A është Italia Greqia e ardhshme? Vendi fqinj buzë humnerës ekonomike

[Vinjol]

A është Italia Greqia e ardhshme? Kjo është pyetja që ngrenë ekspertët e çështjeve ekonomike teksa stoku i bankave italiane vijon të dëshmojë një muaj të dobët performance.


Depozitat bankare duket se janë zbrazur dhe kjo ka rritur frikën se situata mund të përfundoje e njëjtë sikurse skenari fatkeq i Greqisë.

Ndërkaq, banka më e vjetër në botë, Monte dei Paschi, ndodhet në ditë të vështira, çka e dëshmoi dhe testi i fundit i Bankës Qendrore Europiane.

Banka Italiane duhet të rrisë rezervat e kapitalit të saj me 3 miliardë euro për të përmbushur objektivat e vendosura nga rregullatorët evropianë.

Kjo, sepse është viti i katërt që rezultatet e saj vjetore flisnin për një goditje të madhe financiare, ku prej vitit 2011 humbjet arritën në 14.6 miliardë euro.

Një analizë e Bloomberg tregon se pavarësisht serisë së përpjekjeve për t’u rikthyer në pozitat e mëparshme apo për të shlyer kreditë e këqija, bankat italiane kanë dështuar.

Kombinuar me një rritje “mediokre të ekonomisë”, siç e quajnë ekspertët, dhe një mjedis të përkeqësuar financiar global, investitorët po bëhen çdo ditë e më shumë skeptikë.

Analistët e “JP Morgan” kanë paralajmëruar investitorët të shmangin bankat e vendit, ndërsa vërehet se perspektiva e bankave të Europës veriore po bëhen gjithnjë e më tërheqëse sesa bankat në jug të kontinentit.

Po ashtu, normat në rënie të interesit në eurozonë kanë krijuar më shumë presion mbi sektorin bankar dhe ekspertët thonë se, nëse Italia nuk vepron për t’u rekuperuar mund të përfundojë si Greqia.

/ Top Channel

[HFTengineer]

Nje artikull i mike stathis mbulon mire ekonomikisht cu be me greqine



http://www.avaresearch.com/articles/...h-bankers.html

Artikulli tjeter tregon per kreditin qe i dhe imf-ja qe shumica e perqindjes shkon per te paguar kreditn e bankave:


http://www.macropolis.gr/?i=portal.en.the-agora.2080

[Ciarli]

Italia nuk ka themele mistike dhe nuk ka si te jete pikesynim per nje tjeter Greqi te lashte. Thone se ky lloj djalli qe nderton Greqi mahnitese e ka uje me Zotin, e ka trup dhe strehe ate ashtu si edhe Zotat e tjere me pare, dhe pasi provoi Rumanine e Drakules gjysem te padukshem dhe hasi ne ndalesen e engjejve qe nuk flene, nuk ua mban ti leshojne pe nje marrezie te tille ne forme fluture gjigande dhe qe te fut hunden thelle ne tru dhe te pushton, qeton shpirtin, pasi nuk e lane fle thelle ne artikun e Nordeve dhe pret nje tjeter pushtim te shpirtrave te medhenj, Mbreter apo Lorder. Po mbase edhe parja, kjo vlere abstrakte qe na bashkon dhe na ben me trima, ka patur nje fare vlere dhe kuptimi pergjate tmerrit qe Zoti i vertete mbjell edhe ne qiellin e tokes. Apo mbase po loz fshatce jugut te Italise?

[HFTengineer]

Italia nuk ka themele mistike dhe nuk ka si te jete pikesynim per nje tjeter Greqi te lashte. Thone se ky lloj djalli qe nderton Greqi mahnitese e ka uje me Zotin, e ka trup dhe strehe ate ashtu si edhe Zotat e tjere me pare, dhe pasi provoi Rumanine e Drakules gjysem te padukshem dhe hasi ne ndalesen e engjejve qe nuk flene, nuk ua mban ti leshojne pe nje marrezie te tille ne forme fluture gjigande dhe qe te fut hunden thelle ne tru dhe te pushton, qeton shpirtin, pasi nuk e lane fle thelle ne artikun e Nordeve dhe pret nje tjeter pushtim te shpirtrave te medhenj, Mbreter apo Lorder. Po mbase edhe parja, kjo vlere abstrakte qe na bashkon dhe na ben me trima, ka patur nje fare vlere dhe kuptimi pergjate tmerrit qe Zoti i vertete mbjell edhe ne qiellin e tokes. Apo mbase po loz fshatce jugut te Italise?

Na bej nje permbledhje per skllevrit qe i ngriten piramidad ne egjypt dhe qe u enden per dekada ne shkretetire pa len gjurme e skan nevoj per rekorde historike e i than te dhjefsha arkilogjine ne jemi me te me medhenj e krijuam egjyptin , arriten te martojne nje nga te tyret me te madhin e athershem grek dhe luftuan e i munden grekrit, dhe prap skishin nevoj per rekorde historike e arkiologjike.Kta kan me shume misticizem se italjanet e grekrit bashk sepse jane konsiderar te zgjedhurit e zotit nga fete me te medha, dhe gjithashtu jane baballaret e misticizmit.
Se per ekonomi i thyve nmes me shpjegime thollsishme dhe i vure kapkun me kte nfund.

[Ciarli]

Ekonomia eshte perpjestim i zhdrejte i pasurise, apo loje e te fortit per te zhvatur Zoterine(optimalin me cilesi) dhe nuk ka kuptim pa humanizem apo spiritualizem, doze me e forte se ajo, dhe nuk e kuptoj ku e sheh njerzillikun ti ketu apo mbase te k jevgjit e piramidave qe vetem nje mal me m*t mund te kishin bere pa Faraonet e bardhe dhe te lavdishem.
Italia nuk mund te krahasohet me Greqine, province e themeluar diku nga zota te vegjel dhe te dyshimte, sepse ajo eshte fshat i qendres, Europes, me trung dhe shtat, hapesire te sajen ngahera dhe edhe nese del ne hije perseri eshte nje loje miqesore mes tyre, shteteve te Europes, pa marre parasysh intrigat dhe sprovat e veshtira qe Zoti po hedh kunder tyre, si Mafja, lindja e kuqe reaksionare apo kriminelet e nxehur amerikane.

[HFTengineer]

Pallat mire qe dun te bejne shaka karagjozesh qe te hiqen si te zgjut duke fol ironi, po te pakten mer vesh nga ekonomia hudh ndonje gje kur do me llap me ironi te oakten ca ti drejtohesh apo ska gje varja kujt i intereso mjafton qe flet.

[HFTengineer]

Lexo palle eshte leter e imf-se e publikuar tek faqa e imf-se
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft...10/wp10139.pdf

II. WHAT EXPLAINS THE RISE IN CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICITS IN SOUTHERN EURO AREA COUNTRIES?

Stylized facts Current accounts in the SEA have been deteriorating sharply since the mid-1990s, growing from a surplus of 0.1 percent on average in 1994 to a deficit of 10 percent in 2008 (Figures 1 and 2).5 This downward trend is shared by most countries in the region, although it started later for Cyprus, Malta, and Slovenia than for Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain coinciding with their later entry into the EMU and euro area. This overall pattern of growing external deficits is in sharp contrast to NEA which accumulated current account surpluses of the order of 2‒3 percent of GDP after 1994




While the paper simplifies for the sake of the analysis, it should be noted that the north-south divide is not clear-cut and there is also variation within groups. On the one hand, current account deficits remained at more moderate levels in Malta, Slovenia, and especially Italy (3 percent of GDP). On the other hand, some NEA countries (e.g. Ireland) were also running large current account deficits prior to the crisis. Countries within a group also have different structural settings (e.g. financial sector size and development, labor market institutions) and starting positions (e.g. savings, competitiveness and per capita income). The decline in current accounts in SEA was accompanied by a fall in private saving and to a lesser extent a rise in investment (Figures 3 and 4). On average across the region, private saving rates declined by 10 percentage points between 1994 and 2008, while investment rates increased by 2 percentage points and public saving rates improved by about 2 percentage points. Of course, the distribution between saving and investment varies across countries.
In Greece, Italy, Portugal, Cyprus and Malta, declines in private saving rates were the predominant factor behind the decline in the current account. Spain is a well-known example where investment boomed, especially in the construction sector, but falling private saving rates contributed equally to the deterioration of its external position. In Slovenia investment boomed too, while private saving actually improved. Cyprus and Malta experienced an investment boom after EU accession in 2004. However, investment still remained below the high levels of the mid-1990s. In countries where it increased, investment went mostly to the construction sector, while investment in machinery and equipment only increased moderately or declined, suggesting that much of the rise in investment permitted by higher external debt was channeled into the less productive nontradeable sectors (Figure 5). While saving and investment rates started broadly similar to those of NEA in 1994, they have been diverging substantially in subsequent years. By 2008, saving rates in most SEA countries were substantially below the average for NEA, due to both lower private and public saving, while investment rates were broadly in line with the average level in NEA except in Spain and Slovenia, where they were much higher. It is interesting to note that while public saving improved over the period in SEA, it did less so than in NEA. Hence, the relative buoyancy of the private sector in SEA was compounded by a less restrictive stance of the public sector than in NEA. The current account deficits were heavily financed with debt instead of FDI (Figure 6). The larger countries, Spain, Greece and to a lesser extent Italy, were large importers of bond-related inflows, while Portugal and Slovenia took in large foreign loans. 7 Cyprus and Malta are a bit of an exception, in that they received substantial net FDI inflows of the order of 5 and 10 percent of GDP respectively on average over the period 2000‒20088 . Cyprus also relied on non-resident deposits to finance its current account deficit, while Malta used very large inflows of non-resident deposits to invest in non-resident assets with a neutral effect on its financial account. The decline in saving and increase in investment had their counterparts in a fall of the trade balance (as imports increased), a large decrease in net income, and a decline in net transfers (Figure 7, Table 1). Of the 10 percentage point average decline in the current account, the trade balance contributed 2.8 percentage points, net income contributed 3.6 percentage points, and net transfers 3.6 percentage points. Excluding oil, the trade balance improves slightly, but the deterioration of the current account remains sizeable at some 6½ percentage points on average.


The decline in SEA current accounts coincided with the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and its subsequent introduction of the euro. After a first stage of financial liberalization that occurred broadly between 1990 and 1993, the four largest SEA countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) joined EMU in 1994 and the euro area in 1999 (2001 for Greece). The three smaller SEA countries (Cyprus, Malta, and Slovenia) started the process later, by joining the EMU around 2004 and the euro area in 2007-2008 (Table 2). These dates correspond broadly to the start of the deterioration of current accounts (EMU) and its subsequent acceleration (euro area) (Figure 9). Hence, it is natural to ask whether participation into EMU caused this decline and if so, through which mechanisms.11 In what follows, the four early joiners are referred to as SEA-4 and the three later joiners as SEA-3.

SEA countries made great strides in financial liberalization, converging towards levels in NEA countries (Figure 10).12 Liberalization was broad-based, involving relaxation of capital controls, entry barriers, quantitative credit controls, and improved financial supervision, although privatization efforts were slower. While substantial financial liberalization took place in the earlier stage of EMU, it has also been driven by exogenous non-EU related developments and by the EU internal market project. However, the “gates” were open to let capital and credit flow in once the European integration process intensified. Financial liberalization removed barriers to capital inflows, which triggered inflows into lower-income countries with bigger investment needs. The liberalization of domestic financial systems also reduced the need for domestic saving, as credit became more readily available. A narrower indicator focusing on capital account openness shows a similar picture for SEA-3 as for SEA-4, with financial liberalization largely taking place in the early stage of EMU.13 The creation of EMU was marked by a substantial improvement in macroeconomic policies in an effort to reach the “convergence criteria”14 to enter the euro area (Figure 11). In the early 1990s, SEA countries continued to run large fiscal deficits. During stage 2 of EMU, fiscal deficits of SEA were brought down at or below the 3 percent of GDP benchmark, except in Greece where they consistently stayed higher. Moreover, inflation in SEA declined from double-digit figures on average in the early 1990s to a low of 2 percent in 2007. The inflation differentials between SEA and NEA narrowed from 5.5 percent in 1994 to less than 1 percent in 2008. The potential effects on current accounts are twofold: on one hand, lower fiscal deficits and inflation help improve the current account; on the other, the sounder macroeconomic policies contributed to reducing interest costs on foreign borrowing, due to a lower country risk premium.

[HFTengineer]

Persa i perket egjyptit mso ndinje gje nga arkjologjia pallosh:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/201...s-slaves-egypt

[HFTengineer]

Mbase per karagjoizet si shembulli i ktij psikologut qe kuptojne lidhjen e ekonomise me finaincen, politkat e arenes nderkomtare, dhe rolin e cifutave/ monopolet qe ata skan fare, duhet me i sjell nje artikull tjeter pervec dhe ja po ja sjjell pervec asaj te vete imfs, ja kue e ka e shekputur nga international business times:


http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/goldman-sac...e-323748#page1






Petros Christodoulou - Head http://www.spiegel.de/international/...-a-686604.html
of Greek Debt Management Department. (Former Senior Executive Goldman Sachs, Global Markets.)
http://www.spiegel.de/international/...-a-686604.html


Lucas Papademos, Greek Prime Minister
Lucas Papademos has been the head of the Bank of Greece, the head of the European Central Bank, and is now the prime minister of Greece. He worked with Goldman Sachs when Greece was trying to get its debts levels down so it could swap its currency from the drachma to the euro. It later transpired that that cross currency deals negotiated between Greece and Goldman had helped mask Greece’s true levels of debt and contributed to the current crisis in the eurozone.Reuters
Across the world in policy and decision-making bodies, from governments to central banks, graduates of one of the world's most ruthless investment banks hold senior positions.




Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank [edhe cifut]
http://www.jpost.com/Jewish-World/Je...4-11-20-355223

Mario Draghi has the unenviable job of trying to help navigate the eurozone through the stormy sovereign debt crisis the currency area is in the midst of. He has a pivotal role as the head of the eurozone’s central bank. In the past he has had a senior role at the World Bank, as well as been managing director of the Italian Treasury, and president of the Italian central bank. For three years from 2002-2005 Draghi was managing director at Goldman Sachs International.Reuters
Across the world in policy and decision-making bodies, from governments to central banks


Romano Prodi, former Italian Prime Minister and European Commission President
Romano Prodi made millions advising Goldman Sachs on its investments in the early 1990s, before going on to become the most powerful man in the European Union. He held the position of president of the European Commission from 1999-2004, before becoming the Italian prime minister for the second time from 2006-2008. Prodi was first Italian prime minister from 1996-1998.Reuters
Across the world in policy and decision-making bodies, from governments to central banks, graduates of one of the world's most ruthless investment banks hold senior positions.

They are former Goldman Sachs employees and they are ruling the financial world.
--


Mario Monti - Prime Minister of Italy, Former International Adviser to Goldman Sachs, 2005-2011

http://www.voxeurop.eu/en/content/ar...-goldman-sachs



Antonis Samaras -Prime Minister of Greece. Jewish commerce interests behind his political career.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18410765
As Finance Minister, he signed Greece into the EU. Samaras is fully dedicated to the Jewish agenda.
http://www.timesofisrael.com/greek-p...anti-semitism/




Kurt te hysh heren tjeter ne tema per politika apo per ekonomi merr ndonje info me perpra se te flashesh mor pallosh.


Ska ngel njeri nga ekonimstat e EU's qe ska hik tek GS dhe barroso i erdhi casti
https://www.theguardian.com/business...-international

[arbereshi_niko]

Italia, po fitoi "NO" ne referendumin e ardheshem, Renzi shkon ne "pension" dhe
ketu do ti kete fillimet dalja nga Evropa.
Me pas daljes nga €uro te Italise, do te shperbehet edhe Be-ja ...
Presim edhe pak.
Pershendetje