Pakoja e Ahtisari !!!!

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The Ahtisaari plan -- what's inside?

By Robert C. Austin for Southeast European Times – 21/05/07


As the diplomatic tug-of-war over former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari's blueprint for Kosovo continues, relatively little attention has been paid to the actual contents of the document. In Kosovo and elsewhere, the focus tends to be on the front-end of the proposal -- the part where Kosovo is granted the right to a flag, anthem and, most importantly, the right to conclude international agreements and the right to seek membership in international institutions.

Less is said about the truly monumental tasks involved in making the Ahtisaari package a reality on-the-ground. It is doubtful that most people on the street, whether in Pristina or North Mitrovica, have a clear idea of what would come after "independence day".

Ahtisaari's proposal is first and foremost a document designed to make Kosovo a multiethnic society. This means that the non-Albanian communities have been granted substantial powers. With more than 90% of Kosovo made up of Albanians, the minority Serb, Roma, Ashkali, Gorani, Egyptian, Turk and Bosniak communities are given tremendous influence in all sectors. In brief, Ahtisaari has designed an asymmetric state.

One can certainly imagine that in the new Kosovo minority parties will be able to play critical roles in the formation of both governments and government policy. It is also worth noting that Ahtisaari's proposals for community rights did not come out of the blue. They were already in the Kosovo Albanian side's negotiation package for the direct talks in Vienna.

As a first step, Kosovo will have to adopt a constitution that will include many aspects of the Ahtisaari package. A constitutional commission must be formed that includes 21 members, three of whom will come from the Serb community and three from other non-majority communities. Upon approval of the constitution by the existing Assembly in Kosovo, new elections must be held within

The new electoral system borrows much of what was already there, but there are some important changes. There are still 120 seats based on proportional representation. The big difference here is that the party lists will be open -- until now they have been closed, much to the dissatisfaction of many citizens. Twenty seats have been set aside for non-Albanian communities -- ten for the Serb community and ten for other communities. For the first two electoral mandates these are required minimums. Any seats gained in the elections are in addition to the reserved seats.

The new assembly rules also include various qualified majority voting rules. Certain legal changes would require not only a majority in the Assembly but also a majority of Assembly members who represent non-majority communities. In essence, any major alterations require everyone's assent. The new cabinet must include a Serb minister and a minister from another non-majority community. The same rule applies for deputy ministers as well. If the cabinet has more than 12 members, than the non-majority communities get an additional minister and deputy minister.

Any future changes to the constitution require approval from two-thirds of assembly members as well as two-thirds of the members who represent non-majority communities. The same rules apply to the justice system. Kosovo's Supreme Court must have at least 15% of judges representing non-majority communities.

Outside of national level institutions, the communities are again granted wide powers at the local level. Full access to schooling in any official language of Kosovo (Albanian and Serbian), and free use of national symbols, language and alphabet are guaranteed. Where non-majority communities form at least 10% of the population, the post of vice-president of the Municipal Assembly goes to a representative of non-majority communities. As is the case with the Ohrid Framework Agreement, Kosovo's public service at all levels must reflect the multiethnic nature of Kosovo society.

The most crucial area, however, is decentralisation. This is potentially the biggest hurdle for the Albanian majority, as the Ahtisaari package creates a fairly decentralised state with a number of new municipalities designed to accommodate Serb demands. For example, North Mitrovica gets control over higher education and health care. The same holds true for other Serb-dominated municipalities. Schools that teach in the Serbian language are free to use books developed by appropriate ministries in Serbia.

A strong international community presence is envisaged, although many aspects of this have yet to be worked out. As in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the plan grants sweeping powers to the International Civilian Representative (ICR) who also acts as the EU's special representative. The ICR's powers are easy to interpret: he/she is the final authority on the implementation of the package. It is the ICR that makes the difference between independence and supervised independence.

Ahtisaari's proposal does more than create a quasi-independent Kosovo. He offered a framework for another stage in Kosovo's evolution. This stage seems set to last for a protracted period, in the hope that by the time true independence does come, things in the region might make this type of solution more palatable.

Under renewed and potentially more stringent supervision, Kosovo's communities must now prove that they can sustain a multiethnic state. Much depends on the Albanian majority's political will and enthusiasm for remaining committed to Ahtisaari's vision. But it is also up to the non-Albanian communities to make the most of the powers granted them. Should they fail to do so, the blame could not be placed on the Albanians.

Reactions to the plan so far suggest that both sides should spend more energy looking at the specifics -- as the saying goes, the devil is in the details. Kosovo's media is now focused entirely on the endgame and the diplomatic showdown with Serbia and Russia. There is little talk on how to move forward afterwards. At the same time, the Serb community in Kosovo has the opportunity to consider how the Ahtisaari proposal can be used to their advantage. Anyone who suggests that Kosovo is set to become simply another Albanian state in the Balkans has not read the fine print.

A public outreach campaign, especially by the Albanian authorities in Kosovo, would help the public understand just what is expected when it comes to the implementation phase. By accepting the package, the Albanian majority has undertaken a sweeping set of obligations that will be expensive, challenging and not altogether pleasing. Political will and an informed population will be critical if Kosovo is to move ahead.

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After the violence in Kosovo in March 2004, the powers supervising implementation of UNSCR 1244 on Kosovo – the Contact Group of Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the United State – began moving apart over the question of what to do next. The Western five countries – the Quint – came to the conclusion that waiting for Kosovo to fulfill certain standards of good behavior before moving to determine final status would not work. The Albanians were clearly growing restless, things had to move forward. But everyone had to wait first for the tensions arising from the March events to subside. When I arrived in Mitrovica as UN regional representative in July 2005, the bridge connecting north and south was still blocked with barbwire and it took sustained dialogue and diplomacy to return to at least the superficial normalcy of reopening the bridge and keeping it open. In November 2005, the Contact Group – in what was essentially its last gasp of consensus – announced guiding principles for resolving status. At the same time, former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari was asked to lead the process of arriving at a status agreement.

I first met President Ahtisaari in the 1980s while I was working on southern Africa in the US State Department and he was representing the UN in the process of achieving Namibian independence under UNSCR 435. When I heard of his appointment as Special Envoy for Kosovo Status, I thought it a good choice because President Ahtisaari understood tribal conflict, which is what Kosovo was really all about. It seemed unlikely that Belgrade and Pristina would actually be able to agree on status since they had completely opposite positions. President Ahtisaari’s job seemed to be more about trying to draw, from both sides, elements of a possible compromise arrangement around which the Contact Group could reach consensus and then press upon the parties. President Ahtisaari and his team worked to bring Belgrade and Pristina into face-to-face encounters and he managed to derive from these and separate discussions the elements for what came to be known as the Ahtisaari Plan. It was clear from the start that neither Pristina nor Belgrade were ready for real negotiations and it gradually became clear as well that the Contact Group could not hold up its end. There were substantive issues between the Quint and Russia – Russia pushed for recognition that Kosovo would be a precedent for other disputed regions – but in the end, it seemed that Russia was simply in no mood to do any favors for the US and its allies by facilitating their smooth exit from Kosovo. (Russia had withdrawn its own troops some time before and had only a small police and political presence in the peacekeeping mission.) It seemed partial (and cost-free) payback for NATO expansion.

The inability of the Contact Group to agree on an overall package and pass a new resolution in the Security Council was not the fault of President Ahtisaari. But by 2007, it was clear that there would not be a new resolution. Guaranteed Quint support, Kosovo declared independence on its own in February 2008. Technically, the Ahtisaari Plan remained the basis for this declaration and for a continuing international role – to be carried out by the International Civilian Office (ICO) of the European Union Special Representative. But since then, the Plan has been moribund and the ICO lifeless.

During the “negotiations” over status, there was much debate over what models might apply and especially for the north. Some suggested Brcko, some Mostar, some others. In fact, the Ahtisaari Plan seemed to draw on these various experiences elsewhere in the Balkans to derive a formula that would allow Kosovo Serbs to remain in charge of their own local institutions and communal life with continued linkages to Serbia but without partition and instead within the framework of a multi-ethnic Kosovo. It would establish six new Serb majority municipalities (including North Mitrovica) with important elements of self-rule in health, education and social issues plus a role in choosing the local police chief. These municipalities would have the right to own funding, block grants from central government and funding from Belgrade. They could form associations with other municipalities including in Serbia. The intent seemed clear, to allow Serbs in these Kosovo municipalities to live in two worlds at once, in both Kosovo and Serbia. It was an imaginative plan worth trying. But it was predicated on implementation within the framework of an agreed arrangement on status sanctioned by both Belgrade and Pristina and the UN Security Council. This did not happen.

As in any compromise arrangement, the devil would be in the details. Even if all parties had agreed on the Ahtisaari Plan, implementation would have faced many difficult trials. Details important to both Serbs and to Pristina centered on exactly what role the central government would play in the linkages to Belgrade and on setting policy in areas such as education. Without a status agreement, these details, plus the distrust on both sides over the intentions of the other, make it impossible to simply “implement” the plan. The Quint is stuck with the “half-baked” outcome of the declaration of independence without a status agreement but has so far done little to get beyond this. Local elections coming up in November offer a chance to get some of the southern Serbs to accept three of the six planned municipalities. But this will not by itself fill in the missing details. And Pristina has shown little eagerness to implement the Plan, including on protection of cultural heritage, perhaps out of a belief that without getting Serbian agreement in return, why should it accept the burden of Ahtisaari.

All parties need to look again at the Ahtisaari Plan. The Quint should seek to re-engage with Russia and focus on trying to fill in the details through a new round of talks with Belgrade and Pristina. The Serbs living in Kosovo, including in the north, need to get over their simple rejection of Ahtisaari – as linked to Kosovo independence – and reexamine the Plan closely to see how it could be made to address their concerns. In a transitional period, the international community – the UN, EU or whoever – may need to play the role of intermediary and facilitator so that the minority can feel assured that Pristina’s role will stay within the bounds of the eventual agreement. But the plan is too good to either leave aside or seek to implement in a one-sided way or perhaps through force.

The Ahtisaari Plan can be found at - http://www.unosek.org/unosek/en/statusproposal.html



Gerard M. Gallucci retired from the US Foreign Service in 2005. His service included as Chargé d'affaires of the US Embassy in Khartoum, Chargé d'affaires in Brasilia, and at the National Security Council. His 25 years with the US State Department focused on Latin America and Africa and included working on the Angola and Mozambique peace processes, implementation of UNSCR 435/78 for Namibia and on the transition to full democracy in South Africa. He served as UN Regional Representative in Mitrovica, Kosovo from July 2005 until October 2008 and now serves elsewhere. Gallucci has taught in the School of Media and Public Affairs, George Washington University and, prior to government service, at West Virginia Wesleyan College and the University of Arkansas at Little Rock. He holds a Ph.D. from the University of Pittsburgh in Political Science. The views expressed in this piece are his own and do not represent the position of any organization.

You can read more of Mr. Gallucci's analysis of current developments in Kosovo by visiting http://outsidewalls.blogspot.com

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It appears that perhaps the controversy over the EUSR’s northern strategy may have prompted the EU to do a bit of tacking in its policy approach. Maybe. Perhaps.

EULEX chief de Kermabon has been holding talks in Belgrade with the Serbian government. According to EULEX, the main goal of the visit was to discuss “reestablishing” the “District Court” in north Mitrovica. After a March 3 meeting with de Kermabon, Serbian Minister for Kosovo Bogdanović told the press that he learned that EULEX does not support the EUSR’s strategy. Bogdanović said that de Kermabon assured that EULEX and the EU would not use force to impose political solutions in northern Kosovo. According to the Minister, the government and EULEX will form working groups to look at technical questions vis-à-vis customs, courts and police. These groups will start work “in the coming weeks.” Justice Ministry State Secretary Slobodan Homen also met with de Kermabon and told the media that discussions included an emphasis on the functioning of legal institutions. Asked whether there was talk about which legal system would be used – the Serbian or the Kosovar – the State Secretary reportedly said this was not discussed because “the talks were of a technical nature” and because Belgrade’s position on the issue is already clear.

It will be interesting to see if EULEX confirms these comments and how they might be spun in Pristina.

Till now, EULEX’s commitment to bring the Kosovo justice system into the north, by “reestablishing” the southern District Court there, has been clear. On the EULEX website, de Kermabon was quoted as saying in January that “EULEX does not recognize neither assist the so-called parallel structures in Kosovo. Our mandate … says that we are here to assist the Kosovo institutions, judicial authorities and law enforcement agencies.” He continued that “EULEX is working on the reestablishment of a functioning justice in North Mitrovica, has reopened the court and conducted five trials there. Our top priority now is to get Kosovo Serb and Kosovo Albanian judges and prosecutors back to the Mitrovica District Court.” (emphasis added) This must be read against the background of the longstanding demand from the northern Serbs that the existing judges and other court personnel of the Serbian local courts (the same de Kermabon calls “parallel”) be allowed to work openly in a district confined to the Serb majority north and under UNSCR 1244. When de Kermabon talks of “re-establishing” the Mitrovica District Court and sending “back” Serb and Albanian judges he means the Kosovo District Court that used to work out of the northern part of the city with mostly Albanian judges and including a jurisdiction south of the Ibar River and overwhelmingly Albanian.

Belgrade’s position has been that it is ready to reach agreement on rule of law issues as long as they are on a status neutral basis. The Serbian Foreign Minister – with Belgrade under pressure from the EU, and most recently France, to come to terms with an independent Kosovo – has seemingly reaffirmed this stance indicating to the press that Belgrade still insists that solutions on the ground have to be negotiated with the EULEX and UN within the framework of the UN Secretary General’s status neutral six-point plan of 2008.

It will therefore also be interesting to see if and how the two sides square this circle. As I have noted here in the past, the fact that EULEX works ostensibly under a transfer of the UN’s SCR 1244 responsibility for rule of law (at the price of being status neutral) allows a certain level of ambiguity for the EU’s work in Kosovo. The EUSR – or EULEX – could work in a status-neutral manner on one hand while on the other he works as ICR for Kosovo independence. But it remains to be seen if EULEX is any more willing and able to reach practical and status neutral arrangements with the Serbs on core issues like the courts and customs – without leaving the Albanians with a veto – than UNMIK was. UNMIK wasn’t.

Should Belgrade accede to anything less than status neutral, it would be interesting to see if they could deliver the locals.