dėrrmojnė atij bazat e luftės dhe tė ekonomisė, t‘i rrėmbejnė atij nga duart forcėn ekonomike dhe politike dhe tė shkojnė drejt shkatėrrimit tė pushtetit tė tij tė vjetėr dhe tė vendosin pushtetin e ri tė popullit. Kėtė do ta bėjnė me dhunė apo me rrugėn paqėsore e parlamentare?

    Kjo ēėshtje ka qenė e qartė, kot na e ngatėrroi shoku Hrushov nė Kongresin XX dhe e ngatėrroi nė atė drejtim qė u pėlqeu nė fakt oportunistėve. Pėrse duhej t‘u bėheshin gjithė kėto parodi tezave tė qarta tė Leninit dhe tė Revolucionit Socialist tė Tetorit? Partia e Punės e Shqipėrisė e ka pasur tė qartė dhe nuk lėviz nga mėsimet e Leninit nė kėtė ēėshtje. Deri tani asnjė popull, asnjė proletariat dhe asnjė parti komuniste ose punėtore s‘e ka marrė pushtetin pa gjak dhe pa dhunė. Ėshtė e padrejtė kur disa shokė pretendojnė se ata e kanė marrė pushtetin pa gjak; ata harrojnė qė pėr ta ka derdhur gjakun si lumė Ushtria e lavdishme Sovjetike nė Luftėn e Dytė Botėrore.

    Partia jonė mendon pėr kėtė ēėshtje se duhet tė pėrgatitemi pėr tė dyja rrugėt dhe tė pėrgatitemi mirė sidomos pėr marrjen e pushtetit me anėn e dhunės, pse, po tė pėrgatitemi mirė nga kjo anė, edhe mundėsia e parė ka mė tepėr shans tė ketė sukses. Borgjezia mund tė tė lėrė tė psaltėsh, pastaj tė fut njė grusht fashist nė kokė dhe tė dėrrmon, pse s‘ke pėrgatitur as kuadrot e sulmit, as punėn nė ilegalitet, as vendet ku tė ruhesh dhe tė punosh, as mjetet me se tė luftosh. Kėtij eventualiteti tragjik duhet t‘i dalim pėrpara. Partia e Punės e Shqipėrisė ka qenė, ėshtė, do tė jetė dhe do tė luftojė nė rrugėn marksiste-leniniste dhe nė bazė tė Deklaratės sė Moskės pėr paqen, pėr bashkekzistencėn paqėsore, ashtu sikurse na mėson Lenini. Ajo ka qenė, ėshtė dhe do tė jetė e do tė luftojė nė mėnyrė aktive pėr ēarmatimin e pėrgjithshėm. Nė asnjė rast dhe pėr asnjė ēast Partia e Punės e Shqipėrisė nuk do tė pushojė t‘u bėjė njė luftė politike e ideologjike veprimeve tė imperializmit dhe tė kapitalistėve si dhe ideologjisė borgjeze, nuk do tė pushojė t‘i bėjė njė luftė tė ashpėr, tė pandėrprerė dhe pa asnjė kompromis revizionizmit modern dhe nė veēanti revizionizmit titist jugosllav. Mund tė ketė shokė qė tė na akuzojnė ne, shqiptarėt, pėr kokėfortė, pėr piper tė kuq, pėr gjaknxehtė, pėr sektarė, pėr dogmatikė e pėr ēfarė tė duash, por ne i hedhim poshtė tė gjitha kėto akuza false dhe u themi kėtyre se ne s‘lėvizim nga kėto pozita, se janė marksiste-leniniste.

    Thuhet se ne duam luftėn dhe jemi kundėr bashkekzistencės. Bile shoku Kozllov neve, shqiptarėve, na ka vėnė kėtė alternative: ose bashkekzistencė, siē e kupton kėtė ai, ose njė bombė atomike nga imperialistėt, e cila do ta bėjė hi Shqipėrinė dhe asnjė shqiptar s‘do tė mbetet i gjallė. Njė kėrcėnim tė tillė atomik asnjė pėrfaqėsues i imperializmit amerikan nuk ia ka bėrė deri tani Popullit shqiptar. Por ja qė atė ia bėn njė anėtar i Presidiumit tė Komitetit Qendror tė Partisė Komuniste tė Bashkimit Sovjetik. Dhe kujt ia bėn? Njė populli tė vogėl, heroik, qė nė shekuj ka luftuar me armiq tė egėr dhe tė panumėrt dhe qė kurrė s‘ėshtė, pėrkulur, njė populli tė vogėl, qė luftoi me heroizėm tė pashoq kundėr hitlerianėve dhe fashistėve italianė, ia thotė njė partie qė i qėndron besnike konsekuente deri nė fund marksizėm-leninizmit. Por, shoku Froll Kozllov, ti ke gabuar adresė, ti nuk na frikėson dot ne, qė t‘i pėrulemi vullnetit tėnd tė gabuar dhe ne s‘e ngatėrrojmė kurrė Partinė e lavdishme tė Leninit me ju, qė silleni kaq keq dhe kaq paturpėsisht me popullin shqiptar dhe me Partinė e Punės tė Shqipėrisė. Partia e Punės e Shqipėrisė do tė luftojė dhe do t‘i mbėshtetė tė gjitha propozimet e drejta dhe paqėsore tė Bashkimit Sovjetik dhe tė vendeve tė tjera tė kampit tė socializmit, si dhe tė vendeve tė tjera paqedashėse. Partia e Punės e Shqipėrisė do tė vėrė tė gjitha forcat, do t‘i pėrdorė tė gjitha tė drejtat dhe do t‘i kryejė tė gjitha detyrat e saj pėr forcimin e unitetit tė kampit tė socializmit, tė njė uniteti marksist-leninist. Ėshtė absurde tė mendohet qė Shqipėria e vogėl socialiste kėrkon tė shkėputet dhe tė rrojė jashtė kampit tė socializmit, jashtė vėllazėrisė sė popujve tanė socialistė. Qenien nė gjirin e kampit tė socializmit s‘ia ka falur njeri Shqipėrisė, por atė e kanė vendosur vetė populli ynė dhe Partia e Punės e Shqipėrisė me gjak, me pune, me sakrifica, me djersė, me sistemin e qeverimit qė kanė vendosur dhe me rrugėn marksiste-leniniste qė ndjekim. Por askujt gjithashtu tė mos i shkojė ndėr mend se, meqė Shqipėria ėshtė e vogėl, meqė Partia e Punės e Shqipėrisė ėshtė e vogėl, duhet tė bėjė ashtu si thotė ndokush, kur ajo ėshtė e bindur se ai ndokushi gabohet.

    Sikundėr u shpreha edhe mė lart, Partia e Punės e Shqipėrisė mendon se kampi ynė i socializmit, qė ka njė qėllim, qė udhėhiqet nga marksizėm-leninizmi, duhet tė ketė edhe strategjinė e taktikėn e vet dhe kėto tė pėrpunohen sė bashku nga partitė dhe nga shtetet tona tė kampit tė socializmit. Nė gjirin e kampit tonė ne kemi krijuar disa forma organizimi pune, por ėshtė e drejtė tė themi se kėto kanė mbetur disi formale ose, mė mirė me thėnė, nuk funksionojnė nė mėnyrė kolegjiale, si pėr shembull organet e Traktatit tė Varshavės dhe Kėshilli i Ndihmės Ekonomike Reciproke. Tė kuptohemi. Kėtu s‘e kemi ēėshtjen tė pyetemi ose jo edhe ne. Natyrisht, asnjėri nuk na e mohon tė drejtėn tė pyetemi, por duhet tė mblidhemi qė tė pyetemi. Ēėshtjen e ngremė nė parim dhe themi se kėto forma organizimi duhet tė funksionojnė rregullisht, atje tė shtrohen problemet, tė merren vendime dhe tė kontrollohet zbatimi i kėtyre vendimeve.

    Zhvillimi dhe fuqizimi i mėtejshėm i ekonomisė sė vendeve tė socializmit kanė qenė dhe janė kurdoherė nė planin e parė tė partive dhe tė qeverive tona dhe pėrbėjnė njė nga faktorėt vendimtarė tė forcės se pamposhtur tė kampit tė socializmit.

    Ndėrtimi i socializmit dhe i komunizmit po ecėn me hapa tė vrullshėm nė vendet tona. Kjo u detyrohet pėrpjekjeve tė mėdha tė popujve tanė dhe ndihmės qė i jepet shoku-shokut.
    Republika Popullore e Shqipėrisė s‘i ka dhėnė ndihmė ekonomike njeriu deri tani, e para, se jemi tė varfėr dhe, e dyta, se s‘ka njeri nevojė pėr ndihmėn tonė ekonomike. Por brenda normave tė drejta ne kemi bėrė dhe bėjmė tė gjitha pėrpjekjet qė me eksportin tonė tė ndihmojmė, sado pak, vendet miq dhe vėllezėr. Ne jemi ndihmuar nga miqtė tanė dhe nė radhė tė parė nga Bashkimi Sovjetik...

    Kėtė ndihmė tė Bashkimit Sovjetik dhe tė vendeve tė tjera tė demokracisė popullore, Partia e Punės e Shqipėrisė dhe Qeveria e Republikės Popullore tė Shqipėrisė e kanė shfrytėzuar sa mė mirė nė interes te popullit. Pėr kėtė ndihmė populli ynė u ėshtė pėrjetė mirėnjohės popujve sovjetikė dhe popujve tė vendeve tė demokracisė popullore. Nė kėtė ndihmė e kemi kuptuar, e kuptojmė dhe do ta kuptojmė jo sikur na ėshtė dhėnė si lėmoshė, por si ndihmė vėllazėrore, si ndihmė internacionaliste.

    Populli ynė, si njė popull qė ka qenė i varfėr nė kulm, si njė popull qė luftoi me heroizėm, si njė popull qė u vra e u dogj, e kishte pėr detyrė t‘u kėrkonte ndihmė miqve dhe vėllezėrve me tė mėdhenj e mė tė pasur ekonomikisht se ai. Edhe miqtė e kishin dhe e kanė pėr detyrė internacionaliste ta japin kėtė ndihmė. Prandaj duhet hedhur poshtė ēdo pikėpamje e errėt dhe antimarksiste qė mund tė shfaqet nė lidhje me karakterin dhe me qėllimin e kėsaj ndihme nga ndokush. Presionet ekonomike mbi Partinė e Punės tė Shqipėrisė, mbi Qeverinė Shqiptare dhe mbi popullin tonė s‘do tė kenė kurrė sukses.

    Unė dėshiroj tė shtroj kėtu ēėshtjen qė ndihmat nga vendet ekonomikisht mė tė forta pėr vendet mė tė dobėta ekonomikisht, sikurse ėshtė rasti i vendit tonė, duhet tė jenė mė tė mėdha. Populli shqiptar nuk mendon aspak qė tė lidhe duart dhe tė hapė gojėn ta ushqejnė tė tjerėt. Ky s‘ėshtė zakoni i tij. Populli ynė, gjithashtu, nuk ka ato pretendime qė niveli i jetesės nė vendin tonė tė ngrihet menjėherė nė nivelin e jetesės sė shumė prej vendeve tė demokracisė popullore, por njė ndihmė mė e madhe duhet t‘i jepet vendit tonė pėr zhvillimin e mėtejshėm tė forcave prodhuese. Ne mendojmė se vendet ekonomikisht tė forta tė kampit tė socializmit duhet t‘u japin kredi edhe vendeve kapitaliste asnjanėse, edhe popujve tė porsaēliruar nga kolonializmi, kur udhėheqjet e kėtyre vendeve kapitaliste janė kundėr imperializmit, mbėshtetin politikėn paqėsore tė kampit tė socializmit dhe nuk pengojnė e nuk kundėrshtojnė luftėn legjitime tė forcave revolucionare, por nė radhė tė parė duhet tė shikohen mė me kujdes dhe tė plotėsohen nevojat e vendeve tė kampit tė socializmit. Sigurisht ka nevojė India pėr hekur dhe pėr ēelik, por ka nevojė mė shumė dhe mė pėrpara Shqipėria socialiste, ka nevojė pėr ujitje dhe pėr energji elektrike Egjipti, por ka nevojė mė shumė dhe mė pėrpara Shqipėria socialiste.

    Nė shumė probleme politike tė dorės sė parė kampi ynė i socializmit ka pasur dhe ka pikėpamje tė njėjta. Por, duke mos i bėrė nė rregull konsultimet kolegjiale, mjaft herė ėshtė vėnė re se shtete tė kampit tonė tė socializmit marrin iniciativa politike (nė parim ne s‘jemi kundėr marrjes sė iniciativave), tė cilat shumė herė prekin edhe shtete tė tjera tė kampit tė socializmit. Disa nga kėto iniciativa nuk janė tė drejta dhe kjo ndodh, sidomos, kur kėto nuk merren nė formė kolegjiale nga pjesėtarėt e Traktatit tė Varshavės.

    E tillė ėshtė iniciativa e qeverisė bullgare, e cila i njoftoi qeverisė greke, pa e pėrfillur aspak Shqipėrinė, se vendet e demokracisė popullore tė Ballkanit pranojnė tė ēarmatosen nė rast se vepron po kėshtu edhe qeveria greke. Kjo iniciativė ka qenė e gabuar pėr pikėpamjen tonė, sepse, edhe sikur ta pranonte Greqia njė propozim tė tillė, atė nuk do ta pranonte Qeveria Shqiptare.

    Shqipėria ėshtė dakord me propozimin sovjetik qė bėri Nikita Hrushovi nė muajin maj 1959, por jo me propozimin bullgar qė dėshiron tė ēarmatosė vendet e Ballkanit, duke lėnė pa prekur Italinė. Apo harruan shokėt bullgarė se Italia borgjeze dhe fashiste e ka sulmuar disa herė gjatė kėtij shekulli Shqipėrinė?

    A mund t‘u lejohet shokėve bullgarė rasti tjetėr, qė, duke mos u konsultuar aspak me Qeverinė Shqiptare, me tė cilėn ata janė tė lidhur me njė traktat mbrojtjeje, t‘i propozojnė qeverisė greke njė traktat miqėsie dhe mossulmimi, nė njė kohė kur Greqia mban me Shqipėrinė gjendjen e luftės dhe ka pretendime territoriale mbi atdheun tonė? Tė tilla veprime neve na duket se janė tė rrezikshme tė merren nė mėnyrė tė njėanshme.

    Nga kėto kundėrshtime tė drejta dhe legjitime tonat mundet qė shokėt bullgarė tė kenė arritur nė konkluzionet se gjoja ne shqiptarėt nuk kuptojmė mirė bashkekzistencėn, duam luftėn etj. Kėto pikėpamje janė tė gabuara.

    Veprime tė tilla janė shfaqur gjithashtu nga shokėt polakė nė Kombet e Bashkuara, ku shoku Gomulka deklaroi nė mėnyrė tė njėanshme pėrpara Asamblesė sė Pėrgjithshme tė Kombeve tė Bashkuara se Polonia propozon "tė ruhet statukuoja aktuale e vendosjes sė forcave ushtarake nė botė dhe konkretisht tė mos krijohen mė baza ushtarake, po tė qėndrojnė kėto qė janė, tė mos vihen mė raketa, por tė qėndrojnė kėto qė janė, tė ruajnė sekretin e bombės atomike ato shtete qė e kanė dhe tė mos ua japin atė shteteve tė tjera". Njė propozim i tillė, sipas mendimit tonė, ėshtė nė kundėrshtim me interesat e kampit tonė. Tė mos vihen mė raketa, po kush e ku? Tė gjithė anėtarėt e NATO-s, duke pėrfshirė edhe Italinė, Gjermaninė Perėndimore e Greqinė, janė pajisur me raketa. Tė mos i jepet sekreti i bombės atomike, kujt? Atė e ka Anglia, e ka Franca e ka edhe Gjermania Perėndimore. Ėshtė e qartė se njė propozim i tillė do tė na detyrojė ne, vendet e demokracisė popullore, tė mos vendosim raketa, ose ndonjė vend tjetėr i kampit socialist, veē Bashkimit Sovjetik, tė mos e ketė bombėn atomike.


    Ndrrimi i kursit : Afria me Kinėzėt

    Ne shtrojmė ēėshtjen, pėrse Kina komuniste tė mos e ketė bombėn atomike? Ne mendojmė se ajo duhet ta ketė dhe, kur edhe Kina t‘i ketė bombėn dhe raketat, atėherė do tė shohim se me ēfarė gjuhe do tė flasė imperializmi amerikan, do tė shohim se a do tė vazhdohet t‘i mohohen tė drejtat Kinės nė arenėn ndėrkombėtare, do tė shohim se a do tė guxojnė imperialistėt amerikanė tė vringėllojnė armėt siē bėjnė sot. Pse, duke e pasur bombėn dhe duke e hedhur bombėn do t‘i fitojė kėto tė drejta Kina mbi Shtetet e Bashkuara tė Amerikės, mund tė na pyesė ndokush? Jo, Kina, nuk e hedh bombėn kurrė, nė rast se nuk sulmohemi nga ata qė e kanė nė gjak agresionin dhe luftėn. Po tė mos e kishte Bashkimi Sovjetik bombėn, imperializmi do tė fjalosej ndryshe me tė. Me bomba nė kurrė nuk do tė sulmojmė, ne jemi kundėr luftės, ne jemi gati t‘i shkatėrrojmė ato, por bombėn ne duhet ta kemi pėr t‘u mbrojtur. Frika i ruan vreshtat, thotė populli ynė. Imperialistėt duhet tė na e kenė frikėn dhe, bile, tė na e kenė shumė. Partia e Punės e Shqipėrisė, e mbėshtetur nė marksizėm-leninizmin dhe nė Deklaratėn e nė Manifestin e Paqes tė Moskės, nė ēėshtjet e politikės ndėrkombėtare dhe nė problemet e rėndėsishme tė ndėrtimit tė socializmit ka ndjekur njė vijė tė drejtė marksiste-leniniste. Nė marrėdhėniet ndėrkombėtare vija e Partisė sonė ka qenė nė pėrputhje me politikėn e kampit tė socializmit. . .


    Enver Hoxha dhe Mao Ce Dung

    Problemet e mėdha tė kohės e kanė preokupuar edhe Partinė e Punės tė Shqipėrisė, edhe popullin tonė tė vogėl. Republika jonė Popullore ka qenė dhe ėshtė e rrethuar gjeografikisht nga shtete kapitaliste dhe nga revizionistėt jugosllavė; neve na ėshtė dashur tė jemi shumė vigjilentė, tė gozhdojmė njerėz dhe fonde tė konsiderueshme pėr mbrojtjen e kufijve tanė, pėr mbrojtjen e lirisė dhe tė pavarėsisė sė atdheut nga tentativat e panumėrta tė imperialisteve dhe tė satelitėve, shėrbėtorė tė tyre.

    Ne jemi njė vend i vogėl dhe njė popull i vogėl, qė kemi vuajtur jashtėzakonisht shumė, por qė kemi luftuar gjithashtu shumė. Lirinė qė kemi sot s‘na e ka falur kurrkush, por e kemi fituar me gjak. I kemi njohur dhe vazhdojmė t‘i njohim ēdo ditė armiqtė imperialistė, manovrat e tyre kundėr kampit tė socializmit dhe kundėr vendit tonė nė veēanti, prandaj asnjė iluzion s‘kemi pasur dhe as do tė kemi se ata do tė ndėrrojnė natyrėn dhe qėllimet kundėr popujve, kundėr kampit tonė dhe kundėr Shqipėrisė socialiste nė veēanti. . .


    Imperialistėt amerikanė dhe anglezė na kanė akuzuar dhe na akuzojnė ne, shqiptarėt, pėr "tė egėr dhe luftėdashės". Kjo ėshtė e kuptueshme, pse populli shqiptar u ka rėnė duarve dhe turinjve tentativave tė tyre tė shumta pėr tė na robėruar dhe u ka prerė kokėn agjentėve tė tyre, qė komplotonin kundėr Partisė sė Punės tė Shqipėrisė dhe regjimit tonė tė demokracisė popullore. . .

    As ėshtė e rastit, na duket neve, tė vėrtetojmė kėtu, nė kėtė mbledhje, qė lufta ėshtė e huaj pėr vendet socialiste, pėr partitė tona marksiste-leniniste, por ēėshtja qėndron nė atė: pse imperialistėt dhe agjentėt e tyre akuzojnė Kinėn dhe Shqipėrinė pėr luftėdashėse dhe kundėr bashkekzistencės paqėsore?

    Tė marrim ēėshtjen e Shqipėrisė. Kundėr kujt do tė bėjė luftė Shqipėria dhe pėrse? Do tė jetė qesharake tė rrimė dhe t‘i pėrgjigjemi kėsaj pyetjeje. Por atyre qė na akuzojnė ne pėr kėtė, u duhet tė mbulojnė qėllimet e tyre agresive ndaj Shqipėrisė.

    Rankoviēi dėshiron qė ne t‘i bėjmė kufijtė tanė han me dy porta, ku tė hyjnė e tė dalin "pa vizė" agjentė dhe armė jugosllave, italiane dhe greke, pėr tė na sjellė "kulturėn e tyre tė thikės nė dhėmbė", pėr tė realizuar Titoja ėndrrėn e tij qė Shqipėria tė bėhet republikė e shtatė e Jugosllavisė, ose borgjezia reaksionare italiane tė vėrė nė zbatim pėr tė tretėn herė qėllimet e saj grabitqare kundėr Shqipėrisė, ose monarko-fashistet grekė tė realizojnė ėndrrėn e tyre tė ēmendur pėr grabitjen e Shqipėrisė sė Jugut. Pse ne s‘i kemi lejuar dhe s‘do t‘i lejojmė kurrė kėta, prandaj jemi "luftėnxitės"? Ata e dinė farė mirė qė nė rast se i prekin kufijtė tanė, atėherė do tė kenė luftė me ne dhe me gjithė kampin e socializmit.

    Qėllimi i tyre, pra, ka qenė dhe ėshtė tė na izolojnė nga kampi dhe nga miqtė, tė na akuzojnė si "luftėnxitės dhe tė egėr", pse ne nuk u hapim kufijtė tanė tė livadhisin lirisht, tė na akuzojnė qė ne s‘jemi pėr bashkekzistencėn. Por, pėr ironi tė fatit, ka shokė qė e besojnė kėtė lodėr tė revizionistėve dhe kėto shpifje kundėr Partisė sė Punės tė Shqipėrisė. Natyrisht, ne jemi kundėr njė bashkekzistence tė atillė, pėr hir tė sė cilės ne, shqiptarėt, duhet t‘i bejme koncesione territoriale dhe politike Sofokli Venizellosit. Jo, ato kohėra, kur tokat e Shqipėrisė bėheshin monedhė tregu, kane vdekur pėrgjithmonė. Ne jemi kundėr njė bashkekzistence tė atillė me shtetin jugosllav, qė ve si konditė shuarjen e luftės ideologjike e politike kundėr revizionisteve jugosllave, kėtyre agjentėve tė imperializmit ndėrkombėtar, kėtyre tradhtarėve tė marksizėm-leninizmit. Ne jemi kundėr njė bashkekzistence tė atillė me anglezėt apo amerikanėt, pėr hir tė sė cilės ne duhet t‘u njohim, siē kėrkojnė, koncesionet e vjetra politike, diplomatike e tregtare qė u kishte akorduar atyre regjimi i mbretit Zog.

    Si konkluzion i pėrgjithshėm, Partia e Punės e Shqipėrisė ėshtė plotėsisht e bindur se ēėshtja jonė e madhe, ajo e fitores sė socializmit dhe tė paqes do tė triumfojė. Forcat e bashkuara tė kampit socialist, me Bashkimin Sovjetik nė krye, tė lėvizjes komuniste e punėtore ndėrkombėtare dhe tė tė gjithė njerėzve e popujve paqedashės me aksione tė vendosura kanė mundėsi tė detyrojnė imperialistėt pėr tė pranuar bashkekzistencėn paqėsore e tė shmangin luftėn botėrore. Por, nė tė njėjtėn kohė ne do tė forcojmė gjithnjė e mė shumė vigjilencėn revolucionare, me qėllim qė asnjėherė armiqtė tė mos na kapin nė befasi. Ne jemi tė bindur , se fitorja nė kėtė luftė fisnike pėr paqen nė botė dhe pėr triumfin e socializmit do tė jetė jona. Populli shqiptar dhe Partia e Punės e Shqipėrisė, ashtu si deri tani, nuk do tė kursejnė asgjė pėr tė ndihmuar me tė gjitha forcat e veta triumfin e ēėshtjes sonė tė pėrbashkėt. Ne, si gjithnjė, do tė ecim pėrpara nė unitet tė ēeliktė me tė gjithė kampin socialist, me Bashkimin Sovjetik, me tė gjithė lėvizjen komuniste e punėtore ndėrkombėtare.

    Tė dashur shokė,

    Uniteti i Lėvizjes komuniste e punėtore ndėrkombėtare ėshtė faktori vendimtar pėr realizimin e qėllimeve fisnike tė triumfit tė paqes, tė demokracisė, tė pavarėsisė kombėtare dhe tė socializmit. Kjo ēėshtje theksohet nė mėnyrė tė posaēme si nė Deklaratėn e Moskės tė vitit 1957, ashtu edhe nė projektdeklaratėn qė ėshtė pregatitur pėr mbledhjen tonė. Nė Deklaratėn e vitit 1957 theksohet: “Partitė komuniste e punėtore mbajnė njė pėrgjegjėsi historike veēanėrisht serioze pėr fatet e sistemit socialist botėror dhe tė Lėvizjes komuniste ndėrkombėtare. Partitė komuniste e punėtore, qė marrin pjesė nė mbledhje, deklarojnė se ato do tė forcojnė pa u lodhur unitetin e tyre dhe bashkėpunimin shoqėror, nė interes tė bashkimit tė mėtejshėm tė familjes sė shteteve socialiste, nė interes tė lėvizjes punėtore ndėrkombėtare, tė ēėshtjes sė paqes dhe tė socializmit”.

    Duhet thėnė se, veēanėrisht kohėt e fundit, nė lėvizjen komuniste ndėrkombėtare dhe nė marrėdhėniet midis disa partive kanė lindur mosmarrėveshje tė thella ideologjike e politike, thellimi i tė cilave mund t’i sjellė vetėm dėm ēėshtjes sonė tė madhe. Prandaj Partia e Punės e Shqipėrisė mendon se, qė tė shkojmė pėrpara, tė bashkuar, drejt fitoresh tė reja, duhet tė dėnojmė gabimet dhe shfaqjet negative qė janė vėnė re deri tani dhe t’i ndreqim ato. Kėtu ne duam tė ndalemi nė ēėshtjen e Mbledhjes sė Bukureshtit, nė tė cilėn Partia jonė, siē dihet, nuk shfaqi mendimin e saj pėrsa u pėrket mosmarrėveshjeve qė kanė lindur midis Partisė Komuniste tė Bashkimit Sovjetik dhe Partisė Komuniste tė Kinės, por rezervoi qysh atėherė tė drejtėn ta bėjė njė gjė tė tillė nė kėtė mbledhje tė pėrfaqėsuesve tė partive komuniste e punėtore. Atėherė Partia e Punės e Shqipėrisė u akuzua nga shokėt sovjetike dhe nga disa shokė tė partive tė tjera motra pėr ēdo gjė qė mund tė imagjinohet, por askujt nuk i shkoi ndėr mend qė tė mendonte pėr njė ēast pėrse kjo Parti mbajti njė qėndrim tė tillė kundėr tė gjithė korentit, pse kjo Parti, qė ka qėndruar deri nė fund besnike e marksizėm-leninizmit dhe e Deklaratės sė Moskės, akuzohet papritur se gjoja ėshtė “kundėr marksizėm-leninizmit dhe Deklaratės sė Moskės”, pse kjo Parti, e lidhur kaq ngushtė me Bashkimin Sovjetik- dhe me Partinė Komuniste tė Bashkimit Sovjetik, pėrnjėherė del nė kundėrshtim me udhėheqjen e Bashkimit Sovjetik. Tani qė tė gjithė shokėt kanė nė duar si materialin informativ sovjetik, ashtu edhe materialin e Partisė Komuniste tė Kinės, le tė reflektojnė vetė. Ne kemi lexuar e kemi studiuar si materialin sovjetik, ashtu edhe atė kinez, i kemi diskutuar me aktivin e Partisė me kujdes kėto dokumente dhe vijmė kėshtu nė kėtė mbledhje me pikėpamje unanime tė tė gjithė Partisė. Siē dihet, me 24 qershor tė kėtij viti, me rastin e Kongresit III tė Partisė Punėtore tė Rumanisė, pa pritur dhe pa pasur asnjė paralajmėrim paraprak, tė paktėn pėrsa i pėrket Partisė sonė, me iniciativėn e shokėve tė udhėheqjes sė Partisė Komuniste tė Bashkimit Sovjetik u organizua Mbledhja e Bukureshtit. Nė vend qė ajo, sipas marrėveshjes sė arritur me letrat e datave 2 e 7 qershor, “tė shkėmbente mendime” dhe tė caktonte datėn e kėsaj mbledhjeje qė mbajmė sot, u mor me njė ēėshtje tjetėr, me akuzėn ideologjike e politike drejtuar kundėr Partisė Komuniste tė Kinės, nė bazė tė materialit “informativ sovjetik”. Mbi kėtė material, krejtėsisht tė panjohur deri disa orė pėrpara mbledhjes duhej tė prononcoheshin nė favor tė pikėpamjeve tė Komitetit Qendror tė Partisė Komuniste tė Bashkimit Sovjetik delegatėt e partive komuniste dhe punėtore motra qė ndodheshin nė Bukuresht pėr ēėshtje tjetėr dhe qė s’kishin (tė paktėn delegacioni i Partisė sonė) asnjė mandat nga partitė e tyre pėr tė diskutuar, pa le pėr tė vendosur pėr njė ēėshtje kaq tė rėndėsishme tė komunizmit ndėrkombėtar. As mund tė mendohej pėr njė diskutim serioz tė kėtij materiali qė mbante akuza kaq tė mėdha kundėr njė partie tjetėr marksiste- -leniniste, kur nuk u lejohej delegateve dhe sidomos udhėheqjeve tė partive komuniste dhe punėtore ta studionin atė nga tė gjitha anėt dhe t’i lihej koha e duhur palės sė akuzuar tė parashtronte edhe ajo me kohė dhe nė tė gjitha format qė pėrdor edhe pala akuzuese, pikėpamjet e saj. Fakti ėshtė se udhėheqja sovjetike kishte vetėm si preokupim dominues tė kalonin me shpejtėsi akuzat e saj kundėr Partisė Komuniste tė Kinės dhe tė dėnohej me ēdo kusht Partia Komuniste e Kinės. Ky ishte preokupimi i shokut Hrushov dhe i shokėve tė tjerė sovjetikė nė Bukuresht dhe aspak ēėshtjet e politikės ndėrkombėtare qė preokuponin kampin tonė -dhe tė gjithė botėn nė tėrėsi, tė krijuara pas dėshtimit tė konferencės sė nivelit tė lartė nė Paris. Partia jonė do tė ishte plotėsisht dakord me njė konference ndėrkombėtare tė partive komuniste e punėtore, do tė ishte dakord edhe me ēfarėdo konference tjetėr, me ēfarėdo renddite qė mund tė caktohej, por me kusht qė kėto konferenca tė ishin tė rregullta, tė kishin aprovimin e tė gjitha partive, tė pėrcaktohej qartė dhe mė parė rendi i ditės, t’u jepej partive komuniste dhe punėtore materiali i nevojshėm dhe t’u lihej koha e pėrshtatshme pėr tė studiuar materialet, pėr t’u pėrgatitur dhe pėr tė marrė byrotė politike tė partive, nė qoftė se e lypte nevoja, edhe aprovimin e plenumeve tė komiteteve qendrore pėr vendimet qė eventualisht mund tė merreshin nė kėto konferenca. Konferencat duhet tė zhvillohen, pra, brenda normave leniniste qė rregullojnė marrėdhėniet nė mes partive komuniste dhe punėtore, duhet tė zhvillohen nė barazi tė plotė nė mes partive, nė frymėn shoqėrore komuniste, internacionaliste dhe me moral tė lartė komunist. Mbledhja e Bukureshtit nuk u pėrgjigjej kėtyre normave, prandaj Partia jonė, megjithėse mori pjesė nė tė, e dėnoi dhe e dėnon si tė parregullt kėtė mbledhje, nė tė cilėn u thyen normat leniniste. Ne mendojmė se Mbledhja e Bukureshtit i shėrbeu shumė keq ēėshtjes sė lėvizjes komuniste ndėrkombėtare, ēėshtjes sė solidaritetit ndėrkombėtar tė punonjėsve, ēėshtjes sė forcimit tė unitetit tė kampit tė socializmit, ēėshtjes sė shembullit marksist-leninist tė zgjidhjes sė mosmarrėveshjeve ideologjike, politike dhe organizative, qė mund tė ngjasin nė gjirin e partive komuniste dhe punėtore dhe qė dėmtojnė marksizėm--leninizmin. Faji pėr kėtė u bie shokėve tė udhėheqjes sė Partisė Komuniste tė Bashkimit Sovjetik, qė e organizuan kėtė mbledhje, qė e konceptuan nė kėto forma dhe qė zbatuan kėto norma jomarksiste pėr kėtė ēėshtje. Qėllimi ka qenė tė dėnohej Partia Komuniste e Kinės nga lėvizja komuniste ndėrkombėtare pėr gabime dhe faje tė paqena dhe pa baza. Kjo ėshtė bindja e plotė e Komitetit Qendror tė Partisė sė Punės tė Shqipėrisė, nė bazė tė studimit tė fakteve, nė bazė tė materialit sovjetik dhe tė atij kinez, qė Partia e Punės e Shqipėrisė disponon tani, nė bazė tė njė analize tė hollėsishme qė Partia e Punės e Shqipėrisė u ka bėrė zhvillimit tė situatės ndėrkombėtare dhe qėndrimeve zyrtare tė Partisė Komuniste tė Bashkimit Sovjetik dhe tė Partisė Komuniste tė Kinės. E gjithė Partia e Punės e Shqipėrisė mendon njėzėri se shokėt sovjetikė kanė gabuar rėndė nė Bukuresht, ata kanė dėnuar padrejtėsisht Partinė Komuniste tė Kinės se gjoja ajo ka devijuar nga marksizėmle-ninizmi, se gjoja ka shkelur dhe ka braktisur Deklaratėn e Moskės tė vitit 1957, ata e kanė akuzuar Partinė Komuniste tė Kinės si “dogmatike”, “sektare”, se ėshtė “pėr luftėn”, se ėshtė “kundėr bashkėkzistencės paqėsore”, se “do vend tė privilegjuar nė kamp dhe nė lėvizjen komuniste ndėrkombėtare” etj. Shokėt sovjetikė kanė gabuar rėndė gjithashtu edhe nė drejtimin qė, duke pėrfituar nga dashuria dhe besimi i madh qė kanė komunistėt pėr Bashkimin Sovjetik dhe pėr Partinė Komuniste tė Bashkimit Sovjetik, u pėrpoqėn t’ua impononin edhe partive tė tjera komuniste dhe punėtore pikėpamjet e tyre jo tė drejta ndaj Partisė Komuniste tė Kinės. Pėr Partinė e Punės tė Shqipėrisė ka qenė e qartė qė nė momentet e para, qė kur filloi pėrpunimi i ethshėm dhe i palejueshėm nga ana e shokėve sovjetikė ndaj shokėve tė delegacionit tonė nė Bukuresht, se shokėt sovjetikė dėshironin me argumentime tė pabaza e me presion ta tėrhiqnin delegacionin e Partisė sė Punės tė Shqipėrisė nė kurthin qė pregatitnin, ta radhitnin atė nė pikėpamjet e shtrembra tė shokėve sovjetikė.


    S’ka as mė tė voglin dyshim qė mosmarrėveshjet ideologjike kanė qenė dhe janė tė mėdha dhe kėto kanė lindur e janė zhvilluar nė mes Partisė Komuniste tė Bashkimit Sovjetik dhe partisė Komuniste tė Kinės. Kėto duhej tė ishin zgjidhur nė kohė dhe nė rrugėn marksiste-leniniste nė mes tė dy partive. Nė bazė tė dokumentit kinez, Partia Komuniste e Kinės thotė se kėto mosmarrėveshje parimore kanė lindur fill qė pas Kongresit XX tė Partisė Komuniste tė Bashkimit Sovjetik dhe kėto janė ngritur nga shokėt kinezė. Disa janė marrė parasysh nga shokėt sovjetikė, disa janė hedhur poshtė. Partia e Punės e Shqipėrisė mendon se pėr kėto mosmarrėveshje, nė rast se nuk zgjidheshin nė mes tė dy partive, duhej kėrkuar organizimi i njė mbledhjeje tė partive komuniste dhe punėtore, ku tė shtroheshin kėto ēėshtje, tė diskutoheshin dhe tė mbahej qėndrim. S’ėshtė e drejtė qė kėto ēėshtje u lanė dhe faji u bie shokėve sovjetike, qė i dinin kėto mosmarrėveshje, qė s’i pėrfillnin, pse ata ishin tė bindur nė vijėn e tyre dhe nė “paprekshmėrinė” e saj dhe kjo ėshtė pikėpamje idealiste dhe metafizike, mendojmė ne.

    Nė rast se shokėt sovjetikė ishin tė bindur pėr drejtėsinė e vijės sė tyre dhe tė taktikės sė tyre, pėrse nuk organizuan me kohė njė mbledhje tė tillė dhe tė zgjidheshin kėto mosmarrėveshje? A ishin tė vogla ēėshtjet qė ngriheshin, si pėr shembull dėnimi i J. V. Stalinit, ēėshtja e madhe e kundėrrevolucionit hungarez, ēėshtja e formave tė marrjes sė pushtetit, pėr tė mos folur pėr shumė ēėshtje tė tjera shumė tė rėndėsishme siē dolėn mė vonė? Jo! S’ishin aspak tė vogla. Tė gjithė kemi pikėpamjet tona pėr kėto probleme, pse tė gjithėve si komunistė na interesojnė, pse tė gjitha partitė tona janė pėrgjegjėse pėrpara popujve tė tyre, por janė pėrgjegjėse edhe pėrpara komunizmit ndėrkombėtar.

    Pėr tė dėnuar Partinė Komuniste tė Kinės pėr faje dhe mėkate imagjinare, shoku Hrushov dhe udhėheqėsit e tjerė sovjetikė ishin shumė tė interesuar qė ēėshtjet tė shtroheshin sikur mosmarrėveshjet ishin nė mes tė Kinės dhe tė gjithė komunizmit ndėrkombėtar, por ēėshtjet si ato qė pėrmendėm mė lart i ka gjykuar dhe i ka vendosur vetėm shoku Hrushov e shokėt e tij pėrreth, duke menduar se s’ka qenė nevoja tė diskutoheshin nė mėnyrė kolegjiale nga njė mbledhje e pėrfaqėsuesve tė tė gjitha partive, megjithėse ēėshtjet ishin me karakter tė madh ndėrkombėtar.

    Ngjau kundėrrevolucioni hungarez, por ēėshtjet nuk u zbuluan. Pse kjo taktikė e mbylljes sė gjėrave, kur nuk u intereson shokėve sovjetike, ndėrsa kur u intereson atyre jo vetėm qė organizojnė mbledhje si ajo e Bukureshtit, por bėjnė ēmos qė t’u imponojnė tė tjerėve pikėpamjen se Kina “ėshtė nė kundėrshtim vije me tė gjitha partitė komuniste dhe punėtore tė botės”?

    Njė pėrpjekje tė tillė shokėt sovjetike bėnė edhe ndaj nesh. Nė muajin gusht tė kėtij viti udhėheqja sovjetike i drejtoi njė letėr Partisė sonė, me anėn e sė cilės na propozonte qė “me qėllim qė shkėndija e mosmarrėveshjeve tė mos ndizet” tė takoheshin pėrfaqėsuesit e tė dyja partive tona, nė mėnyrė qė Partia jonė tė radhitej nė anėn e Bashkimit Sovjetik, kundėr Partisė Komuniste tė Kinės, dhe tė dyja partitė tona tė shkonin nė njė front tė bashkuar nė kėtė mbledhje. Natyrisht, Komiteti Qendror i Partisė sonė nuk e pranoi njė gjė tė tillė dhe nė pėrgjigjen e tij zyrtare e konsideroi kėtė si njė punė aspak marksiste, si njė veprim fraksionist tė drejtuar kundėr njė partie tė tretė motėr, kundėr Partisė Komuniste tė Kinės. Sigurisht, ky qėndrim i drejtė parimor i Partisė sonė nuk i ka pėlqyer udhėheqjes sė Partisė Komuniste tė Bashkimit Sovjetik. Qė kėto ēėshtje janė tė njė rėndėsie tė dorės sė parė, kjo s’ka dyshim; qė kėto na interesojnė shumė tė gjithėve, kjo s’ka dyshim, por s’ka aspak dyshim, gjithashtu, pėr Partinė e Punės tė Shqipėrisė qė ēėshtjet si u shtruan nė Bukuresht kundėr Kinės ishin tendencioze dhe kishin pėr qėllim tė dėnonin dhe tė veēonin Partinė Komuniste tė Kinės nga gjithė lėvizja komuniste ndėrkombėtare. Kjo pėr Partinė e Punės tė Shqipėrisė ishte e tmerrshme dhe e papranueshme, jo vetėm se ajo nuk ishte e bindur pėr njė gjė tė tillė, por dyshoi me tė drejtė se po organizohej njė veprim jo nė rrugėn marksiste kundėr njė partie motėr tė madhe e tė lavdishme, siē ėshtė Partia Komuniste e Kinės, se po organizohej nėn petkun e akuzės pėr dogmatizėm kundėr Kinės njė sulm kundėr marksizėm-leninizmit. Nė mbledhje u akuzua Partia Komuniste e Kinės pėr shumė faje. Kjo duhej tė pasqyrohej nė komunikatė. Pse s’u bė? Nė qoftė se akuzat ishin me baza, pse u hezitua dhe doli njė komunikatė qė s’i pėrgjigjej qėllimit tė mbledhjes? Pse nuk u fol atje pėr “rrezikun e madh tė dogmatizmit” qė kėrcėnonte gjoja komunizmin ndėrkombėtar?

    Jo, shokė, Mbledhja e Bukureshtit nuk mund tė mbrohet, ajo s’ishte parimore, ajo ishte tendencioze pėr tė arritur disa qėllime dhe qėllimi kryesor ishte, sipas mendimit tė Partisė sė Punės tė Shqipėrisė, qė, duke u akuzuar Partia Komuniste e Kinės pėr dogmatizėm, tė mbuloheshin disa gabime tė rėnda nė vijė, qė i kanė lejuar vetes, shokėt udhėheqės sovjetikė. Shokėt sovjetikė kishin nevojė pėr pėrkrahjen e partive tė tjera pėr kėtė ēėshtje, prandaj tentuan hapur pėr t’i zėnė ato nė befasi. Shokėt sovjetikė ia arritėn njė gjysmė qėllimi dhe fituan tė drejtėn tė shtronin nė partitė e tyre dėnimin e Kinės, si fryt i njė “konference ndėrkombėtare tė komunizmit”. Ne partitė komuniste dhe punėtore, me pėrjashtim tė Partisė sė Punės tė Shqipėrisė dhe tė disa partive komuniste e punėtore tė tjera, u shtruan “gabimet e rėnda nė vijė tė bėra nga ana e Partisė Komuniste tė Kinės”, u raportua dėnimi “unanim” qė u muar kundėr Kinės nė Bukuresht, u luftua pėr tė krijuar opinionin nė parti dhe nė popull nė kėtė drejtim. Nė disa nga kėto mbledhje partie u dėnua gjithashtu edhe Partia e Punės e Shqipėrisė. Komiteti Qendror i Partisė sė Punės tė Shqipėrisė vendosi, dhe vendosi drejt, qė, pas Mbledhjes sė Bukureshtit, nė Parti tė punonte vetėm komunikatėn, t’i thoshte Partisė sė tij se ekzistojne divergjenca parimore nė mes Partisė Komuniste tė Bashkimit Sovjetik dhe Partisė Komuniste tė Kinės, tė cilat duhet tė shtrohen dhe tė zgjidhen nė mbledhjen e ardhshme qe do tė bėhet nė nėntor nė Moskė. Dhe kėshtu u bė. Por ky qėndrim i Partisė sonė nuk u pėlqeu shokėve tė udhėheqjes sė Partisė Komuniste tė Bashkimit Sovjetik dhe kėtė ne shumė shpejt filluam ta ndiejmė. Fill pas Bukureshtit, kundėr Partisė sonė dhe Komitetit tė saj Qendror filloi njė sulm i papritur, joparimor, njė ndėrhyrje brutale dhe presion i gjithanshėm. Sulmin e filloi shoku Hrushov nė Bukuresht dhe e vazhdoi shoku Kozllov nė Moske. Shokėt e Byrosė Politike, qė rastėsisht kalonin nėpėr Moskė, iu nėnshtruan njė pėrpunimi, me qėllim qė tė viheshin kundėr udhėheqjes sė Partisė sonė, duke ua shtruar ēėshtjen se “udhėheqja e Partisė sė Punės tė Shqipėrisė tradhtoi miqėsinė me Bashkimin Sovjetik”, se “vija qė ndjek udhėheqja e Partisė sė Punės tė Shqipėrisė karakterizohet nga “zigzage”, se “Shqipėria duhet tė vendosė qė tė shkojė ose me 200 milionėt (pra me Bashkimin Sovjetik) ose me 650 milionėt (pra me Kinėn Popullore)” dhe, mė nė fund, se “e vetmuar Shqipėria ėshtė nė rrezik, se mjafton njė bombė atomike tė hidhet nga amerikanėt dhe e shuan fare Shqipėrinė dhe gjithė popullsinė e saj” e tė tjera kėrcėnime tė tilla. Ėshtė fare e qartė se qėllimi ka qenė qė tė krijohej pėrēarje nė udhėheqjen e Partisė sonė, tė eleminoheshin nga udhėheqja e partisė sė Punės tė Shqipėrisė ata elementė qė udhėheqėsit sovjetikė mendonin se i pengonin nė ndėrmarrjen e tyre tė shtrembėr e jo tė ndershme. Rezultat i kėsaj pune pėrēarėse ishte kapitullimi i Liri Belishovės, ish-anėtare e Byrosė Politike tė Komitetit Qendror tė Partisė sė Punės tė Shqipėrisė, pėrpara lajkave tė udhėheqėsve sovjetikė, pėrpara shantazheve e frikėsimeve, dhe vėnia e saj nė opozicion tė hapur me vijėn e Partisė.

    Pėrpjekja qė bėjnė shokėt sovjetikė nė letrėn qė i drejtojnė Komitetit Qendror tė Partisė Komuniste tė Kinės pėr ta paraqitur kėtė ēėshtje sikur nė Shqipėri po dėnohen miqtė e Bashkimit Sovjetik, ėshtė false. Miq pėrjetė tė popujve sovjetikė janė tė njėmilion e gjysmė shqiptarėt dhe Partia e Punės e Shqipėrisė, qė e kanė farkėtuar dhe e kanė ēelikosur kėtė miqėsi tė kalitur me gjak, dhe jo kapitullantėt, pėrēarėsit dhe deviatorėt e ndryshėm.

    Por pėrpjekjet pėr tė ngjallur dyshime nė qėndrimin e drejtė tė Partisė sonė nė Bukuresht nuk u kufizuan vetėm nė Moskė. Ato u bėnė, bile me zjarr tė madh, edhe nė Tiranė nga punonjės tė ambasadės sovjetike me nė krye vetė ambasadorin sovjetik nė Tiranė.


    Partia e Punės e Shqipėrisė ka qenė kurdoherė e mendimit dhe ėshtė e bindur se grupi i Titos ėshtė tradhtar i marksizėm-leninizmit, agjenturė e imperializmit, armik i rrezikshėm i kampit socialist dhe i gjithė lėvizjes komuniste e punėtore ndėrkombėtare, prandaj kundėr tij duhet zhvilluar njė luftė e pamėshirshme. Nga ana jonė, ne e kemi bėrė dhe e bėjmė kėtė luftė si komunistė internacionalistė dhe sepse ne e kemi ndjerė dhe e ndiejmė pėrditė mbi kurrizin tonė peshėn e veprimtarisė armiqėsore tė klikės revizioniste tė Titos kundėr Partisė dhe vendit tonė. Por ky qėndrim i Partisė sonė nuk u ka pėlqyer dhe as u pėlqen shokut Hrushov dhe disa shokėve tė tjerė.

    Grupi titist ėshtė njė grup trockistėsh dhe renegatėsh prej shumė kohėsh. Tė paktėn pėr Partinė e Punės tė Shqipėrisė ai ėshtė i tillė qė prej vitit 1942, domethėnė 18 vjet mė parė. Qė nė atė kohė grupi titist pėrpiqej tė vinte themelet e Federatės Ballkanike, nėn drejtimin e titistėve tė Beogradit, tė lidhte partitė komuniste pas qerres sė Partisė Komuniste Jugosllave, tė bėnte qė ushtritė partizane tė popujve tė Ballkanit tė ishin nėn vartėsinė e shtabit titist jugosllav. Pėr kėtė qėllim ai, dakord qė nė atė kohė me anglezet, u pėrpoq tė krijonte shtabin ballkanik dhe ta lidhte e ta vinte atė, domethėnė ushtritė tona, nėn drejtimin e anglo-amerikanėve. Partia jonė u rezistoi me sukses kėtyre planeve djallėzore. Dhe kur valoi Flamuri i Ēlirimit nė Tiranė, banda titiste e Beogradit u dha urdhėr agjentėve tė saj nė Shqipėri tė diskreditonin suksesin e Partisė Komuniste Shqiptare dhe tė organizonin puēin pėr tė rrėzuar udhėheqjen e Partisė, atė qė organizoi Partinė, qė udhėhoqi Luftėn Nacionalēlirimtare dhe qė e ēoi popullin shqiptar nė fitore. Dhe puēi i parė u organizua nga Titoja, tok me agjentėt e tij tė fshehtė nė Partinė tonė. Por komplotin e Titos e shkatėrroi Partia Komuniste Shqiptare. Komplotistėt e Beogradit s‘i hodhėn armėt dhe tok me kryeagjentin e tyre nė Partinė tonė, tradhtarin Koēi Xoxe, vazhduan riorganizimin e komplotit kundėr Shqipėrisė sė re me forma tė tjera, me forma tė reja. Qėllimi ishte: Shqipėria tė bėhej republikė e shtatė e Jugosllavisė.

    Nė njė kohė kur vendi ishte i shkatėrruar dhe i djegur e duhej rindėrtuar nga e para, kur populli ishte pa bukė e pa strehė, por me njė moral tė lartė, kur popull e ushtri me armė nė dorė bėnin roje vigjilente kundėr komploteve tė reaksionit qė organizoheshin nga misionet anglo-amerikane dhe qė e kėrcėnonin Shqipėrinė e re me invazione tė reja, kur njė pjesė e madhe e Ushtrisė Partizane Shqiptare kapėrceu kufirin e atdheut dhe u vajti nė ndihmė vėllezėrve jugosllavė, luftonte krah pėr krah me ta, komplotistėt e Beogradit kurdisnin plane pėr tė robėruar Shqipėrinė.

    Por Partia jonė u bėri ballė heroikisht kėtyre agjentėve tė fshehur nėn maskėn e komunistit. Kur panė trockistėt e Beogradit se e humbėn davanė, se komplotet po ua shkatėrronte Partia jonė, provuan kartėn e fundit: Tė invadonin Shqipėrinė me ushtritė e tyre, tė mbytnin rezistencėn, tė arrestonin udhėheqėsit e Partisė sė Punės tė Shqipėrisė dhe tė shtetit shqiptar, dhe ta deklaronin Shqipėrinė republikė tė shtatė tė tyre. Partia e prishi edhe kėtė plan djallėzor tė tyre. Ndihma dhe ndėrhyrja e J.V. Stalinit nė ato ēaste qe vendimtare pėr Partinė tonė dhe pėr lirinė e popullit shqiptar. Ishte tamam koha e demaskimit tė klikės sė Titos nga Informbyroja. Byroja Informative bėri tė dėshtojnė veprimet komplotiste tė klikės sė Titos jo vetėm nė Shqipėri, por edhe nė vendet e tjera tė demokracisė popullore. Renegati dhe agjenti i imperializmit, Titoja dhe banda e tij, duke vepruar nėn maskėn e komunistėve, u pėrpoqėn tė shkėputnin vendet e demokracisė popullore tė Ballkanit dhe tė Evropės Qendrore nga miqėsia dhe nga aleanca e luftės me Bashkimin Sovjetik, tė shkatėrronin partitė komuniste dhe punėtore tė vendeve tona dhe t‘i shndėrronin shtetet tona nė rezervė tė imperializmit anglo-amerikan.

    Pse, pra, "kthesa" qė u bė nga ana e shokut Hrushov dhe e Komitetit Qendror tė Partisė Komuniste tė Bashkimit Sovjetik mė 1955 ndaj revizionistėve jugosllavė nuk u bė ēėshtje e njė konsultimi tė rregullt me partitė e tjera komuniste e punėtore, por u konceptua e u zbatua nė mėnyrė aq tė shpejtė dhe tė njėanshme? Kjo ishte njė ēėshtje qė na pėrkiste tė tėrėve. Revizionistėt jugosllavė o ishin vėnė nė luftė kundėr marksizėm-leninizmit dhe partive komuniste e punėtore tė botės, o nuk ishin vėnė; o ata kishin gabuar, ose kishim gabuar ne kundrejt tyre dhe jo vetėm Stalini. Kėtė gjė s‘mund ta zgjidhte dhe s‘lejohej ta zgjidhte vetėm me dėshirėn e tij shoku Hrushov. Por ky nė fakt kėshtu bėri dhe kthesėn nė marrėdhėniet me revizionistėt jugosllavė e lidhte me vajtjen e tij nė Beograd. Partisė sė Punės tė Shqipėrisė kjo i ra si bombė e papritur dhe ajo e kundėrshtoi menjėherė kategorikisht.

    Partia e Punės e Shqipėrisė ishte, nga ana tjetėr, dakord qė me Republikėn Federative Popullore tė Jugosllavisė tė vendoste marrėdhėnie shtetėrore tė fqinjėsisė sė mirė, marrėdhėnie tregtare dhe kulturore, nė rast se respektoheshin normat e bashkekzistencės paqėsore nė mes tė shteteve me regjime tė ndryshme, pse pėr Partinė e Punės tė Shqipėrisė Jugosllavia titiste s‘ka qenė, s‘ėshtė dhe s‘do tė jetė kurrė njė vend socialist, derisa tė ketė nė krye grupin renegat dhe agjent tė imperializmit.

    Nė Shqipėri titistėve u hasi sharra nė gozhdė, ose, si thotė Titoja, "Shqipėria iu bė ferrė nė kėmbė" dhe natyrisht grupi tradhtar titist e vazhdoi luftėn kundėr Partisė sė Punės tė Shqipėrisė dhe mendonte se na demaskonte duke na cilėsuar "stalinistė".

    Grupi i Beogradit s‘na luftoi vetėm me propagandė, por ai vazhdoi spiunazhin, diversionin, komplotet, dėrgimin e bandave tė armatosura nė vendin tonė dhe vepronte mė fort se para vitit 1948. Kėto janė tė faktuara.

    Kundrejt Partisė sonė, pėr kėtė qėndrim, janė bėrė shumė presione. Udhėheqja shqiptare konsiderohej si "gjaknxehtė", "kokėfortė", se i ekzagjeronte ēėshtjet me Jugosllavinė, se i nxiste pa tė drejtė jugosllavėt etj. Nė radhė tė parė, nė kėtė drejtim Partia jonė ėshtė sulmuar nga shoku Hrushov. Grupi tradhtar i Beogradit filloi organizimin e kundėrrevolucionit edhe nė Shqipėri . Sikur Partia jonė tė kishte bėrė gabimin e futjes nė "vallen e pajtimit" me revizionistėt jugosllavė, siē predikohej pas vitit 1955, atėherė demokracinė popullore tė Shqipėrisė do ta kishte marrė lumi. Ne, shqiptarėt, nuk do tė ishim sot kėtu nė kėtė sallė, po do tė luftonim ende nėpėr male.

    Partia dhe populli, nė njė unitet tė ēeliktė, qėndronin shumė vigjilentė dhe zbuluan e demaskuan spiunėt e Titos nė Komitetin tonė Qendror, qė punonin nė bashkėpunim me legatėn jugosllave nė Tiranė. Titoja u dėrgoi lajm kėtyre tradhtarėve, duke u thėnė se ishin ngutur, se duhej tė kishin pritur udhėzimet e tij. Kėta spiunė e tradhtarė i dėrguan letėr edhe shokut Hrushov qė tė ndėrhynte kundėr Komitetit Qendror tė Partisė sė Punės tė Shqipėrisė. Kėto janė tė faktuara me dokumente. Qėllimi i Titos ishte qė kundėrrevolucioni nė Shqipėri tė koordinohej me atė nė Hungari. Pas Kongresit XX tė Partisė Komuniste tė Bashkimit Sovjetik do tė mbahej Kongresi ynė III. Agjentura jugosllave mendoi se kishte ardhur ēasti ta rrėzonte udhėheqjen "kokėforte dhe staliniste shqiptare" dhe organizoi komplotin, i cili u zbulua dhe u dėrrmua nė Konferencėn e Partisė nė Tiranė, nė prill 1956. Komplotistėt morėn dėnimin e rreptė tė merituar.

    Agjentėt e tjerė tė rrezikshėm tė Titos nė Shqipėri, Dali Ndreu dhe Liri Gega, morėn urdhėr nga Titoja tė arratiseshin nė Jugosllavi se "ishin nė rrezik" dhe se veprimet kundėr Partisė sonė "duheshin organizuar nga territori jugosllav". Partia ishte plotėsisht nė dijeni tė veprimtarisė dhe tė urdhrit sekret tė Titos. Ajo ishte vigjilente dhe i kapi tradhtarėt mu nė kufi, kur tentonin tė arratiseshin. Tradhtarėt shkuan nė gjyq dhe u pushkatuan. E gjithė agjentura jugosllave qė pėrgatiste kundėrrevolucionin nė Shqipėri u zbulua dhe u asgjėsua.

    Pėrgatiti: Armand JONUZI „TIRANA OBSERVER“

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    The text below might contain errors as it was reproduced by OCR software from the digitized originals,
    also available as Scanned original in PDF


    download materialin ne pdf
    http://files.osa.ceu.hu/holdings/300/8/3/pdf/2-8-46.pdf.

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    BOX-FOLDER-REPORT: 2-8-46
    TITLE: New Light On The 1960 Conference: Albanians Break "Secrecy Pact"
    BY: Kevin Devlin & lz
    DATE: 1970-8-13
    COUNTRY: Albania
    ORIGINAL SUBJECT: Party

    --- Begin ---

    RADIO FREE EUROPE Research


    COMMUNIST AREA

    This material was prepared for the use of the
    editors and policy staff of Radio Free Europe.


    0698

    INTERNATIONAL
    COMMUNIST CONFERENCES

    ALBANIA: PARTY

    13 August 1970

    NEW LIGHT ON THE 1960 CONFERENCE:
    ALBANIANS BREAK "SECRECY PACT"

    (Summary at end)

    The 81-party Moscow Conference of 1960 was without
    doubt a "watershed event" in the history of the international
    Communist movement. It marked the clamorous collapse, after
    four decades, of the Leninist-Stalinist monolith. Until
    the secret "mini-conference" held in association with the
    Rumanian party congress five months earlier, most of the
    minor Communist parties had little or no idea of the rift
    that had already opened up between the Soviet and Chinese
    regimes; and now the ideological-political conflict between
    the two giants of the Communist world was traumatically
    revealed in frequently bitter debates.

    Yet these debates took place behind firmly closed doors,
    and the conference ended with an ostentatious demonstration
    of unity. This did not, indeed, deceive many observers: a

    [page 2]

    cursory reading of the Moscow Statement of 1960 was enough to
    show that it was an amalgam of divergent views and ambiguous
    formulations. Within a few months the pattern of cyclical
    deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations had manifested itself
    again through indirect polemics, with the Russians using
    Albania as a substitute target while the Chinese similarly
    aimed at Moscow in attacking Belgrade.

    Nevertheless, even when the private rift became a public
    conflict, marked not only by polemics, the historic proceedings
    of the 1960 conference remained veiled in secrecy to a remarkable
    extent. Some early and fragmentary leaks" from European
    Communist sources [1] were supplemented in time by the
    very selective references made by both sides during the Sino-Soviet
    polemics of 1963-64, [2] and by a statement which the Belgian CP
    Politburo published on 22 February 1962, and which offered a
    partisan version of "the main theses presented by the Chinese
    CP" at the 81-party conference.

    However, nine and a half years after the 1960 conference
    the only contributions which had been made public were those
    by Maurice Thorez of France [3] and Luigi Longo of Italy, [4]
    together with the "major portion" of the speech given by the
    U. S. delegate, James E. Jackson. [5] Strictly speaking, indeed,

    -----------------

    (1) The "leaks" were mainly communicated through Edward Crankshaw,
    the British journalist and student of Communist affairs; see
    his articles in The Observer (12 Feb. 1961, 6 May 1962 and
    8 Sept. 1963) and Atlantic Monthly (May 1961 and May 1963) and
    in his book The New Cold War (1963).

    (2) The most important of these sources were: on the Chinese side,
    the People's Daily - Red Flag editorials of 6 Sept. 1963 and
    4 Feb. 1964; on the Soviet side, a Kommunist article of
    October 1963 and the "Suslov Report" of February 1964
    (Pravda, 3 April 1964).

    (3) The texts of two conference speeches by Thorez and a declaration
    by the French delegation (with some more recent documentation)
    were published by the PCF Central Committee in January 1963
    under the title Problemes du mouvement international; most of
    this material had been issued a year earlier for internal
    distribution only.

    (4) Interventi della delegazione del Partito Comunista Italiano
    alla conferenza degli 81 Partiti comunisti ed operai, Rome,
    15 Jan. 1962. This booklet contained the texts of Longo's
    two conference speeches, a memorandum from the Italian
    delegation to the 26-party editorial commission and a letter
    from the Italian delegation to Khrushchev.

    (5) Political Affairs, December 1963; the previous (November 1963)
    issue of the CPUSA monthly organ had carried an interesting
    article entitled "Recollections of the 1960 Conferences"
    (Bucharest and Moscow) by another member of the American
    delegation, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn.

    [page 3]

    the Italian documentation was not published: it was contained
    in a booklet issued for internal party use (although it soon
    became available to interested outside observers). It could
    be said, then, that of the more than 90 addresses delivered by
    heads of delegations at the conference (some spoke more than
    once), the only ones made public in full were the two speeches
    by Maurice Thorez -- until June 1970, when the Albanians published
    the text of the speech which Enver Hoxha delivered on 16 November
    1960.

    The text appears in the third volume of a series of Albanian
    party documents,[6] covering the period between February 1957
    and February 1961. During the past few years the Tirana regime
    has made a point of publishing much documentation on the party
    history; but this was obviously much more than a routine matter
    of implementing an historical chronicle. Indeed, the Albanians
    indicated as much by issuing the text in extense in the foreign
    language services of Radio Tirana and the ATA news agency [7]
    as well as in the August number of the party theoretical organ
    Rruga e Partis� (The Way of the Party). It is equally obvious
    that the historic importance of the Hoxha speech is incomparably
    greater than that of the Thorez texts, with their ritual loyalty
    to the Soviet line.

    Possible Motives

    Before examing the content of the speech, and the new light
    that it sheds upon the 81-party conference, we may ask why
    Albania has become the first regime to break the pact of secrecy,
    after nearly a decade. [8] The question cannot be answered with
    assurance, but some tentative suggestions may be offered. In
    the first place, publication of the speech is clearly a
    characteristic gesture of independence on the interparty level. This obvious

    ------------------

    (6) V�llimi i 3-t�, PPSh-Dokumente Kryesore (Principal Documents
    of the Albanian Workers' Party, Vol. 3), Tirana 1970; the
    work was published by the Institute of Marxist-Leninist
    Studies attached to the Central Committee of the Albanian
    party.

    (7) Radio Tirana, English service, 30 June, 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5
    July 1970; ATA English service, 17 July 1970.

    (8) It may be noted that the Chinese have never published the
    speeches which Teng Hsiao-ping and Liu Shao-chi delivered
    at the 1960 conference--and that they have so far apparently
    ignored (as have other Communist leaderships) the Albanian
    publication of Hoxha's speech.

    [page 4]

    fact does not, however, explain the timing of the gesture.
    Here it is significant that publication comes at a time when
    the Albanian regime has been displaying considerably more
    flexibility in interstate relations with some socialist
    countries--notably with regard to Rumania and Yugoslavia,
    which differ from Albania in so many ways, but share with
    Hoxha's regime one important attribute: resistance to Soviet
    pressures. By placing on record his unswerving ideological
    "rectitude" (in the context of 1960), Hoxha has in fact left
    himself freer (in the context of 1970) to make cautious
    advances to these fellow-rebels against Soviet hegemony.
    Furthermore, the main thrust of the speech was an attack on, and rejection
    of, Soviet authority in the international Communist movement;
    and Hoxha evidently sees present profit in restressing this theme
    now, against a background which includes the Moscow Conference
    of June 1969, post-invasion "normalization" in Czechoslovakia
    (and elsewhere), the orchestrated triumphalism of the Lenin
    Centenary and, not least, the continued resistance of some
    important Communist parties and regimes to these efforts to
    reassert the hegemonial primacy of the CPSU. Finally, it is
    clear that, on the domestic level, publication of the speech
    serves to build up national pride and popular support.

    The general outline and some of the details of Hoxha's
    speech were already known from various sources, notably the
    1968 (revised) edition of the official Albanian party history, [9]
    which gave a summarized account containing some useful quotations.
    But to read the full text is to appreciate the truly traumatic
    impact that Hoxha's harangue must have had upon the loyalist
    majority in St. George's Hall on that November day. China's
    Teng Hsiao-ping, speaking two days earlier, had been equally
    intransigent but not nearly so offensive. "If the Chinese
    speech had shocked and disturbed the majority of delegates,"
    the Italian Communist Giusseppe Boffa later observed, "that
    of Hoxha disgusted them." [10]

    -----------------

    (9) Historia e Partis� s� Pun�s te Shqup�ris� (revised edition,
    Tirana 1968), pp. 360-372. Until the text was published
    the best "outside" account, pieced together from fragments
    of evidence, was that given by William E. Griffith in his
    Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Mass., 1963)
    pp. 55-56.

    (10) Giuseppe Boffa, Dopo Krusciov (Rome, 1965), p. 68.

    [page 5]

    "Traitors" Attacked

    Thus, in the opening section of his speech Hoxha supported
    the Chines and opposed Soviet positions with regard to
    peaceful coexistence, East-West relations and ways of transition
    to socialism. But he did so in unnecessarily offensive terms:

    U.S.-led world imperialism is mustering, organizing
    and arming its assault forces. It is preparing for
    war. He who fails to see this is blind. He who sees
    it and covers it up is a traitor in the service of
    imperialism. [11]

    Similarly, in expounding the Chinese view that Communist
    parties, including those in capitalist countries, should guard
    against "peaceful way" delusions (" ...we should prepare ourselves...
    especially for taking power by violence"), the Albanian leader
    took the occasion to attack Khrushchev personally and reject
    the line of the 20 the CPSU Congress in general:

    This question has been clear, and it was not necessary
    for Comrade Khrushchev to confuse it at the 20th Congress,
    and to do so in such an way as to please the opportunists.
    Why was it necessary to resort to so many parodies of
    Lenin's clear theses and the October Socialist Revolution?
    The Albanian Workers' Party is quite clear about, and does
    not shift from, Lenin's teachings on this matter. So far,
    no people, no proletariat and no Communist or workers
    party has seized power without bloodshed and without
    violence. [12]

    This proclamation of ideological rectitude--which was
    simultaneously a rejection of Soviet authority--was linked with
    an almost melodramatic insistence on the determination of the
    Albanians to resist all attempts to coerce them into submission.
    Referring to the pre-conference meetings in Moscow between
    Soviet and Albanian representatives, Hoxha gave a highly
    colored account of one such attempt:

    ----------------

    (11) Radio Tirana, 30 June 1970; JPRS Translations on Eastern
    Europe (TEE) No. 239, 23 July 1970, p. 3. Emphasis supplied.

    (12) Ibid., TEE No. 239, p. 5

    [page 6]

    There may be comrades who reproach us Albanians
    with being stubborn, hotblooded, sectarian, dogmatic
    and what not; but we reject all these false accusations
    and tell them that we shall not deviate from these
    positions, for they are Marxist-Leninist positions.

    They say that we are in favor of war and against
    coexistence. Comrade [Frol] Kozlov has even put to
    us Albanians these alternatives: either coexistence, as
    he conceives it, or an atomic bomb from the imperialists
    which will turn Albanian into a heap of ashes and leave no
    Albanian alive. Until now, no representative of U.S.
    imperialism has made such an atomic threat against the
    Albanian people. But here it is, and from a member of
    the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist
    Party of the Soviet Union. And [addressed] to whom? To
    a small, heroic country, to a people who have fought
    through centuries against savage and innumerable enemies
    and who have never bent the knee; to a small country
    and a people who have fought with unprecedented
    heroism against the Hitlerites and the Italian
    Fascists...

    But, Comrade Frol Kozlov, you have made a mistake
    in the address. You cannot frighten us into yielding
    to your wrongly-calculated wishes; and we never
    confound the glorious Party of Lenin with you, who
    behave so badly, with such shamelessness, toward the
    Albanian people and ... party. [13]

    ----------------

    (13) Radio Tirana, 1 July 1970; TEE No. 239, p. 6.

    [page 7]

    In stressing Albnaia's independence Hoxha also served
    notice that, times having changed, his regime could not be
    treated by Khrushcheve as Yugoslavia had bee treated by
    Stalin--that is, it could, in any effective sense, be
    expelled from the socialist camp:

    It is absurd to imagine that little socialist
    Albania may detach itself and live apart from
    the socialist peoples. Albania is indebted to
    no one for its presence within the ranks of
    the socialist camp. The Albanian people
    themselves and [their] party have placed
    it there through their blood and sweat, their
    work, their sacrifices, their system of
    government and through the Marxist-Leninist line they
    pursue. But let no one think that because
    Albania is a small country, because the Albanian
    Workers' Party is a small party, it should do
    what someone else says when it is convinced that
    that someone is mistaken. [14]

    -----------------

    (14) Radio Tirana, 1 July 1970; TEE No. 239, pp. 6-7;
    emphasis added. Later in his speech Hoxha taunted
    Khrushchev with the same argument: "The fact that
    Albania proceeds along the path of socialism and
    that it is a member of the socialist camp is not
    determined by you, Nikita Khrushchev. It does
    not depend on your wishes. This has been determined
    by the Albanian people, headed by their workers
    party..." (Radio Tirana, 3 July 1970: TEE No. 239,
    p. 22)

    [page 8]

    Against Soviet Hegemony

    For all the emotional rhetoric, however, it is clear that
    Hoxha's attack upon Soviet positions was carefully constructed
    and calculated. Thus, his criticism of Soviet hegemony over
    Eastern Europe, as exercised through Comecon and the Warsaw
    Pact, was both measured and reasonable in tone. His demand that
    both institutions be reformed to provide for more regular
    consultation and collective decision-making was a legitimate demand
    --and one that did, in fact, anticipate future developments:

    [The] Albanian Workers' Party is of the opinion
    that our socialist camp, which has one goal, which
    is guided by Marxism-Leninism, should also have its
    own strategy and tactics, and that these should be
    worked out collectively by our parties and states
    of the socialist camp. Within the ranks of our
    camp we have se up certain forms of organization
    of work; but the truth is that these have remained
    somewhat formal, or, to put it better, they do not
    function in a collective way--for instance, the
    organs of the Warsaw Treaty and the Council of
    Mutual Economic Aid.

    Le me make it quite clear: this is not a question
    of whether we, too, should be consulted or not.
    of course, no one denies us the right to be
    consulted; but we should hold meetings [15] for
    consultation. We raise this problem as [a matter of]
    principle, and say that these forms of organization should
    function at regular intervals. Problems should be
    taken up for discussion, decisions should be adopted,
    and there should be a check-up on the implementation
    of these decisions. [16]

    Implicit here--and made explicit later on--was the charge
    that the Soviet leadership had been taking policy decisions without
    consulting fraternal regimes which would be affected by them:

    On may political issues of first-rate importance,
    our socialist camp has held, and holds, identical
    views. But since collective consultations have not
    become a regular habit, on many occasions it has
    been noted that states from our socialist camp take
    [independent] political initiatives. Not that we
    are opposed, in principle, to taking initiatives,

    ------------------

    (15) In the context, Hoxha evidently means regular,
    multilateral meetings--institutionalized consultation.

    (16) Radio Tirana, 1 July 1970; TEE No. 239, p-7.

    [page 9]

    but these initiatives often affect other states
    of the socialist camp as well. Some of these
    initiatives are not correct, especially when they
    should be taken collectively by the members of the
    Warsaw Pact.

    Bulgaria, Poland As Substitute Targets

    It is interesting that at this early stage of his carefully
    constructed philippic Hoxha chose to illustrate his argument by
    criticism not of the Russians themselves but of the client regimes
    in Bulgaria and Poland. By accepting the fiction that these
    regimes had acted independently of the Soviet Union, he strengthened
    his own claim to independent judgement. In both cases, of course,
    the initiatives in question had been undertaken with Soviet consent:

    An initiative of this kind is that of the Bulgarian
    government which, with total disregard for Albania,
    informed the Greek government that the Balkan
    countries of people's democracy agreed to disarm if the
    Greek government was prepared to do so. From our
    point of view, this initiative is an erroneous one,
    for, even if the Greek government had endorsed it,
    the Albanian government would not have accepted it.
    Albanian is in agreement with the Soviet proposal made
    by Nikita Khrushchev in May 1959, but not with the
    Bulgarian proposal, which would mean disarming the
    Balkan countries while leaving Italy unaffected.
    Or had the Bulgarian comrades forgotten that bourgeois
    and fascist Italy had attacked Albania a number of
    times during this century? On the other hand, can the
    Bulgarian comrades, without consulting in any way the
    Albanian government, with which they are bound by a
    defensive treaty, be allowed to propose a treaty of
    friendship and non-aggression with the Greek
    government, at a time when Greece maintains a state of war
    with Albanian and makes territorial claims against our
    country? It seems to us that it is dangerous to
    take such unilateral action...

    Similar gestures have also been made by the Polish
    comrades at the United Nations, when Comrade Gomulka
    stated in a unilateral way at the General Assembly...
    that Poland proposes to preserve the status quo on
    the stationing of military forces in the world, and,
    concretely, that no more military bases should be
    created, but those already set up should remain; that
    no more missiles should be installed but existing
    ones should remain; that those states that have the
    secret of the atomic bomb should keep it and not give
    it to other states. In our opinion, such a proposal
    is counter to the interests of our camp. No more

    [page 10]

    missiles to be installed--but by whom and where?
    All the NATO allies... have been equipped with missiles.
    Not to give the secret of the atomic bomb to whom?
    Britain, France and West Germany have it. It is clear
    that a proposal of this kind would oblige us, the
    countries of people's democracy, not to install
    missiles [and forbid] any other country of the socialist
    camp, except the Soviet Union, to have the atomic
    bomb. [17]

    This is a good example of the effective polemical techniques
    which Hoxha used in his address. A passage nominally consisting
    of attacks upon Bulgarian and Polish policies--the former being
    even contrasted with a temporary Soviet position--ends by moving
    in upon the real target. Yet the approach, though obvious, is
    still indirect.

    "We pose the question," Hoxha went on: "Why should Communist
    China not have the atomic bomb? We think that China should have
    it, and when she has the bomb and missiles, then we shall see in
    what terms United States imperialism will speak." He did not need
    to say more: the background to this declaration was clear to all
    delegations. On arrival in Moscow for the conference, if not
    earlier, they had been given the Chinese letter-manifesto of 10
    September 1960, in which the latter set forth at length their
    indictment of the Soviet leadership--including the revelation that in
    June 1959 the USSR had unilaterally abrogated a secret agreement,
    reached a year earlier, to help China produce a nuclear weapon.

    Boldness and Subtlety

    Here again, Hoxha combined boldness with considerable subtlety:
    his attack upon the Russians was the more effective for being
    indirect. Similarly, this defense of China's nuclear ambitions also
    represented an implicit appeal to the regional loyalties of the
    "pro-Chinese neutralist" parties in Asia [18] -- an appeal which
    would have been weakened if it had been made explicit. One further,
    important point may be made: this is one of the relatively rare
    passages of his long speech in which Hoxha directly championed
    Chinese positions. Indirectly, he did so throughout the speech,
    of course; but, apart from the section on the Bucharest meeting of
    June 1960, he made few explicit references to the Chinese--as a
    matter of policy, and perhaps also of principle, he preferred to
    put his case in Albanian terms, as the spokesman of an independent
    regime.

    ------------------

    (17) Radio Tirana, 1 July 1970; TEE No. 239, pp. 8-9.

    (18) The most important of these were the North Korean, North
    Vietnamese, Indonesian and Japanese arties.

    [page 11]

    This concern emerged clearly in his discussion of
    economic relations and aid within the socialist camp. Albania,
    he cheerfully acknowledge, had given economic aid on one
    --"first, because we are poor and, second, because no one stands
    in need of our aid." After expressing gratitude for help,
    given "first and foremost by the Soviet Union," Hoxha firmly
    laid down his own principles. Economic help given by one
    socialist state to another should be considered " not as charity
    but as fraternal, internationalist aid." More than that:
    Albanians "have a duty to seek the aid of their friends and
    brothers economically better off than they, and it was and
    still is the internationalist duty of their friends to give
    this aid." [19] In other words: Albania had the right to
    ask for help, but other socialist states (primarily the USSR)
    had not the right to deny it.

    Hoxha went on to make the proposal that "the aid of the
    economically stronger to the economically weaker [socialist]
    countries, as is the case of our people, should be greater."
    (This, of course, was also a Chinese argument, and one of
    obvious interest to the Koreans and Vietnamese; yet, again,
    Hoxha put it only in general terms.) He added that Albania
    agreed that the economically stronger socialist states should
    also aid "neutral capitalist" countries and ... peoples recently
    liberated from colonialism"--provided they were anti-imperialist
    and did not hinder or oppose revolutionary forces. But, he
    stressed, "first of all, the needs of the countries of the
    socialist camp should be looked into carefully and be fulfilled.
    Of course, India stands in need of iron and steel, but socialist
    Albania stands in more urgent need of them." This indirect
    attack upon Soviet foreign policy priorities must have found some
    resonance among more than the Asian regimes.

    The Bucharest Confrontation

    In this passage on economic relations between socialist
    states there was one significant sentence: "Economic pressures
    on the Albanian Workers' Party, on the Albanian government
    and on our people will never be of any avail." This laconic
    declaration in fact pointed forward to the most controversial
    section of Hoxha's speech: his polemical discussion of the
    secret meeting of Communist party delegations held in Bucharest
    in June 1960, and of subsequent Soviet efforts to bring the
    Albanians back into line.

    ---------------

    (19) TEE, No. 239, p. 8.

    [page 12]

    We may recall briefly that the Soviet and Chinese leaderships
    had agreed in early June to use the impending congress of the
    Rumanian party for a discussion by fraternal delegations of the
    question of holding an all-party conference, at which efforts
    would be made to settle the ideological disputes which had
    become evident with the Chinese publication of the
    anti-revisionist manifesto, Long Live Leninism, in April 1960.
    Khrushchev, however, decided to use the Bucharest meeting to
    build up and anti-Chinese front in the international movement.
    In the course of intensive lobbying before the secret
    "mini-conference" took place (on 24-26 June), the Russians distributed
    to other delegations an 80-page "Letter of Information" [20]
    which was a cold indictment of the Chinese regime's ideological
    deviations and factionalist activities. Their purpose
    clearly was to indict the Chinese before what amounted to an
    impromptu tribunal of the fraternal parties.

    Shaken by this unexpected and scandalous revelation of
    Sino-Soviet disunity, the overwhelming majority of the 50-odd
    delegations present reacted predictably by supporting the Soviet
    criticism. The front was, however, weakened by the reticence
    of the Asian parties later to be classified as "neutralist
    pro-Chinese"; and it was broken by the Albanian delegation's
    explicit opposition to this collective indictment of the
    fraternal Chinese party. [21]

    In this Moscow speech Hoxha concentrated on the conspiratorial
    aspect of Soviet behavior in Bucharest. "Right from the start,"
    he declared, "when the Soviet comrades began their feverish and
    impermissible work of inveigling the comrades of our delegation
    in Bucharest, it became clear to the Albanian Workers' Party
    that the Soviet comrades wanted, by means of groundless arguments
    and pressure, to lure the Albanian Workers' Party into the ****

    ------------------

    (20) The "Letter of Information," dated 21 June 1960, was nominally
    a communication from the CPSU Central Committee to its Chinese counterpart.

    (21) The putative reason for the Albanian decision to defy Soviet
    authority at the Bucharest meeting cannot be discussed here.
    Major factors evidently include the Tirana regime's traditional
    hostility to Titoist Yugoslavia and its consequent dislike of
    the Moscow-Belgrade rapprochement; its resentment of Khrushchev's
    denunciation of Stalin; its militant line in international
    affairs, arising from domestic circumstances; its geopolitical
    position; and, above all, the fact that it now had an alternative patron--China--to turn to.

    [page 13]

    they had prepared, to bring it into line with the distorted
    views of the Soviet comrades. [22]

    Developing the idea of a shameful conspiracy, Hoxha
    revealed that some but not all of the ruling parties [23]
    were privy to the Soviet plan to mount an anti-Chinese
    offensive in Bucharest. In fact, he said, "with the exception
    of the Albanian Workers' Party, the Chinese Communist Party,
    the Korean Workers' party and the Vietnamese Workers' Party,
    the other parties of the camp"--that is, the loyalist regimes
    of the Eastern Europe--"had been acquainted with the fact that a
    conference would be organized in Bucharest to accuse China."
    It followed that "the question becomes much more serious, and
    assumes the form of a faction of an international character."

    The delegations present in Bucharest had no mandate
    from their parties to pass judgement on "the ideological and
    political accusations directed against the Chinese CP" by
    Khrushchev. But in any case the Russians were not interested
    in having a genuine debate on those charges:

    The fact is that the overriding concern of the Soviet
    leadership was to have its accusations against the
    Chinese Communist Party passed over quickly, and
    to have the Chinese CP Condemned at all cost... The
    aim was to have the Chinese CP condemned by the
    international Communist movement for faults which do not
    exist and are baseless.

    The questions raised by the Sino-soviet dispute--"for example,
    the condemnation of Joseph Stalin, the great problem of the Hungarian
    counter-revolution, that of the ways of taking power"--were important
    ones which concerned the whole international movement; but the
    Soviet leaders had avoided a discussion of them because "they were
    dead certain of their line and of its inviolability." Hoxha
    went on:

    In order to condemn the Chinese Communist Party for
    imaginary insults and sins, Comrade Nikita Khrushchev and
    other Soviet leaders were very concerned to present the

    ----------------

    (22) This and subsequent quotations dealing with the Bucharest
    meeting are taken from the Radio Tirana broadcast of 2 July
    1970 (TEE No. 239, pp. 11-17).

    (23) The non-ruling parties (which sent mostly second-rank delegations)
    had no warning of the Soviet intention. See Elizabeth Gurley
    Flynn, "Recollections of the 1960 Conferences," Political
    Affairs (monthly organ of the CPUSA) November 1963, pp. 22-38.

    [page 14]

    case as if the divergences existed between China and
    the whole international Communist movement. But when
    it came to problems like those I have just mentioned,
    judgement on them had been passed by Khrushchev and his
    companions alone, in the belief that there was on need
    for them to be discussed collectively at a meeting
    of the representatives of all the parties, although these
    were major international problems in character. The
    Hungarian counter-revolution occurred, but matters
    were hushed up. Why this tactic of hushing things
    up when they are not to the advantage of the Soviet
    comrades, while now, when it is to their advantage,
    the Soviet comrades not only call meetings like that
    at Bucharest but do their utmost to force on others
    the view that China is in opposition to the line of
    all the world's communist and workers' parties?

    In short, perceiving that Soviet behavior at Bucharest was
    "aimed at condemning the Chinese Communist Party and isolating
    if from the whole international Communist movement," the Albanian
    party rejected this attempt as "monstrous and unacceptable."
    It did so "not only because it was not convinced of the truth
    of these allegations, but also because it rightly suspected
    that a non-Marxist action was being organized against a great
    and glorious fraternal party like the Chinese Communist Party,
    that under the guise of an accusation of dogmatism against
    China an attack was being launched against Marxism-Leninism
    and the principles of the Moscow Declaration and peace manifesto
    [of 1957.]"

    For the record, but obviously with no hope of success,
    Hoxha urged the assembled delegations to condemn the Bucharest
    meeting:

    The Albanian Workers' Party is of the opinion that the
    Bucharest meeting was not only a gross mistake but also
    a mistake which was deliberately aggravated. In no way
    should the Bucharest meeting be cast into oblivion, but
    it should be severely condemned as a black stain on
    the international Communist movement.

    Soviet Coercion

    By taking this stand at the Bucharest meeting, the Albanians
    had exposed themselves to the attacks of the loyalist majority,
    Hoxha admitted. "Some leaders of fraternal parties called
    us neutralists, while others reproached us with deviation
    from the correct Marxist-Leninist line, and these leaders
    went so far as to try to discredit us before their own parties.
    We reject all these with scorn because they are slanders." And
    the Russians did not confine themselves to merely verbal attacks:

    [page 15]

    Immediately following the Bucharest meeting, an
    unexpected unprincipled attack was launched. Brutal
    intervention and all-round pressure was undertaken against
    the Albanian party and its central committee.

    The attack was begun by Comrade Khrushchev in
    Bucharest and was continued by Comrade Kozlov in
    Moscow. The comrades of our Politburo who happened
    to pass through Moscow were worked upon with a view
    to turning them against the leadership of our party,
    [the Soviets] declaring that the leadership of the
    Albanian Worker's Party had betrayed the friendship
    with the Soviet Union... that Albania must decide to
    go either with the 200 million, with the Soviet Union,
    or with the 650 million, with People's China, and,
    finally, that an isolated Albania would be in danger,
    since it would take only one atomic bomb dropped by
    the Americans to wipe out completely Albania and all
    its population, and other threats of the kind. [24]

    Hoxha went on, in what may be considered the most sensational
    passage of his explosive address, to outline an alleged Soviet
    plot to overthrow the existing Albanian leadership and
    substitute forces loyal to the CPSU:

    It is absolutely clear that the aim was to sow
    discord in the leadership of the Albanian Workers'
    Party, to remove from the leadership...those elements
    who, the Soviet leaders thought, stood in the way of
    their crooked and dishonest undertaking. The result
    of this divisive activity was that Comrade Liri Belishova,
    member of the Politburo..., capitulated to the cajolery
    of the Soviet leaders, to their blackmail and intimidation,
    and took a stand in open opposition to the line of her
    party.

    The main burden of this work of factionalist intervention,
    according to Hoxha's partisan account, was borne by "the employees
    of the Soviet Embassy, with the Soviet Ambassador to Tirana
    himself in the lead"; and their aim, he alleged, was nothing less
    than a coup:

    They began feverishly and intensively to attack the
    Marxist-Leninist line of the Albanian Worker's Party, to split
    the party, to create panic and confusion in its ranks,
    to alienate the leadership from the party. The Soviet
    Ambassador to Tirana went so far as to attempt to
    incite the generals of our Army to raise the People's

    ------------

    (24) This and subsequent quotations are taken from the Radio
    Tirana broadcast of 3 July 1970; TEE No. 239, pp. 17-24.
    [page 16]

    Army against the leadership of the Albanian Workers'
    Party and the Albanian state. But the saw struck a
    nail, and this came to naught, for the unity of our
    party is steel-like...

    Nevertheless, the employees of the Soviet Embassy in
    Tirana, with the Ambassador in the lead, succeeded
    through impermissible, anti-Marxist methods in making
    the chairman of the Control Commission of the
    Albanian Workers' Party, who two weeks earlier had
    been at one with the line pursued by the Central
    Committee of the Albanian Workers' Party in Bucharest,
    fall into the Clutches of these intriguers, deviate from
    Marxism-Leninism and come out flagrantly against the
    line of his party. [25]

    It is clear that these contemptible acts of these
    Soviet comrades were aimed at splitting the
    leadership of the Albanian Workers' Party...and this as
    punishment for the alleged crimes we had committed in Bucharest,
    for having had the courage to express our views freely
    as we saw fit.

    Noting that the Soviet Embassy officials had also tired
    in vain to subvert Albanians who had studied in the USSR, Hoxha
    said that of "many other examples" of Soviet pressure which
    he could list, he would mention only two.

    In October, while the 26-party editorial commission
    was in session in Moscow to debate the draft conference document,
    an enlarged meeting of the Warsaw Pact chiefs of staff was held
    in the Soviet capital. At this meeting "the member of the Central
    Committee [of the CPSU] and minister of the Soviet Union, Marshal
    Malinovsky, launched an open attack on the Albanian people,
    on the Albanian Workers' Party, on the Albanian government
    and on our leadership." His colleague Marshal Grechko, the
    Warsaw Pack Commander-in-Chief, went further: he "not only told
    our military delegation that it was difficult for him to meet
    the requirements of our army for some very special equipment,
    for the supply of which contracts had been signed, but said
    bluntly, 'You are in the Warsaw Pact only for the time being'-
    implying that Marshal Grechko seems to have decided to throw
    us out. But fortunately," Hoxha added scornfully, "it is not
    up to the Comrade Marshal to take such a decision." [26]

    -------------

    (25) The reference is to Koco Tashko who, together with
    Liri Belishova, was purged early in September 1960.

    (26) It may be noted that, even after the Soviet-Albanian
    break, Albanian remained a formal though non-participating
    member of the Warsaw Pact--until after the invasion of
    Czechoslovakia in 1968, when it formally withdrew.

    [page 17]

    Then at a meeting with the Chinese delegation, also in
    October, "Nikita Khrushchev declared solemnly to the Chinese
    comrades, 'We will treat Albania like Yugoslavia.'"[27]
    This roused Hoxha to another flight of calculated outrage.
    What crime had the Albanians committed, that they should be
    treated like Tito's Yugoslavia? Had they betrayed
    Marxism-Leninism, as the Titoist clique had done? had they, like
    the Titoists, broken away from the camp to "hitch up with
    U.S. imperialism?" No--

    Our only crime is that in Bucharest we did not
    agree that a fraternal Communist party like the
    Chinese CP should be unjustly condemned. Our only
    crime is that we had the courage to oppose openly,
    at an international communist meeting and not in
    the market-place, the unjust action of Nikita Khrushchev.
    Our only alleged crime is that we are a small party of
    a small and poor country which, according to Comrade
    Khrushchev, should merely applaud and approve, but
    express no opinion of its own. But this is neither
    Marxist nor acceptable. Marxism-Leninism has granted
    us the right to have our say and we will not give up
    this right for anyone, neither on account of political
    and economic pressure, nor on account of the threats
    and epithets that may be hurled at us.

    Economic Blackmail

    So far (except for his account of the Soviet Embassy's
    subversive activities), Hoxha had dealt mainly with the "threats
    and epithets"; now he turned to the "political and economic
    pressure." He was "obliged to inform this meeting that the
    Soviet leaders have in fact passed from threats to treating
    Albania in the same way as Titoist Yugoslavia, to concrete
    acts." The revelation which followed was presented in dramatic
    terms:

    This year our country has suffered many natural
    calamities. There was a big earthquake, the flood
    in October, and especially the drought, which was
    terrible, with not a drop of rain for 120 days.
    Nearly all the grain was lost. The people were
    threatened with starvation. The very limited
    reserve was consumed.

    ---------------

    (27) A little later in his speech Hoxha, addressing Khrushchev
    directly, said that on 6 November the Soviet leader had
    told the Chinese delegates, "We [Soviets] lost in Albania,
    and you, Chinese, won in Albania," Adding contemptuously
    that the Albanian party was his "were link." Hoxha
    waxed indignant over this attitude of treating socialist
    Albania as "something to be bought and sold or lost and
    won as in a card game."

    [page 18]

    Our government urgently sought to buy grain from the
    Soviet Union, explaining the very critical situation
    that we were faced with. This happened after the
    Bucharest meeting. We waited 45 days for a reply
    from the Soviet government, while we had only 15 days
    bread for the people. After 45 days, and after repeated
    official requests, the Soviet government, instead of
    50,000 tons, granted us only 10,000 tons--that is, enough
    to last us 15 days. And this grain was to be delivered
    during the months of September and October. This was
    open pressure on our party to submit to the wishes of
    the Soviet comrades.

    During those critical days we got wise to many things.
    Did the Soviet Union, which sells grain to the whole
    world, not have 50,000 tons to give to the Albanian
    people who are loyal brothers of the Soviet people, loyal
    to Marxism-Leninism and to the socialist camp, at a
    time when, through no fault of their own, they were
    threatened with starvation? Comrade Khrushchev had once said
    to us: "Do not worry about grain, for all that you
    consume in a whole year is eaten by mice in our
    country. The mice in the Soviet Union might eat;
    but the Albanian people could be left to die of
    starvation. This is terrible, comrades, but it is true... [28]

    After noting that the Russians had even obliged the Albanians
    to dip into its limited gold reserves to buy this inadequate
    supply of grain, refusing to make it a credit transaction,
    Hoxha went on to reveal that the then-loyalist Rumanian
    regime had joined in the Soviet attempts at coercion:

    The Rumanian leadership did the same thing when it
    refused to sell a single ear of corn to the Albanian
    people on a credit basis at a time when Rumania
    was trading in corn with the capitalist countries,
    while we were obliged to buy maize from French farmers,
    paying in foreign currency.

    Some months before the Bucharest meeting, Comrade
    [Gheorghiu-] Dej invited a delegation of our party
    for the specific purpose of conducting talks on the
    future development of Albania...[He] said to our party:
    "We, the other countries of people's democracy, should
    no longer discuss how much credit should be granted to
    Albania, but we should decide to build Albania such

    --------------

    (28) In a later passage Hoxha contrasted Khrushchev's behavior
    with that of Stalin (who "always behaved as a great Marxist,
    as an outstanding internationalist, as a comrade, brother
    and sincere friend of the Albanian people"): "In 1945,
    when our people were threatened with starvation, Comrade
    Stalin ordered ships loaded with grain destined for the
    Soviet people, who were also in dire need of food at that
    time, and sent the grain at once to the Albanian people,
    whereas the present Soviet leaders permitted themselves
    these ugly deeds!"

    [page 19]

    and such factories to raise the level of production...
    regardless of how many million roubles they would
    cost. That is of no importance." Comrade Dej added:
    "We have talked this over with Comrade Khrushchev
    too, and we have been in agreement." But then came
    the Bucharest meeting, and our party maintained the
    stand you all know. The Rumanian comrades shook
    off what they had previously said, and chose the
    course of leaving the Albanian people to suffer
    from hunger.

    Emphasis on Independence

    What Hoxha did not say about the Soviet and satellite
    attempts to exert economic pressure on his regime is also
    significant. Thus, he did not say that the Chinese had come
    to the Albanians' aid in their hour of need, by buying a
    consignment of French grain and having it shipped to Tirana. [29]
    Nor did he mention that during the same period the Soviets
    were bringing a similar type of economic pressure to bear upon
    China, by withdrawing their technicians and unilaterally abrogating
    hundreds of individual aid agreements and contracts. Once more,
    it seems, Hoxha was concerned to downplay the new Tirana-Peking
    alliance, and to present his challenge to Soviet authority as far
    as possible in Albanian terms. It is relevant to note that the
    publication of the speech comes at a time when the Tirana regime
    is again concerned, as often in the past to reaffirm the
    independent, principled character of the Albanian struggle
    against Khrushchevian and neo-Khrushchevian revisionism.

    Repeatedly during his long speech Hoxha returned to this
    sensitive and central theme of Albania's principled independence,
    as when he protested against Khrushchev's alleged belief that the
    Albanian party "has no views of its own, but has made common
    cause with the Communist Party of China in an unprincipled
    manner, and therefore that on matters pertaining to our party
    one can talk with the Chinese comrades." Or again, when he
    addressed Khrushchev directly: "You consider Albania as a market
    commodity which can be gained by one or lost by another... You
    were repeating the same thing...when you decided that Albania
    is no longer a socialist country, as transpires from the letter

    -------------

    (29) See William E. Griffith, Albania and the Sino-Soviet
    Rift (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), p. 47.

    [page 20]

    you handed to us on 8 November, in which our country is not
    mentioned as a socialist country." [30]

    This prickly insistence on the independence of little
    Albanian was coupled with an irate rejection of the
    "swollen-headed" Soviet leadership's pretensions to hegemonic authority:

    Our party has always considered the CPSU as a mother party.
    It has done this because it is the oldest party... It
    has spoken of its universal experience, of its great
    maturity. But our party has never accepted, nor will
    it ever accept, that some Soviet leaders may impose
    on it their views which it considers erroneous.
    The Soviet leaders...have become swollen-headed over
    the colossal successes attained by the Soviet people
    and the CPSU, and violate Marxist-Leninist principles,
    regarding themselves as infallible; they consider every
    decision, every act, every word they say and every
    gesture they make infallible and irrevocable. Others
    may err, others may be condemned, while they are above
    reproach. "Our decisions are sacred; they are inviolable.
    We can make no concessions to, no compromise with, the
    Chinese Communist Party," the leaders of the CPSU said
    to our people.

    The ironical thing was that, as a Communist schooled in
    the Leninist-Stalinist myths, Hoxha himself had to demonstrate
    the inerrancy which he denied to the Soviet leaders. There were
    therefore some inherent contradictions in the Albanian positions
    which, after all, had developed rapidly within a few months after
    a decade and a half of satellite loyalty. One, already noted,
    arose from the need to adopt the Chinese line while at the same
    time stressing Albanian independence. Luigi Longo of the PCI
    pointed to another in his first conference speech [31] On the
    one hand, Hoxha sought to blame Soviet actions at and after

    -------------

    (30) The reference is to a 127-page Soviet letter dated 5 November
    1960. Ostensibly a reply to a Chinese letter of 10 September,
    it was (according to a Zeri i Popullit editorial of 25 March
    1962) distributed to all conference delegations on 8-9
    November. Publicly, the Soviets have never denied that
    Albania is a socialist country, though one under deviant
    leadership.

    (31) Interventi della delegazione del P.C.I. alla Conferenza
    degli 81 Partiti Comunisti e operai (Rome, 1962), p. 49.

    [page 21]

    the Bucharest meeting for the rift between their parties. On
    the other hand, in order to legitimize his rebellion and give
    it historical foundation, he sought to show that Albanian
    disagreement with the Soviet line on such issues as Stalin,
    Yugoslavia and East-West relations went back to 1956 and the
    20th Congress.

    The Yugoslav Issue

    Like the Chinese, he made effective use of the denunciation
    of modern revisionism contained in the Moscow Declaration of
    1957, contrasting this with the intermittent Soviet efforts to reach
    a rapprochement with Tito (although the e1957 Declaration, unlike
    the Moscow State of 1960 then in process of preparation, made
    no specific reference to Yugoslavia--a mistake, Hoxha noted
    in passing).

    Since 1957, Hoxha complained, "the consistent and ceaseless
    fight to smash [Yugoslav revisionism] ideologically and politically
    was not conducted with the proper intensity." And, in the opinion
    of the Albanian party, "the reason why Tito's revisionist group
    has not been totally exposed, why false hopes have arisen from
    an alleged improvement and positive turn of this group, is that
    Comrade Khrushchev and some other Soviet leaders maintain a
    conciliatory attitude toward, erroneous views about, and an
    incorrect assessment of, this dangerous Titoist revisionist
    group." [32]

    The Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement begun in 1955 was based
    on the argument that Stalin's condemnation of Tito in 1948 was
    unjustified. "Our party has never endorsed such a view because
    time and experience have proved the contrary," Hoxha declared.
    "Stalin made a very correct assessment of the dangers of
    Yugoslav revisionism."

    What was wrong, in fact, was not Stalin's condemnation
    but Khrushchev's revocation of it. In the first place, Hoxha
    argued, the USSR had not had the right to initiate a rapprochement
    with Yugoslavia in 1955:

    The Albanian Workers' Party considers the decisions taken
    against Tito's renegade group by the Cominform not as
    decisions taken by Comrade Stalin personally, but as
    decisions taken by all the parties that made up the
    Cominform, [33] and not only by these parties alone,

    -------------

    (32) This and subsequent quotations are taken from the Radio
    Tirana broadcast of 4 July 1970 (TEE No. 239, pp. 23-28).

    (33) Albania, like China and the other Asian regimes, did not
    participate in the Cominform.

    [page 22]

    but also by the Communist and workers' parties which
    did not take part in the Cominform...

    Why then was the change of attitude toward the Yugoslav
    revisionists adopted by Comrade Khrushchev and the Central
    Committee of the CPSU in 1955 not made an issue for
    consultation in the normal way with other...parties
    [instead of being] conceived and carried out so hastily
    and in a unilateral way? This was a matter that concerned
    us all... It was not up to Comrade Khrushchev to settle
    this affair at his own discretion. Yet that is what he
    did!

    Hoxha went on to reveal (or claim) that when the Albanian
    party leaned of Khrushchev's intention to visit Belgrade in 1955--
    a visit which signalled the zigzag process of rapprochement--it
    "immediately opposed it categorically." His account of this
    "opposition is vague, and we have unfortunately no Soviet version
    of what occurred; but it does seem that the Albanians made some
    cautious attempt to hinder the rapprochement, without success:

    Before Comrade Khrushchev set out for Belgrade in May
    1955 the Central Committee of the Albanian Workers'
    Party sent a letter to the Central Committee of the
    CPSU, in which it expressed the opposition of our
    party to his going to Belgrade, stressing that the
    Yugoslav issue could not be settled in a unilateral
    way, but that a meeting of the Cominform should be
    called, to which it asked that the Albanian Workers'
    Party should also be invited...

    Of course, formally, we had no right to decide whether
    Comrade Khrushchev should or should not go to Belgrade,
    and we backed down on this. But in essence we were
    right, and time has confirmed that the Yugoslav issue
    should not be settled in this precipitate way.

    Even after the rapprochement had got under way, the 1949.
    Cominform resolution denouncing Tito as an agent of imperialism
    had been revoked, and other Communist parties had followed the
    Soviet lead with regard to Yugoslavia--even then, Hoxha continued
    "Our party refused to take such a conciliatory and opportunistic
    course... The Albanian Workers' Party remained unshaken in its
    views that the Titoite group were traitors...that Comrade Stalin
    had not erred in this matter, that by pursuing their treacherous
    line the revisionists had attempted to enslave Albania, to
    destroy the Albanian Workers' Party and....plunge Albania into
    international conflicts...the tragedy is that its unshaken,
    principled Marxist-Leninist stand was in opposition to the
    conciliatory stand of the Soviet leaders and of certain other
    Communist and workers' parties toward the Yugoslav revisionists."

    [page 23]

    Hoxha went on to discuss some of the events of the crucial
    year, 1956, the year of the 20th CPSU Congress, the denunciation
    of Stalin, the Polish October and the Hungarian rising. It was
    also, according to Hoxha, the year of a Yugoslav plot to
    overthrow his regime. His partisan account did not dissipate the
    veil of mystery that still shrouds the purge of anti-Hoxha
    elements after the Tirana party conference in April 1956. It
    seems probable that the anti-Stalinist impact of the 20th Congress
    had much to do with the emergence of these elements, although
    the likelihood of Yugoslav intervention need not be discounted.

    Hoxha's simplistic version was that the Albanian party
    "unmasked Tito's spies in our Central Committee who worked in
    collusion with the Yugoslav legation in Tirana... These spies
    and traitors also wrote to Comrade Khrushchev to intervene against
    the Central Committee of the Albanian Workers Party." [34] He
    referred to the "Titoite agents" Dali Ndreu and Liri Gega, who,
    he said, were caught trying to escape to Yugoslavia--and who
    were later executed. [35] He went into more controversial detail
    on the case of the Albanian general, Panajot Plaku, who did
    manager to escape to Yugoslavia:

    Agent Plaku wrote letters to Tito and Khrushchev, asking
    from the latter that... he should liquidate the
    leadership of Albania with Enver Hoxha at its head, on the
    ground that it was allegedly anti-Marxist and Stalinist.
    Nikita Khrushchev not only was not filled with
    indignation by the letter of this traitor, but he was of the
    opinion that [Plaku] could return to Albania provided
    no measure whatever was taken against him; otherwise he
    could find political asylum in the Soviet Union. [36]

    We felt as if the Kremlin walls had tumbled down upon our
    heads, for we could never have imagined that the First
    Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU could go
    so far as to support Tito's agents and traitors to our
    party and our people.

    --------------

    (34) This and subsequent quotations are taken from a section of
    the text carried by the ATA dispatch of
    but omitted from the Radio Tirana broadcasts; it would
    have come between the broadcast of 4 July 1970 and the
    of 5 July.

    (35) Referring to Liri Gega in his reply to Hoxha's conference
    speech, Khrushchev accused the Albanians of having
    executed a pregnant woman.

    (36] In a brief reference to this affair in an anniversary speech
    of early November 1961, Hoxha said that it was in 1957--
    the year after the defection-- that Khrushchev offered asylum
    to "the traitor Panajot Plaku" (Zeri i Popullit, 8 November
    1961)

    [page 24]

    In April 1957, according to Hoxha, Soviet-Albanian talks
    almost broke down over the Yugoslav issue. He quoted Khrushchev
    as having "angrily told us: 'We give up the talks. We cannot
    come to terms with you. You are seeking to lead us to Stalin's
    road.'" At this, it seems, the "cool-headed" Albanians retreated
    --"convinced that we were right, and not Khrushchev, that our
    line would again be confirmed by life."

    Hungary, 1956

    Hoxha went on to deal with the Hungarian drama of 1956. In
    his Manichean version: "The counterrevolution was prepared by
    the agents of the Yugoslav revisionists in cooperation with the
    traitor Imre Nagy, in cooperation with the Hungarian fascists.
    They were all openly acting under the direction of the Americans.
    The Yugoslav revisionists had planned that Hungary should detach
    herself from the camp of socialism, that she should turn into a
    second Yugoslavia and be converted into a force against the
    socialist camp." Hoxha went on to suggest that their infatuation
    with Tito prevented the Soviets from discerning the advance of
    "counterrevolution" in Hungary:

    The counter-revolutionaries in Hungary were acting
    openly. But how could their activity fail to be
    noticed? We cannot understand. How is it possible
    that in a fraternal people's democracy, where the
    party was in power and held in its hands the weapons
    of the dictatorship, and where the Soviet Army was
    stationed, Tito and the Horthyite bands could act
    as freely as they did? We think that the stands
    of Comrade Khrushchev and of the other Soviet
    comrades toward Hungary have not been clear because the
    very erroneous views they were holding about the
    Yugoslav revisionists were preventing them from
    viewing these questions correctly.

    There followed another minor revelation. Hoxha had, he said,
    warned the Soviets of the danger of counter-revolution in
    Hungary, but in vain:

    Before the counter-revolution broke out, and when
    things were boiling up at the Pet�fi Club, I happened
    to pass through Moscow, and in conversation with
    Mikhail Suslov told him what I had seen on my way
    through Budapest. I told him, too, that Imre Nagy
    was deserting and was organizing a counter-revolution
    at the Pet�fi Club. Comrade Suslov categorically

    [page 25]

    opposed my view and, in order to prove to me that
    Imre Nagy was a good man, pulled out of his drawer
    Imre Nagy's fresh self-criticism. Nevertheless,
    I told Comrade Suslov that Imre Nagy was a traitor.

    Despite this warning, Hoxha went on, no steps could be taken
    to guard against counter-revolution in Hungary "so long as
    Khrushchev and his comrades placed their trust in the Yugoslav
    revisionists... so long as they set so little value on the
    absolutely necessary regular meetings with their friends and
    allies, so long as they considered their unilateral decisions
    on matters that concern us all as the only correct ones, and
    so long as they attached no importance whatever to collective
    work and collective decisions." Even after the "great lesson"
    of Hungary, he alleged, the Soviet leaders kept documentary
    evidence of Yugoslav intervention in Hungary under lock and key,
    and resumed a policy of "reconciliation, smiles, contacts,
    moderation and almost kisses" toward Tito.

    Because the Albanian party refused to accept this line,
    "many friends and comrades, particularly the Soviet and Bulgarian
    comrades, being unable to attack our correct line, ridiculed us,
    smiled and, with their friendly contacts with the Titoites, isolated
    our people everywhere." Interestingly, Hoxha singled out Novotny's
    dogmatist but unswervingly loyalist regime in Czechoslovakia as
    an alleged exception to this tendency:

    Such a situation was created that the press of friendly
    countries accepted articles from Albanian writers only
    provided they made no mention of the Yugoslav
    revisionists. Everywhere in the countries of people's democracy,
    except in Czechoslovakia, where, in general, the
    Czechoslovak comrades assessed our activities correctly,
    our ambassadors were isolated in a roundabout way,
    because the diplomats of friendly countries preferred
    to converse with the Titoite diplomats, while they
    hated our diplomats and did not want even to set eyes
    on them. [37]

    When Khrushchev led a CPSU delegation to Tirana in May 1959
    for interparty talks, the first thing he said (Hoxha reported)
    was that "he would not talk against the Yugoslav revisionists."
    His hosts respected this wish--but "after our guests' departure
    ...the Albanian Workers' Party felt no longer bound by the
    conditions imposed upon us by our guest, and continued on its
    Marxist-Leninist way."

    --------------

    (37) Emphasis added.

    [page 26]

    In the closing section of his speech Hoxha tackled what
    had been a "gut issue" among Communists throughout the world
    for four years -- the question of Stalin. Many militants,
    particularly in Asian and Latin American parties, still resented
    the traumatic and unexpected way in which Khrushchev shattered
    their idol with his "secret speech" at the 20th CPSU Congress.
    Here was another subject on which Hoxha could expect a
    considerable amount of resonance, overt or covert.

    The basic argument was one that he had already used
    effectively in other contexts -- that the Soviet leaders had
    no right to take important decisions affecting the interests
    of other Communist parties without consulting those parties:

    Stalin was severely and unjustly condemned on this
    question [of the personality cult] by Comrade
    Khrushchev and the 20th Congress. Comrade Stalin
    and his work do not belong to the CPSU and the
    Soviet people alone, but to us all...

    Why was Comrade Stalin condemned at the 20th Congress
    without prior consultation with the other Communist
    and workers' parties of the world? Why was this
    anathema pronounced upon Stalin all of a sudden...
    and why did many fraternal parties learn of it
    only when the imperialist press published Comrade
    Khrushchev's secret report far and wide? The
    condemnation of Comrade Stalin was imposed on the
    Communist and progressive world by Khrushchev. [38]

    The Albanian party found itself in "a great dilemma," Hoxha
    explained. It "adopted in general the formula of the 20th Congress
    on this matter, but nevertheless it did not stick to the
    limitations set by the Congress, nor did it yield to the blackmail
    and intimidation from outside the country." It maintained a
    "correct and grateful [attitude] toward this glorious Marxist.--
    against whom, while he was alive, there was no one among us brave
    enough to come out and direct criticism." [39] Stalin had made

    -------------

    (38) This and subsequent quotations are taken from the Radio
    Tirana broadcast of 5 July 1970 (TEE, No. 239, pp. 29-34).

    (39) Gomulka of Poland turned this taunt against its author in
    a later speech at the Conference. According to the Italian
    Communist Giuseppe Boffa (Dopo Krusciov, p. 68) and the
    American delegate Elizabeth Gurley Flynn (op. cit., p. 31)
    he told Hoxha that the latter praised Stalin now, but that
    if the dictator were alive he would not have dared to criticize
    the Soviet party in this way -- for it he had done so, he
    would not have left Moscow alive and in freedom.

    [page 27]

    mistakes, but it was not right, normal or Marxist to blot out
    his name and great work, as had been done. "We should all
    defend the good and immortal work of Stain. He who does not
    defend it is an opportunist and a coward."

    His opponents -- and that meant the great majority of
    delegates at the 1960 conference -- might have described Hoxha
    himself as an opportunist; but they could hardly accuse him
    of cowardice. Nevertheless, as this analysis suggests, his
    anti-Soviet bravado was a calculated performance, his indictment
    carefully constructed. His rebellion would not have been
    possible if he had not been able to turn away from Moscow to
    the alternative patron in Peking.

    Yet, as we have seen, he was at pains to minimize this
    dependent relationship; and with some reason. The text not
    made public after nearly a decade show that in his historic
    intervention Hoxha presented himself as an ally of China, not
    a satellite--a junior partner, let us say. The fact that
    he and Shehu left the conference for Tirana after hearing
    Khrushchev's polemical reply to Hoxha's speech, [40] whereas
    the Chinese delegates stayed until the end, is more than symbolic.

    The importance of this anti-Soviet rebellion, providing
    Mao Tse-tung with his first dependable ally, lies in the fact
    that it came not from one of the Asian regimes and parties
    already subject to the geopolitical influence of China but
    from the smallest and weakest of the East European countries.
    This fact gave a global dimension to the Sino-Soviet conflict.

    In the decade that has passed since then this basic conflict
    has continued, and the Communist world has undergone further

    ---------------

    (40) Khrushchev's speech has not, of course, been published,
    but it is known from various sources (notably Edward
    Crankshaw in The New Cold War) that he turned Hoxha's
    championship of Stalin against him by identifying him
    with the methods of the Soviet dictator, picturing
    Albania as a backward regime ruled by terror, in which
    a clique of power-hungry leaders used mock trials,
    firing squads and concentration camps to crush pro-Soviet
    sentiment, and where almost all of the original leadership
    had been purged.

    [page 28]

    radical transformations, with the polycentric assertion of local
    interests. But Albanian rejection of Soviet authority has
    remained a constant factor. Publication of Hoxha's speech
    at this juncture represents, among other things, a commitment
    that this stand will be maintained. [41]

    Summary: After nearly a decade, Albanian has
    published the full text of the speech which Enver
    Hoxha delivered at the 81-party Moscow Conference
    in November 1960 -- thus becoming the only regime
    to break the "pact of secrecy." The text shows
    that Hoxha's rejection of Soviet authority was
    couched in extremely offensive terms, with strong
    personal attacks against Khrushchev. It contains
    interesting revelations on the secret interparty
    meeting held in Bucharest in June 1960, when
    Khrushchev tried to drum up an anti-Chinese
    consensus, and on subsequent Soviet efforts to
    coerce the Albanians into submission. While
    supporting Chinese positions at the 1960 Conference,
    Hoxha in fact played down the new Peking-Tirana
    alliance, arguing his "principled "case largely
    in Albanian terms. The paper discusses the
    probable reasons for the publication of the historic
    text at this time, concluding that if represents,
    inter alia, a reaffirmation of Albanian independence
    and a pledge that the struggle against Soviet
    authority will continue.

    Kevin Devlin & lz

    --------------

    (41) Reviewing the volume in which the text appeared, the Albanian
    theorist Vangjel Moisiu wrote in Zeri i Popullit of 1
    August 1970 that the decade of the sixties had demonstrated
    the correctness of Hoxha's "principled viewpoints, analyses
    and predictions" and "the great historic and international
    significance" of the Albanian party's struggle against
    Khrushchevian revisionism.

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