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    ICG: - UNMIK-u ka lejuar nderjen e Kosovės

    Grupi Ndėrkombėtar i Krizave kritikon UNMIK-un se ka lejuar ndarjen e Kosovės


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    Nju Jork, 3 qershor 2002 - Grupi Ndėrkombėtar i Krizave (ICG), njė institucion politik i pavarur, ka kritikuar ashpėr Misionin e Kombeve tė Bashkuara nė Kosovė (UNMIK), qė, sipas tij, ka lejuar ndarjen e Kosovės nė enklava serbe dhe shqiptare.

    Nė njė raport tė Grupit Ndėrkombėtar tė Krizave (ICG) thuhet se UNMIK-u ka bėrė shumė pak pėr tė sfiduar influencėn e vazhdueshme tė Beogradit nė veriun e dominuar nga serbėt.

    Pavarėsisht rezolutės 1244, sipas sė cilės Misioni i Kombeve tė Bashkuara duhet tė ketė kontroll mbi gjithė territorin e Kosovės, Serbia ende kontrollon shėrbimin shėndetėsor, arsimin dhe drejtėsinė nė enklavat serbe nė veri.

    Raporti i ICG-sė shkruan se Beogradi madje ka financuar grupe qė kanė pėrdorur dhunėn ndaj policisė sė Kombeve tė Bashkuara, veēanėrisht nė qytetin e Mitrovicės. Situata, sipas raportit rrezikon tė kėrcėnojė bisedimet pėr tė ardhmen e Kosovės.


    Durimi ėshtė mė e madhja trimėri.


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    Rexhepi:- Ndarjen e Kosovės e kemi kritikuar edhe ne

    PRISHTINE, 4 qershor - Kryeministri Bajram Rexhepi ka shprehur mbėshtetjen e tij lidhur me raportin e Grupit Ndėrkombėtar tė Krizave (ICG) ku shprehen kritika tė ashpra pėr administratėn ndėrkombėtare nė Kosovė, e cila sipas raportit ka dėshtuar nė punėn e saj dhe ka lejuar ndarjen e Kosovės. “Qeveria e Kosovės ka kritikuar edhe mė herėt UNMIK-un pėr ndarjen e qytetit tė Mitrovicės. Ne fillimisht kemi kritikuar pėr njė ndarje qė ka qenė gati faktike, edhe pse jo e plotė, mirėpo kjo ka ardhur nga Grupi Ndėrkombėtar i Krizave, i cili fort mirė e njeh situatėn. Nuk besoj se UNMIK-u e inkurajon ndarjen”, tha Rexhepi. Sipas kryeministrit, ndarja tashmė i takon sė kaluarės. “Tani institucionet e Kosovės, sė bashku me UNMIK-un, do tė shkojnė drejt integrimit. Shumė elementė qė kanė qenė nė projekt-strategjinė pėr Mitrovicėn, tė hartuar nga Qeveria e Kosovės, kanė filluar tė gjejnė aplikim nga ana e UNMIK-ut dhe KFOR-it”, tha Rexhepi. Ai shprehu optimizmin e tij se shumė shpejt institucionet e Kosovės dhe ato ndėrkombėtare, tė UNMIK-ut e KFOR-it, do ta shtrijnė veprimtarinė nė tėrė Kosovėn. “Edhe me veprimet e parlamentit, qeverisė e presidencės, tani janė krijuar parakushtet dhe ėshtė krijuar njė klimė shumė mė e mirė qė ata tė mund tė veprojnė mė lehtė atje... Ndėrhyrjet e Beogradit nė proceset politike mund tė shkaktojnė pengesa si deri tani, edhe nė procesin e integrimit tė minoriteteve dhe krijimin e kushteve tė mirėfillta pėr tė gjitha komunitetet”, u shpreh kryeministri i Kosovės Bajram Rexhepi


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    Suzan Manuel-zėdhėnsia e UNMIK-ut, gjatė njė intervistimi tė shkurtėr para hyrjes qėndore tė ndėrtesės sė KFOR-it nė Prishtinė, deklaroi se UNMIK-u e di qė nuk ushtron autoritetin e vet nė disa pjesė tė Kosovės, sidomos nė Kosovėn Veriore. Ajo shtoi se kryeadministratori Shtainer ka plane sekrete pėr bashkimin e Kosovės, por ato ende nuk i ka bėrė publike.

    Kėtė qė e ka thėnė Suzana, ne, shqiptarėt e kemi ditur para shumė kohe. Edhe qė ndėrkombėtarėt flasin nė shumė gjuhė e kemi ditur. Edhe qė ndėrkombėtarėt janė me shumė fytyra e kemi ditur, por qė ata nuk skuqen kur rrejnė pak kemi besuar. Mu pėr kėtė, shumė probleme qė dualėn nė mesin e politikanėve tė Kosovės rreth themelimit tė institucioneve ishin edhe sherret e disa ndėrkombėtarėve.

    Tė shohim se ēfarė do tė bėhet pas takimit Shtajner-G.Soros.

    Sidoqoftė, probleme mund tė ketė, por veriu nuk do tė ndahejt nė asnjė mėnyrė. Pėrndryshe, ashtu siē ka dėshtuar misioni i UNMIK-ut nė Kosovė, do tė vjen edhe fundi i tij.

    Unė pra mendoj kėshtu!
    Ndryshuar pėr herė tė fundit nga kosovar : 04-06-2002 mė 20:28


    Durimi ėshtė mė e madhja trimėri.


  4. #4
    Shpirt Shqiptari Maska e Albo
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    Jam teper kurioz te di se cfare kerkon G. Soros qe te takoje Shtajner? Cila eshte axhenda e bisedimeve, ku behet takimi dhe a ka ndonje "fondacion" apo zyre te Sorros ne Kosove?

    Faleminderit
    "Babai i shtetit ėshtė Ismail "Qemali", e zbuloi Edvin shkencėtari!"

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    . Shtajner thotė se raporti i Grupit Ndėrkombėtar tė Krizave shikon tė kaluarėn dhe jo tė ardhmen e veriut tė Mitrovicės

    Prishtinė, 5 qershor - Shefi i UNMIK-ut Mihael Shtajner ka reaguar lidhur me raportin e Grupit Ndėrkombėtar tė Krizave, me tė cilin kritikohet ashpėr administrata ndėrkombėtare pėr gjendjen e krijuar nė veri tė Kosovės. Shefi i UMMIK-ut ka thėnė se raporti shikon tė kaluarėn dhe jo tė ardhmen dhe si i tillė ai ėshtė i nxitur vetėm nė zhvillimet e ēastit. Nė pjesėn analitike raporti i GNK-sė, sipas Shtajnerit nuk pėrmban asgjė tė re, ndėrkohė qė gjėrat prej atėherė kanė ndryshuar. Shtajner ndryshimin mė tė madh e parasheh nė muajt e ardhshėm, qė e bazon nė planin e tij pėr Mitrovicėn, detajet e tė cilit asnjėherė nuk janė dhėnė.
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    Shtajner takohet me Sorosin nė USA dhe pėrmbajtja e bisedimeve qė do tė zhvillohen ende nuk dihen.


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  6. #6
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    Daci i pakėnaqur me punėn e deritashme tė administratės ndėrkombėtare nė Kosovė

    Prishtinė, 5 qershor, Zoti Daci tha se mbėshtet pa rezervė raportin e Grupit Ndėrkomėbatrė tė Krizave pėr Kosovėn. Kėto qėndrime ai tha se i ka bėrė publike edhe nė biseda tė ndryshme me pėrfaqėsuesit ndėrkombėtarė.
    Daci tha se nuk ėshtė i kėnaqur me punėn e deritashme tė administratės ndėrkombėtare nė Kosovė, as me rezultatet trivjeēare sepse UNMIK-u nuk ka arritur tė respektojė obligimet e veta qė i ka marrė mbi vete si qeveri e vetme deri para disa muajve.
    "Ne i kryem detyrat e shtėpisė, por nuk do tė hezitojmė t'i kontrollojmė edhe detyrat e institucioneve tė tjera", theksoi ai.


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  7. #7
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    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Pritet trysni mbi Beogradin pas reportit kritik kundėr UNMIK-ut


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    Uashington (SH.B.A.), Isuf Hajrizi "Zeri" Prishtinė

    Autorėt e raportit mbi dėshtimin e UNMIK-ut nė Mitrovicė nga organizata Grupi Ndėrkombėtar i Krizės (ICG) besojnė se Uashingtoni dhe kryeqendrat evropiane do ta shtojnė trysninė ndaj Beogradit pėr ta zgjidhur problemin nė veri tė Kosovės.

    "Nga bisedad qė kemi patur me disa nė qarqet relevante, kemi mėsuar se do tė shtohet trysnia mbi Serbinė pėr Mitrovicėn krahas kėrkesės pėr bashkėpunim tė Beogradit me Hagėn," ka deklaruar pėr Zėrin, Nikolas Uajt, drejtor i programit tė ICG-sė nė Bruksel.

    Uajt, i cili gjendet pėr vizitė nė SHBA, nuk ėshtė befasuar pse raporti nė fjalė nuk ėshtė mirėpritur as nga UNMIK as nga Beograd duke thėnė se organizata e tij "e ka pėr detyrė qė tė raportoi pėr politikėn e gabuar (tė ndėrkombėtarėve) nė disa vende tė botės."

    Nė raportin prej 32 faqesh tė publikuar tė hėnėn, ICG e ka kritikuar UNMK-un pėr "dėshtim" tė vėndosjes sė Mitrovicės veriore nėn kotrollin ndėrkombėtar duke lejuar serbėt qė tė themelojnė institucione paralele nėn kontrollin e Beogradit qė bien ndesh me "biblen" e OKB-sė - Rezolutėn 1244.

    Nė raportin e saj ICG -- organizatė me seli nė Bruksel dhe Uashington nė radhėt e sė cilės pėrfshihen disa nga emrat mė tė njohur tė politikės amerikane dhe ndėrkombėtare -- sjell para komunitetit botėror qėllimet jo tė mira tė qeverisė serbe pėr Kosovėn dhe rekomandon njė varg veprimesh pėr t'i korrigjuar gabimet e UNMIK-ut dhe tė KFOR-it nė Mitrovicė.

    ICG sqaron faktin se qėllimi i vėrtetė i njė pjese tė udhėheqjes nė Borgrad ėshtė mbajtja e Kosovės si pjesė e Serbisė me dėshirėn pėr ta kėthyer njė ditė ushtrinė jugosllave dhe UDB-nė nė Kosovė. Nė ballė tė kėsaj politike, sipas raportit tė ICG-sė ėshtė zėvėndės kryeministri i Serbisė Nebojsha Ēoviq dhe presidenti jugosllav Vojislav Koshtunica.

    Autorėt e raportit tė ICG-sė e kanė ekspozuar rolin e vėtetėt tė Ēoviqit, njeriut i cili thuhet nė raport, nė njė anė flet me tonin e moderuar para komunitetit ndėrkombėtar ndėrsa qėllimet e Qendrės Koordinuese qė ai e kryeson nė Kosovė janė pėr kantonizimin e Kosovės dhe vėnjės sė njė pjese tė territorit tė saj nėn regjimin e Beogradit.

    Ēoviqi e ka fituar njė reputacion nė Uashington dhe Evropė si "shpresa e dalur nga parajsa" pėr konfliktet sllavo-shqiptare nė Ballkan dhe sipas njė analisti nė Uashingtoni "fajet pėr njė prezantim farsė tė njė personi si Ēoviqi i ka ambasadori amerikan nė Beograd."

    Sipas zėdhėnėsve tė ICG, qeveria e Beogradit ėshtė qartas duke i shkelur jo vetėm Rezolutėn 1244, por edhe marrėveshjet e saja mė insitucionet monetare ndėrkombėtare duke financuar projekte nė "njė vėnd tjetėr" me fondet qė jepen pėr rindėrtimin e Serbisė.

    Ēoviqi e ka pranuar se Beogradi ka shpenzuar nė Kosovė sė paku 50 million euro gjatė tetė muajėve tė parė vitin e kaluar nė kohen kur Serbia pranonte ndihma substanciale ndėrkombėtare. Sipas tij rreth 30 mijė serbė nga Kosova marrin pagat nė Beograd.

    Njė burim nė Uashington tha se shumica e kėtyre personave qė paguhen nga Beogradit janė "njerėz tė sigurimit" - pra Rojet e Urės dhe tė tjerėt rreth tyre tė udhėhequr nga njeriu i Ēoviqit nė Mitrovicė, Oliver Ivanoviqi. Ky i fundit e ka kritikuar ashpėr raportin pėr Mitrovicėn duke e quajtur organizatėn ICG si "lobisti mė i famshėm shqiptar nė Uashington."

    E pyetur pėr reagimet e Ivanoviqit, zėdhėnėsja e ICG-sė nė Uashington Hedher Herlbert qeshet me deklaratėn e pėrfaqėsuesit serb duke thėnė se "ėshtė nėn nivelin qė meriton njė pėrgjigje."

    Helbert megjithatė thotė se UNMK-u dhe KFOR-i duhet ta marrin seriozisht situatėn pėr t'i anuluar institucionet paralele nė Mitrovicė duke e detyruar Beogradin qė tė heq dorė nga ky rajon i Kosovės.

    Sipas saj, forcat ndėrkombėtare tė NATO-s nė Kosovė do tė duhej qė ta shfrytėzonin "procesin e racionalizimit tė komandės" pėr t'i hequr trupat franēeze nga Mitrovica tė cilat thuhet se kanė vepruar nė kundėrshtim me Rezolutėn 1244 duke mos u pozicionuar nė kufirin me Serbinė nė veri por duke u vendosur pėrgjatė Lumit Ibėr pėr ta ndarė Mitrovicėn nė dy pjesė.

    Procesi "racionalizimt" tė komandės nga NATO pėrfshinė pėrzierjen sektoreve dhe zvogėlimin e tyre nga pesė nė tri. Anglezėt dhe franēezėt do tė formojnė njė sektor tė pėrbashkėt dhe shpresohet se zėvėndėsimi i forcave franēeze me ato angleze nė Mitrovicė do ta ndryshonte situatėn nė terren.

    Mirėpo sipas njė burimi amerikan anglezėt janė duke e rezistuar njė plan tė tillė, nga frika se ushtarėt e tyre do tė viheshin nė shėnjestėr nga serbėt nė veri tė Mitrovicės ė cilėt nuk kanė hezituar qė t'i sulmojnė ndėrkombėtarėt nė tė kaluarėn.

    Zyrtarėt amerikanė nė Uashington dhe OKB i janė shmangur deklarimit publik rreth rekomandimeve tė ICG-sė por e kanė pranuar se raporti do tė analizohet me kujdes pėr tė parė se nė ēfarė mėnyrė do tė mund tė angazhoheshin amerikanėt nė zgjedhjen e problemit tė Mitrovicės qė nė raport thuhet se ėshtė pengesa kyesore pėr sukses, apo si njė "albatros i UNMIK-ut nė Kososovė."

    "Mitrovica ėshtė ajo qė e varros apo shpėton (Majkel) Stajnerin, si udhėheqėsi mė i dukshėm ndėrkombėtar pėr Kosovėn," thotė pėr Zėrin Erik Uiti analist i Ballkanit nė Institutin Demoratik tė Politikės (DPI) nė Uashington. Sipas tij zgjedhjet tė cilat UNMIK-u i pėrdor si vegėl tė matjes sė suksessit nė Kosovė, nuk do tė duhej tė mbaheshin deri sa tė ishte zgjedhur problemi i Mitrovicės.

    Ai thotė se komuniteti ndėrkombėtar nė Kosovė po vepron nė tė njejtėn mėnyrė si nė Bosnjė duke mbajtur njė varg "zgjedhjesh demokratike" ndėrsa vendi vazhdon tė jetė i ndarė dhe marrėveshja e Dejtonit e parealizuar.


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  8. #8
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    Decentralisation and Serb colonisaton


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    May 27, 2002 / By Rogelj Peter

    There are two important issues in the near future, which will have a great impact on the destiny (that is on the final status) of Kosova. Therefore, it's a necessity that Kosova's leadership prepares a clear strategy how to deal with these two issues. These two issues (return of displaced persons and local government related to autumn's local elections) are closely inter-connected.


    LOCAL ELECTIONS

    "Decentralisation" as a pre-requisite for relocation and colonisation

    Serbs have made their participation on the local election conditional upon "decentralisation" of Kosova. Under this term they mean: establishment of new municipalities and redrawing of municipal boundaries (in particular in northern Mitrovica); granting municipality extra-autonomy, virtually independence from Pristina; establishment of separate Serb and Albanian administration, police and judiciary in mixed municipalities (they falsely refer to situation in Bosnia) etc. It's a danger that the international community keen to see "multiethnic" elections will yield to some of these demands to secure "multiethnic"character of elections, as it was the case last year by UNMIK-FRY Common Document as a price for Serb participation in Kosova-wide elections. Albanians leadership should prepare clear strategy how to deal with this issue, since it could have long-term impacts on Kosova.

    By "decentralisation" as they envisage Serbs would get legal grounds to perform their colonialist plans. According to Belgrade's "Programme of returns of displaced persons to Kosovo-Metohija" 24 localities in Kosova planned as sites of "returns"/ colonisation are situated near existing Serb settlements. To allocate land for colonisation it is necessary that authorities authorised to perform this task exist. Since municipal authorities are authorised to issue building licences, new Serb-run municipalities must be established and separate Serb administration in other municipalities must get competencies to issue these licences. Serb-staffed courts in the new municipalities are necessary to verify transfer of ownership from public (municipal) to private property. Serb-staffed police is necessary to protect newly built "series of settlements."

    Of course, parallel institutions in existing Serb enclaves can issue such building licences even today since the legitimate municipal authorities have virtually no power in enclaves. However, these licences have not legal power and buildings constructed in this way are not protected from demolition in the future. And this is the essence of "decentralisation": Serbs want to legalise existing parallel structures in the areas under their control. By "decentralisation", Serb areas independent from Pristina and under direct Belgrade's control will take legal shape. Legalisation of parallel structures in Serb areas will be followed by demographic build-up through colonisation of "returnees" in the newly built "groups of settlements." In this way, areas under recognised Serb administration will be a foundation stone for the future "Serb entity" in Kosova.

    Experiences from Bosnia-Herzegovina are significant in this regard. As it is known, a Serb entity - Republika Srpska (RS) exists in Bosnia. This entity follows the policy of ethnic homogenisation by discouraging displaced non-Serbs from returning to RS as well as discouraging displaced Serbs from returning to other part of Bosnia (Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina) and encouraging them to stay permanently in RS. Authorities in RS offers various incentives to encourage Serb refugees from Federation to settle permanently in RS, the most notorious is allocation free charge of land to these people. 25.000 plots of land were supplied free of charge to displaced Serbs, mostly on strategic points to permanently alter ethnic profile of areas and secure Serb control. This ethnic engineering is described in detail in International Crisis Group's (ICG) reports on the situation in RS at http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/ba...6_08102001.pdf and
    http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/ba..._14051998.pdf. It is clear from the presented "Programme for return of displaced persons to Kosovo-Metohija" that Serbs intend to carry out similar project also in Kosova. As Republika Srpska was necessary to perform this project in Bosnia, equally "decentralisation" of Kosova is necessary to perform colonisation and ethnic engineering in Kosova.


    Albanian strategy to prevent "decentralisation"

    Of course, "decentralisation" (in fact, partition) as envisaged by Serbs poses a great threat to Albanian interests. An intense action on political, diplomatic and media field will be necessary in following weeks and months to prevent Serb schemes. Therefore it's necessary for Kosova's leadership to prepare a clear strategy on how to cope with this issue. In this strategy it's necessary to prepare objections on Serb claims why "decentralisation" is necessary as well as counter-measures in event that UNMIK yield to Serb demands.


    Serb manipulation with the term "decentralisation"

    The term "decentralisation" bears positive meaning and Serbs exploit this. But in order to analyse that term it's necessary to emphasise the difference between the situation in northern Mitrovica and other Serb-populated areas in Kosova where "decentralisation" can be effected.


    Northern Mitrovica

    In northern Mitrovica, Serbs were a minority before the war and establishment of administration (either in municipal or sub-municipal level) in this part of the city would mean a reward for ethnic cleansing. Serbs first expelled Albanians thus upsetting ethnic balance in their favour and taking de-facto control. Establishment of separate administration by UNMIK would mean international recognition and legalisation of situation resulting from ethnic cleansing. This would make a mockery of the proclaimed aim of IC to promote "multi-ethnic society".
    Serbs have presented their plan how to organise local administration in Mitrovica. They have proposed two-tiered administration based on the model of Bosnian city of Mostar. The present municipality of Mitrovica would be transformed into township with town council and administration while at least two municipalities having second-level administration (one of them northern Mitrovica) would be formed within township. This proposal is tantamount to official division of Mitrovica.

    Experience from Mostar (described in detail at http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/ba...0_19042000.pdf) shows that in this way Mitrovica will never be united again. And Mostar's model cannot be applied in Mitrovica since Mostar was divided on western part with Croatian majority and eastern part with Bosniak majority before the war (figures on ethnic composition of Bosnian settlements can be found at Web site of Bosnian Congress USA). As distinguished from Mostar, there was no Serb majority in northern Mitrovica before the war. If we speak about experiences from Bosnia, in Mitrovica should be applied formula (it can be found at http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/ba...4_02021999.pdf) from Brcko, which is an example of successful reintegration of divided area. Mr Steiner as former senior official in Bosnia certainly knows well conditions there.

    The condition (not the only) for re-integration of Mitrovica is single recognised administration in the whole city. Albanian side can offer two concessions: these single administration can be headed by international (like in Brcko in the first phase) and Serbs displaced from other parts of Kosova currently living in foreign homes can be eligible to vote for the Mitrovica assembly instead for the municipalities of their origin. As it is known, there were less than 11.000 Serbs in the whole Mitrovica municipality before the conflict as opposed to 16.000 today. This increase also means increase of Serbs' seats in municipal assembly, although squatters are not legitimate inhabitants of some area eligible to vote there. The rule should be: displaced persons can vote only for assemblies of municipalities in which they have property. Fortunately, breaking this rule in Kosova doesn't enable so blatant examples of electoral engineering as it is the case in Bosnia. However, from tactical point of view, Albanians should not offer these concessions too early.

    In no way, Albanians must not agree to separate Serb administration be it first-level or second-(or third- etc) level. In case that UNMIK yield to Serb demand Albanians should announce boycott of elections and freeze relations with UNMIK for some tome. A contingency plans for defence of Albanian population north of Ibar River (Bosnian quarter and three towers in northern Mitrovica, villages of Suhodoll, Vinarc, Gushac, Vidimiriq and Cabra) should be prepared in case that newly formed municipality northern Mitrovica comprises these places. Serbs want to draw the boundary along the Ibar River, and the internationals should be told that war would break out if they allow that.

    Equally must be Albanian side persistent in opposing to transformation of "bridge-watchers" to Kosova police service (KPS) or formation of Serb-staffed court. Serbs have expressed willingness to disband "bridge-watchers" in exchange for establishment of municipality. But it's better to have status quo in northern Mitrovica than legalisation of it. The prospect for Mitrovica should be: re-integration of northern Mitrovica to common multiethnic institutions of united city. This won't be able to achieve if separate Serb institutions will be legalised in the meantime.


    Other Serb-majority areas

    In other Serb-majority areas (where Serbs were in majority before the conflict) decentralisation per se would not contradict moral principles. However, claims for it are unacceptable as well. In the first place, decentralisation can function in a meaningful way only if the central authorities can perform their powers in the whole territory under their jurisdiction. In Kosova, this is not the case. Central authorities in Pristine (international and domestic as well) have no influence in northern Kosova and very small influence in Serb enclaves. This areas function effectively as an appendix of Serbia where Belgrade through parallel structures exerts control. This contradicts 1244 Resolution and Constitutional Framework as well. Kosova is already not only highly decentralised but also divided territory. "Decentralisation" would only mean legalisation of the current situation giving legitimacy to existing parallel system. But decentralisation makes sense only as a way to promote more efficient governance not to legalise division of territory.

    These are the reasons why "decentralisation" as envisaged by Serbs in unacceptable. Until Kosova's institutions extend their effective power in all parts of Kosova (as provided for in 1244 and Constitutional Framework) including to "Serb areas", any kind of decentralisation should be out of question. In order that local governments can get more powers, the central government should first be able to exercise their powers. It's not certain that this will happen until final status of Kosova is resolved. That's why Albanian position should be: No to new municipalities in Kosova, No to change of borders between the municipalities, No to establishment of sub-municipal ethnically-based administration and No to expansion of powers for municipalities in this interim period of provisional institutions. Local governments in Kosova must act according to existing legal framework. At first, existing all parallel structures must be unconditionally dismantled and legitimate central Kosova's institutions have to assume their full responsibilities in the entire territory of Kosova. Only then we can talk about decentralisation.

    The second reason against "decentralisation" is balance between the situation in Kosova and other parts of FRY. As long as Kosova is part of FRY, municipalities in Kosova could not have more powers than municipalities in other parts of FRY/ Serbia. UNMIK Regulation 2000/45 is already more generous in this regard than legislation in Serbia. Why should for example, the municipality of Leposaviq has more powers vis-a-vis the multiethnic government in Pristina with very limited powers than the municipality of Presheva has vis-a-vis ethnic Serb government in Belgrade. The international community (IC) has supported Belgrade's stance as to unacceptability of autonomy for Albanians in Presheva Valley (i.e. "decentralisation"). Now, the same IC cannot be in favour of autonomy for Serb-populated parts of Kosova. Every different attitude amounts to sheer racism. And it should be told internationals that by yielding to Serb demands for "decentralisation" in Kosova they will be responsible for destabilisation of the situation in Presheva valley with negative consequences in Kosova itself. Namely, Albanians there will file the similar demands for decentralisation. It is known from the physics that upsetting balance leads to instability.

    Kosova assembly rightly demanded from UNMIK last week to start exercising their powers in all Kosova and to dismantle existing parallel structures which are operating in Kosova in contradiction to existing legal acts in Kosova. If IC is not willing to enter open conflict with Serbs, which is needed for dismantling illegal institutions, it should at least not grant these institutions legal status by "decentralisation." It's obvious that Serb brinkmanship with respect to parallel institutions pays. And it should be make clear to internationals they will enter into serious conflict with Albanians too, if they yield to Serb blackmail for "decentralisation". The compromise should be offered to UNMIK: Albanians won't insist on immediate dismantling of existing parallel structures (this would be parallel process with advance on the field of rule of law and minority rights in Kosova) while UNMIK won't change status quo with regard to local governance.

    Serbs are announcing boycott of the local elections if they demands for "decentralisation" (in fact, partition) are not met. Albanians should not hesitate to use similar threat in event that UNMIK yield to Serb blackmail. Unlike Serb (10% of population) boycott, Albanian boycott would indeed make local elections senseless. Albanian political parties should overcome their differences and be united before the internationals in defence of national interests. It would be the worst if some Albanian politicians were keener to please internationals than to serve its people or to make partisan calculations at the expense of the national interests.

    Local elections that would legalise de-facto division of Kosova or reward ethnic cleansing in northern Mitrovica indeed don't make any sense. It's better to have existing local authorities in office beyond expiry of their term in this autumn than to make another step towards "Serb entity" and partition of Kosova. Last year, threat with the boycott of Kosova-wide elections didn't make much sense since central institutions had to be established as a first step towards independent Kosova. This year, a threat with boycott of local elections is a powerful weapon since institutions on the local level are already functioning and there's no need to establish them from the scratch. Of course, threat with boycott is efficient only if all major Albanian parties make an agreement to do that and form united front against the internationals and Serbs. These elections will be test of unity of Albanian political class and ability to overcome difference in defence of national interests.

    Possible Serb boycott would not deprive Serbs of their representatives at the local level. Serbs boycotted local elections two years ago, too. But SRSG co-opted Serb members to municipal assemblies in proportion to their numbers of local population. Therefore there's no need to make unreasonable concessions to Serbs out of fear that Serb boycott will prevent municipal assemblies from being "multiethnic".


    Objections to Serb arguments in favour of decentralisation

    Serbs claim that "decentralisation" is necessary for return of displaced persons to Kosova. This is not true since the bulk of refugees originate from Albanian-majority settlements. Less than 7.000 out of about 100.000 displaced Serbs originate from 29 abandoned Serb-majority villages that are situated on 13 locations (5 individual villages and 8 clusters of more adjacent villages). There are no displaced Serbs (those Serbs who abandoned their property) in the existing Serb-majority settlements that would be incorporated in the new municipalities and therefore no need for return. On the other hand, establishment of the new Serb-run municipalities is necessary to perform relocation of displaced persons, their colonisation in the imagined "Serb entity" and ethnic engineering. And that's why establishment of new municipalities or separate Serb administration must not be allowed.

    Serbs claim that "decentralisation" is necessary to stabilise existing Serb population in Kosova by preventing sale of real estates to Albanians. This is not true, since there is little interest for buying Serb property in pure Serb settlements. Inter-ethnic sales are taking place mostly in mixed areas where Albanians are already in majority. By putting in this way, Serb leaders reveal they want to ban interethnic sale in "their" areas. This is a violation of human right to dispose of one's property including selling it. And this is another reason against separate Serb administration.

    Serbs claim that separate administration is necessary since they lack freedom of movement. In the first place, Serbs, unlike Albanians in northern Mitrovica, have freedom of movement in all Kosova. It's true that there are many places in Kosova that are dangerous for Serbs and that must be changed. But Serbs don't need to travel these places to receive administrative services. There are community offices in Serb villages where Serbs can get all administrative services without exposing to danger.

    Serbs claim that separate administration is necessary since there is discrimination in Albanian-dominated municipalities. This is the only claim that could have some substance and Albanians should do their best to dispel such accusations. However, there are significant checks and balances to such conduct, since every municipality has international administrator who oversees conduct of municipal leadership. And SRSG (Steiner) can also (article 47/2 of Regulation 2000/45) annul every decision of municipality that is detrimental to interest of minority communities. In financial matters this accusation is unfounded since community offices dispose of their own finances to fund local projects. And finally, there are Albanians too who could level similar accusation. There are four Serb-dominated municipalities in Kosova where Albanians are in minority and thus exposed to possible unfair treatment.

    Therefore, there are strong reasons why Albanians can defend its stance against "decentralisation" before the internationals. However, as experiences from the behaviour of the internationals in Bosnia and their attitude regarding "FRY-Macedonia border agreement" show, the truth and justice don't matter much for IC. Even faced with the strongest and most convincible arguments, the internationals can also make unprincipled and unfair decision. Therefore Albanians have to prepare a list of counter-measures (and boycott is the strongest) that will be activated in case that the internationals adopt the course detrimental to Albanian interests.


    The position of internationals regarding local elections

    Local government is regulated by the UNMIK Regulation 2000/45. The internationals have said they don't intend to establish new municipalities. It remains to be seen whether they will persist in that in face of Serb blackmail. However, they have also said they are in favour of "decentralisation", which is allegedly enshrined in 2000/45 Regulation.

    There's a danger that separate Serb administration will be formed in existing municipalities. In this event we will have the similar situation as Serbs have proposed in Mitrovica: two-tiered administration. There are three articles in 2000/45 Regulation that are leaving room for establishment of parallel administration. These articles are 5.2, 5.3 and 47.7.

    5.2 With the approval of the municipality, villages, settlements and urban quarters, singly or in combination, may carry out activities that are within the responsibilities and powers of the municipality. In this event, the villages, settlements and urban quarters shall receive commensurate resources from the municipality. Where approval has been withheld by the municipality, villages, settlements and urban quarters may apply to the Central Authority for approval to carry out such activities.

    5.3 The Statute and local municipal regulations shall stipulate the form of co-operation between the municipality and villages, settlements and urban quarters and the scope of work and organization of villages, settlements and urban quarters. All villages, settlements and urban quarters shall comply with the applicable law when carrying out activities by arrangement with the municipality.

    47.7 The Special Representative of the Secretary-General may, on his initiative or upon the request of a village, settlement or urban quarter, take such measures as he deems necessary to ensure that the needs of the village, settlement or urban quarter are adequately addressed.

    If creative interpretation of law is applied, these articles can serve as a legal basis for establishment of two-tiered administration in municipalities. In this way UNMIK would forge a so-called compromise: on the one hand no new municipalities would be established (as a concession to Albanian side), while separate Serb administration would be established in Serb settlements within existing municipalities. This would be de-facto political victory for Serbs.

    They are not interested for new municipalities as such. New municipalities matters for them only as a framework for administration of area. If this administration can be formed within (or outside) existing municipalities then municipalities aren't necessary. From the example of Mostar in Bosnia is clear that municipal authorities would not have any powers in the self-administered "villages, settlements and urban quarters" (northern Mitrovica!) within their municipality.


    Ethnic-territorial profile of Kosova in the context of local self-government

    Table 1: Serb-majority or Serb-plurality settlements in Kosova (without three northern municipalities)
    centre of settlement/ cluster of settlements
    settlement
    present municipality
    % of Serbs
    approximate population of settlement 1991
    population of settlement/cluster of settlements
    number of settlements in cluster
    remark
    number of displaced persons

    Bellopole
    Bellopole
    Peja
    100
    790


    exodus


    Bellopole
    Zgermle
    Peja
    100
    110
    900
    2
    exodus
    900

    Bellopole
    Bellopole
    Istog
    >50
    120
    120
    1
    exodus
    120

    Berkova
    Berkova
    Klina
    >90
    260


    exodus


    Berkova
    Opraske
    Istog
    100
    180
    440
    2
    exodus
    440

    Brestovik
    Brestovik
    Peja
    100
    520


    exodus


    Brestovik
    Cereverhe
    Peja
    100
    200


    exodus


    Brestovik
    Lipe
    Peja
    100
    0


    exodus


    Brestovik
    Levoshe
    Peja
    100
    150


    exodus


    Brestovik
    Sige
    Peja
    58
    220
    1090
    5
    exodus
    1090

    Dojnice
    Dojnice
    Prizren
    100
    100
    100
    1
    exodus
    100

    Dvoran
    Dvoran
    Suhareke
    65
    230
    230
    1
    exodus
    230

    Frasheri i Madh
    Frasheri i Madh
    Mitrovica
    60
    500
    500
    1



    Gojbuje
    Gojbuje
    Vushtrri
    100
    380





    Gojbuje
    Mirace
    Vushtrri
    100
    70
    450
    2



    Gorazhdec
    Gorazhdec
    Peja
    100
    1150
    1150
    1



    Hoca e Madhe
    Hoca e Madhe
    Rahovec
    100
    1080
    1080
    1



    Kijeve
    Kijeve
    Malisheve
    55
    250
    250
    1
    exodus
    250

    Kllokot
    Kllokot
    Viti
    100
    1170
    1170
    1



    Kuzmin
    Kuzmin
    Fushe Kosove
    100
    520
    520
    1



    Bernica i Ulte
    Bernica i Ulte
    Prishtina
    100
    720
    720
    1



    Neredime e Eperme
    Neredime e Eperme
    Ferizaj
    >50
    580
    580
    1
    exodus
    580

    Novak
    Skenderaj i Ulet
    Prizren
    >90
    160


    exodus


    Novak
    Novak
    Prizren
    100
    350


    exodus


    Novak
    Smac
    Prizren
    60
    230
    740
    3
    exodus
    740

    Osojan
    Biqa
    Klina
    100
    320


    exodus


    Osojan
    Drenovciq
    Klina
    100
    130


    exodus


    Osojan
    Belica
    Istog
    >50
    190


    exodus


    Osojan
    Osojan
    Istog
    100
    360





    Osojan
    Polane
    Istog
    100
    100


    exodus


    Osojan
    Tucep
    Istog
    100
    240
    1340
    8
    exodus
    980

    Palaj
    Palaj
    Obiliq
    100
    740
    740
    1



    Pasjan
    Budrike e Poshtme
    Gjilan
    100
    1230





    Pasjan
    Partesh
    Gjilan
    100
    1500





    Pasjan
    Pasjan
    Gjilan
    100
    1760
    4490
    3



    Ponesh
    Ponesh
    Gjilan
    70
    840
    840
    1



    Prilluzhe
    Babimoc
    Obiliq
    65
    810





    Prilluzhe
    Plemetin
    Obiliq
    45
    1080





    Prilluzhe
    Grace
    Vushtrri
    100
    520





    Prilluzhe
    Prilluzhe
    Vushtrri
    >90
    1620
    4030
    4



    Ranllug
    Novoberde
    Novoberde
    >50
    240





    Ranllug
    Bostan
    Novoberde
    100
    370





    Ranllug
    Jasenovik
    Novoberde
    100
    330





    Ranllug
    Tirnice
    Novoberde
    100
    160





    Ranllug
    Izvor
    Novoberde
    100
    520





    Ranllug
    Prekovc
    Novoberde
    <100
    250





    Ranllug
    Zebnice
    Novoberde
    100
    280





    Ranllug
    Manishince
    Novoberde
    100
    120





    Ranllug
    Slivove
    Prishtina
    <100
    380





    Ranllug
    Hajnoc
    Kamenica
    100
    300





    Ranllug
    Berivojce
    Kamenica
    >60
    750





    Ranllug
    Bolevc
    Kamenica
    100
    160





    Ranllug
    Bosce
    Kamenica
    100
    270





    Ranllug
    Zotaj
    Kamenica
    100
    250




    Ranllug
    Bratilovc
    Kamenica
    100
    50




    Ranllug
    Businjce
    Kamenica
    100
    0





    Ranllug
    Bushince
    Kamenica
    100
    300





    Ranllug
    Carakovc
    Kamenica
    <100
    150





    Ranllug
    Carefc
    Kamenica
    100
    160





    Ranllug
    Domorovc
    Kamenica
    100
    450





    Ranllug
    Kormnjan e Ulet
    Kamenica
    100
    630





    Ranllug
    Drenoc
    Kamenica
    100
    330





    Ranllug
    Gllogoc
    Kamenica
    100
    440





    Ranllug
    Gogollofc
    Kamenica
    100
    0





    Ranllug
    Kormnjan e Eperme
    Kamenica
    100
    560





    Ranllug
    Gragjenik
    Kamenica
    60
    110


    exodus


    Ranllug
    Grizime
    Kamenica
    100
    160





    Ranllug
    Kolloleq
    Kamenica
    100
    310





    Ranllug
    Kostadince
    Kamenica
    100
    120





    Ranllug
    Ropotove e Vogel
    Kamenica
    100
    180





    Ranllug
    Miganoc
    Kamenica
    100
    150





    Ranllug
    Mocare
    Kamenica
    100
    310





    Ranllug
    Hodefc
    Kamenica
    100
    150





    Ranllug
    Pancelle
    Kamenica
    100
    350





    Ranllug
    Rajnoc
    Kamenica
    100
    300





    Ranllug
    Ranllug
    Kamenica
    100
    980





    Ranllug
    Strellice
    Kamenica
    100
    170





    Ranllug
    Strezofc
    Kamenica
    >50
    280


    exodus


    Ranllug
    Tirince
    Kamenica
    100
    70





    Ranllug
    Tomance
    Kamenica
    100
    170





    Ranllug
    Vaganesh
    Kamenica
    100
    60



    390

    Ranllug
    Ropotove e Madhe
    Kamenica
    100
    750





    Ranllug
    Mali Krsljanci
    Kamenica
    75
    130





    Ranllug
    Dragance
    Gjilan
    75
    40





    Ranllug
    Kusce e Eperme
    Gjilan
    100
    1410





    Ranllug
    Makresh i Eperm
    Gjilan
    100
    240





    Ranllug
    Koretishte
    Gjilan
    100
    1150





    Ranllug
    Mozgove
    Gjilan
    100
    90





    Ranllug
    Parllove
    Gjilan
    <100
    870





    Ranllug
    Shillove
    Gjilan
    100
    1070





    Ranllug
    Stanishor
    Gjilan
    100
    370





    Ranllug
    Strazhe
    Gjilan
    100
    400
    17840
    52



    Sekirace
    Sekirace
    Podujeva
    100
    30
    30
    1



    Shterpce
    Sefce
    Shterpce
    100
    1280





    Shterpce
    Jazhince
    Shterpce
    100
    650





    Shterpce
    Brezovice
    Shterpce
    100
    370





    Shterpce
    Verbeshtice
    Shterpce
    100
    630





    Shterpce
    Shterpce
    Shterpce
    100
    2170





    Shterpce
    Berevc
    Shterpce
    100
    810





    Shterpce
    Biti e Eperme
    Shterpce
    65
    350





    Shterpce
    Sushice
    Shterpce
    75
    170





    Shterpce
    Biti e Ulet
    Shterpce
    55
    390





    Shterpce
    Gotovushe
    Shterpce
    100
    950





    Shterpce
    Drajkoc
    Shterpce
    85
    170





    Shterpce
    Vice
    Shterpce
    <100
    170
    8110
    12



    Sredske
    Bogoshevc
    Prizren
    100
    0





    Sredske
    Drajciq
    Prizren
    80
    160





    Sredske
    Sredske
    Prizren
    100
    260


    exodus


    Sredske
    Zivinjan
    Prizren
    100
    0
    420
    4
    exodus
    260

    Srpskibabush
    Bablak
    Ferizaj
    55
    230


    exodus


    Srpskibabush
    Mirash i Ri
    Ferizaj
    70
    60


    exodus


    Srpskibabush
    Srpskibabush
    Ferizaj
    100
    290
    580
    3
    exodus
    580

    Starogracke
    Starogracke
    Lipjan
    >90
    440
    440
    1



    Ulpiana
    Batuse
    Fushe Kosove
    100
    530





    Ulpiana
    Bresje
    Fushe Kosove
    >90
    1050





    Ulpiana
    Uglare
    Fushe Kosove
    100
    1130





    Ulpiana
    Cagllavice
    Prishtina
    100
    1200





    Ulpiana
    Ulpiana
    Prishtina
    100
    3950





    Ulpiana
    Fshati Llap
    Prishtina
    100
    1430





    Ulpiana
    Preoc
    Prishtina
    100
    700





    Ulpiana
    Sushice
    Prishtina
    65
    600





    Ulpiana
    Dobratin
    Lipjan
    100
    940





    Ulpiana
    Gushterice e Ulet
    Lipjan
    100
    1190





    Ulpiana
    Gushterice e Eperm
    Lipjan
    100
    470





    Ulpiana
    Lepine
    Lipjan
    >90
    410





    Ulpiana
    Livadh
    Lipjan
    100
    510





    Ulpiana
    Radeve
    Lipjan
    100
    230





    Ulpiana
    Skulanove
    Lipjan
    100
    280





    Ulpiana
    Suhodoll
    Lipjan
    >90
    500
    15120
    16



    Verboc
    Gerncare
    Viti
    100
    520





    Verboc
    Verboc
    Viti
    100
    560
    1080
    2



    Zubin Potok?
    Baje
    Skenderaj
    83
    230
    230




    Zvecan?
    Suhodoll i Eperm
    Mitrovica
    <100
    250
    250




    total



    65580
    65580
    133

    6660



    There are 133 settlements (out of 1329) in "Albanian part of Kosova" (Kosova excluding three northern municipalities of Leposaviq, Zvecan and Zubin Potok) with Serb majority and plurality. These settlements (in fact villages) are situated in 29 non-adjacent locations, plus there are two villages that could be joined northern municipalities (this especially the case with Suhodoll I Eperm). These 28 locations consist of 14 individual isolated villages and 14 clusters of more adjacent villages. In these settlements lived around 65.580 Serbs according to 1991 census. 28 villages (8 clusters and 5 individual villages) with 6.660 Serbs are now empty of Serbs as a result of their flight in 1999.

    In this table are not included two settlements with Serb pre-war majority (Viti, Nente Jugoviq) and two with Serb pre-war plurality (Fushe Kosova, Lipjan) where Serbs became a minority in a legal way (by sale of property, not by exodus). In Novoberde Albanians are now constituting a majority but it remains unclear whether this is a result of purchase of Serb property or displacement of Serbs. Dragance village (Gjilane municipality) is now abandoned by Serbs as a result of their voluntary departure. Considering that 20% of Serbs (this is a very conservative estimate since recent survey made among Serb refugees by Belgrade authorities revealed that 70-75% of them would return if some conditions, like security and reconstruction, are fulfilled) Serb majority cannot be re-established in settlements where their percentage were up to 55%. There are six such villages.

    From this table can be seen that four new municipalities with Serb majority can be realistically established: Ranllug, Ulpiana, Pasjan and Prilluzhe (Shterpce is already a municipality). In other cases, establishment of the new municipalities is not practical out of too small population. However, in some of them can be also established some form of separate administration.

    For integrity of Kosova is by far the most dangerous establishment the municipality (or separate administration) in Ranllug because 52 settlements there are not encircled by Albanian settlements but they have direct territorial connection to Serbia in the section between Albanian villages Stubllina (Gjilan municipality) and Hodanofc (Kamenica). The establishment of Ranllug municipality adjoining Serbia would create in this part of Kosova the same situation as in northern Kosova effectively seceding this part of Kosova to Serbia. Besides it would cut off links with part of Albanian-populated Preseva valley. Albanians must do their best to prevent establishment of this municipality. However this is not enough to secure integrity of Kosova there. The land along the border must become a private ownership of Albanians and it is recommendable to establish also physical presence there. It is also necessary to secure Albanian majority in the mixed village of Berivojce. If this village belongs to Ranllug municipality then Kamenica will be surrounded by Serb-controlled territory.

    As experiences so far show it is necessary to have Serbs surrounded by Albanian settlements or Albanian owned land (as a "barrier") to ensure at least minimal functioning of the institutions of Kosova and protect integrity of Kosova. Besides those 52 villages in eastern Kosova there are also 12 villages in Shterpce municipality and 2 villages (Banje in Skenderaj municipality and Suhodoll in Mitrovica) in the north, which are not surrounded by Albanian villages. Fortunately, Stherpce is separated from Macedonia by the huge Sharr mountain range. Albanians must ensure that land between Banje village (as well as Serb sections of the villages of Cerkolez and Suhogerle) and Zubin Potok municipality is owned by Albanians to prevent expanding Serb-controlled territory in Drenice. The most vulnerable is the position of the Suhodoll I Eperm which could be easily incorporated in Zvecan municipality which in turn would increase isolation of the village Suhodoll I Poshtem from south Mitrovica. It is recommendable to place some sort of "barrier" between Suhodoll I Eperm and Zvecan. In eastern Kosova is necessary to have the village Mucibabe (Gjilan municipality) populated as much as possible since this village serves as a barrier between Serbia and Serb village of Pasjan.

    Securing control in these border areas is necessary to prevent Belgrade's plans to relocate displaced Serbs by settling them in these areas. Plans for massive colonisation in "series of settlements" are not feasible in areas encircled by Albanians. Through the control over public services (like electricity, telephone and water) and control over traffic routes Albanians can prevent large-scale colonisation even if local Serb authorities were given the right to issue building licences. Despite that, these local authorities can still illegally (free of charge) privatise land to Serbs, which is also detrimental to the interests of Kosova and is the reason why Albanians should strongly object formation of separate Serb administration, either in form of the new municipality or in the sub-municipal level.

    However, Albanians cannot such leverage in the areas adjoining Serbia. Takeover of telephone services in northern Kosova by company from Serbia is proof for that. Therefore, gaining control/ownership of land in eastern Kosova (Stubllina-Hodanofc), northern Drenice (Banje,Suhogerrle,Cerkolez - Zubin Potok) is of vital importance to secure integrity of Kosova in these areas. Gjilan, Kamenica and Istog municipalities are designated as areas of "return" in the "Program for return" made by Belgrade and without securing control of the land bordering Serbia Albanians won't be able to prevent this plan. This should be a priority in the next weeks and months regardless whether separate Serb administration is to be established or not. When this area belongs to Ranllug municipality this task will be impossible to accomplish. The Ministry for Spatial Planning has particular responsibility to carry out these tasks necessary to protect integrity of Kosova.


    Ethnic-territorial profile of Kosova in the context of return/relocation

    From the Table 1 is obvious that return (to original homes) don't pose a threat to strategic Albanian interests. By return Serbs won't expand territory under their control since this control can be established only in the settlements where they formed a majority. However, there are only 6.660 Serbs (out of about 100.000 displaced) coming from such settlements. All these 28 settlements are scattered throughout Kosova and they not border Serbia.

    This is why is Belgrade interested for relocation of refugees (resettlement to other locations) rather than their return to original places of living. All programmes for "return" presented by Belgrade so far have in common that they don't foresee return to refugees to their original homes but their relocation on some places in Kosova (so-called "groups (or series) of settlements"). In order to perform its plans, Belgrade needs material and legal conditions. "Decentralisation" is necessary for establishment of local authorities (recognised by UNMIK), which would distribute public-owned Kosova's land free of charge to Serb colonists ("returnees") and provide all necessary licences for building. It is intention of Belgrade to settle as many displaced Kosova (and other) Serbs as possible to these areas under "decentralised" Serb administration. So strengthened, these "decentralised" Serb areas would form a nucleus for the future "Serb entity" in Kosova. In case that IC decides in favour of Kosova's independence, Belgrade will try to retain control at least of this "Serb entity".

    In short, Belgrade's strategy is:

    - firstly, creation of Serb-administered areas through "decentralisation" of Kosova
    - the second phase, is colonisation of these areas by Serbs who never lived there
    - the third phase is unification of these demographically consolidated Serb areas into "Serb entity"
    - this entity would then serve as a stronghold for re-establishing control of all Kosova (in case that IC decides against independence of Kosova) or for partition of Kosova (if IC decides in favour of independence, Serbs have already announced they are going to claim partition)

    Albanians will successfully prevent this Serb scheme only by not allowing the first step ("decentralisation") to happen.

    Realistically speaking, Belgrade will not be able to perform its plan of large-scale colonisation in enclaves encircled by Albanian-populated territory. However, even there the local Serb administration will be able to alienate Kosova's land to private property of Serbs by simply distributing them free of charge. Implementation of the afore-mentioned Belgrade's Programme would inevitably lead to violence. And for the sake of peace in Kosova , it's necessary to tell UNMIK that "decentralisation" (i.e. legalisation of parallel system run from Belgrade) of Kosova must not be allowed.

    Parallel to rejection of "decentralisation" Albanian leadership should also compile strategy regarding returns. The essence of this strategy should be: full support to return of all displaced persons to their original homes throughout Kosova provided that there will be no relocation of refugees.

    Last week SRSG Michael Steiner presented "Sustainable returns concept". In this document stands, among others, that "displaced persons should endeavour to return to their original homes or at least the area they originated from." What does it mean "area they originated from"? "Area" can mean parcel of land, street, settlement, municipality or region. His words can be understood in a way that UNMIK is preparing a ground to make a major concession to Belgrade allowing him to perform colonisation of Kosova. In the last year's Principles of return stood that displaced persons could return only to their original homes. Now, UNMIK is getting closer to the position of Belgrade. But if someone doesn't want to return to his home to repossess his property, neither UNMIK nor Belgrade has any right to donate such person Kosova's resources (like land) for satisfying his whim.

    In other parts of Yugoslavia is not possible to perform ethnic engineering under cover of returns. I have asked SDA (Bosniak Party of Democratic Action in Bosnia) whether such plans could be realised in Republika Srpska. They replied me: there are no political subject who will be willing even to consider such idea since he would be accused by all sides for promoting ethnic engineering.

    It should be make clear to the internationals that the whole return process is doomed to failure in event of its abuse for relocation/ colonisation. "Decentralisation" is a recipe for renewal of violence of Kosova. Albanians should make clear to internationals they reserve the right to attack every building being built as a part of colonisation ("returns") programme. There are already a lot of such buildings in Kosova having been constructed in two waves of Serb colonisation of Kosova. Self-defence attacks on buildings being built for colonists will create an atmosphere of fear and violence of Kosova which, in turn, will divert return of people who have every right to return to their property. If that happens, Steiner's benchmarks as a pre-requisite for considering final status will never be achieved.


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  9. #9
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    Janosh Bugajski, drejtor pėr Evropėn Lindore nė Institutin pėr Studime Strategjike Ndėrkombėtare nė Uashington dhe analist i njohur pėr ēėshtje tė Ballkanit, duke komentuar raportin e Grupit ndėrkombėtar tė Krizave nė njė interviėtė dhėnė "Evropės sė lirė" tha se nė javėn e kaluar ishte nė Mitrovicė pėr ta parė situatėn pėr sė afėrmi dhe konstatoi se ky ėshtė njė qytet i ndarė ashtu siē e kishte parė Mostarin, ashtu siē serbėt dėshironin ta ndanin Sarajevėn dhe kjo ėshtė e papranueshme tė ndodhė nė epokėn bashkėkohore me integrim nga Evropa.

    Sipas Bugajskit sa mė parė qė kėto hapėsira tė integrohen nė Kosovė dhe qė autoriteti qendror tė jetė i aftė tė ushtrojė kontrollė do tė jetė mė mirė. Atėherė do tė jetė njė presion mė i fuqishėm i UNMK-ut dhe i NATO-s pėr ēarmatosjen e ēfarėdo bandave qė veprojnė pėr ndarjen e mėtejshme tė qytetit.
    Ndėrkaq, lidhur me statusin final tė Kosovės, z. Bugajski tha se ēdo herė ėshtė moment i drejtė tė diskutohen ēėshtjet dhe ai nuk beson nė vonesėn e gjėrave. Kėtu qėndron problemi ngase vonesat i kthejnė prapa proceset. Sipas tij tash ėshtė mirė tė fillojė ky proces pėr t'u dhėnė shpresė kosovarėve se ata nuk do tė kthehen prapa nė ndonjė lloj strukture post-jugosllave, se ata nuk do tė varen pėrgjithmonė nga komuniteti ndėrkombėtarė. Ata vetėm synojnė tė qėndrojnė nė kėmbėt e veta dhe sipas Bugajskit kjo ėshtė aspiratė shumė e rėndėsishme.


    Ndryshuar pėr herė tė fundit nga kosovar : 09-06-2002 mė 23:06


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  10. #10
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    kosova.com

    - Nė fillim tė javės Grupi Ndėrkombėtar i Krizave sulmoi ashpėr UNMIK-un nė njė raport pėr Kosovėn qė nuk ka bėrė sa duhet nė bashkimin e qytetit tė Mitrovicės. Lidhur me kėtė ēėshtje analisti i njohur amerikan Xhejms Huper i cili ka punuar mė parė pėr Grupin Ndėrkombėtar tė Krizave i pyetur se a ka mundur qė komuniteti ndėrkombėtar tė bėjė mė shumė nė kėtė aspekt.
    "Qė nė fillim ata lejuan qė veriu i Mitrovicės tė bėhej njė zonė ku nuk vepronte ligji. Kjo zonė u bė strehė e shumė elementėve kriminalė qė pėrdorin ēėshtjen kombėtare pėr tė ruajtur pushtetin e tyre, pėr tė ruajtur kontrollin e tyre tė paligjshėm mbi zonėn nė veri tė lumit Ibėr. Komuniteti ndėrkombėtar duhet t'i kishte dhėnė fund kėsaj menjėherė sapo forcat e NATO-s kishin hyrė nė Kosovė", tha z. Huper.
    I pyetur pse komuniteti ndėrkombėtar nuk arriti tė bėjė mė shumė qė ta vėnė edhe kėtė qytet nėn kontrollė si pjesėn tjetėr tė Kosovės, analisti Huper tha se komuniteti ndėrkombėtar me sa duket u vu nė pozitė tė vėshtirė pėr shkak tė qėndrimeve qė u mbajtėn ndaj serbėve nė Kosovė. "Pra ata u treguan mė tolerant ndaj serbėve nė veri tė Mitrovicės. Por arsyeja e vėrtetė ėshtė se Shtetet e Bashkuara nuk kėmbėngulėn nė kėtė gjė dhe disa aleatė evropianė si francezėt qė po pėrgatiteshin pėr marrėdhėnie me Beogradin nuk dėshironin t'i dėmtonin marrėdhėniet me Serbinė dhe lejuan qė serbėt tė kishin kontrollin nė veri. Ajo qė ka ndodhur me Mitrovicėn ėshtė e patolerueshme", shprehet Huper.
    Ndėrkaq duke i komentuar kritikat e udhėheqėsve serbė qė i bėnė raportit tė Grupit Ndėrkombėtar tė Krizave (GNK), analisti Huper tha se ka respekt tė madh pėr GNK-nė pėr vitet qė punonte pėr ta. Ata analizojnė problemet e vėshtira kur pjesė tjetėr e komunitetit ndėrkombėtar pėrpiqet t'i shmanget. Mitrovica ėshtė njė prej tyre. Organizatat si Grupi i Krizave pėrpiqen tė sensibilzojnė opinionin pėr to dhe tė sigurojnė mbėshtetje pėr ndryshimin e qėndrimit tė politikanėve. Ata janė njė grup serioz qė nuk mund tė bien nėn ndikimin e grupeve lobiste shqiptare apo serbe dhe se raporti duhet parė shumė seriozisht. Nė kėtė raport ka shumė ide tė mira, tha Huper.
    Duke u pėrgjigjur nė pyetjen se a ėshtė ende herėt qė tė hapen bisedimet pėr statusin pėrfundimtar tė Kosovės, analisti Huper thotė se jo nuk ėshtė herėt. Megjithėse pėr Mitrovicėn nuk ka bėrė sa duhet lidhur me tė tjerat z. Shtajner ka punuar shpejt. Ai ėshtė njė zyrtar dinamik, njohės i mirė i rrethanave dhe i vendosur ta ēojė kėtė proces pėrpara. Por ajo qė duhet bėrė tani qė u ngritėn institucionet dhe qė u krijuan bazat e demokracisė parlamentare nė Kosovė ėshtė ecja pėrpara pėr hartimin e planeve dhe projekteve pėr statusin pėrfundimtar nė bashkėpunim me grupet e ndryshme politike. Eshtė ende herėt tė flitet pėr vetė statusin, por nuk ėshtė herėt tė hartohen planet se si do tė realizohet kjo dhe ky ėshtė hapi tjetėr qė ai duhet hedhė, tha nė fund tė intervsitės dhėnė "Zėrit tė Amerikės" analisti Huper.


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  11. #11
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    Zeri i Amerikes


    Intervistė me profesoren e shkencave politike Sabrina Ramet
    6 Jun 2002 18:09 UTC


    Autoritetet vetqeverisėse nė Kosovė ndeshen aktualisht me njė provė vendimtare, thotė profesorja e shkencave politike nė Universitetin Trontheim tė Norvegjisė, Sabrina Ramet. Qeveria e re duhet tė tregojė se ėshtė e aftė t’i shėrbejė harmonisė dhe bashkėpunimit, dhe tė mos pėrqėndrohet nė ēėshtje qė sjellin ndėrlikimin e situatės dhe mund tė ndikojnė negativisht nė aspiratat e shqiptarėve pėr pavarėsinė e Kosovės. Kosova ende po pėrjeton pasojat e traumave tė luftės. Disa nga kėto pasoja janė mė tė dukshme dhe mė problematike aty ku jetojnė njė numėr i konsiderueshėm pakicash serbe, si pėr shembull nė Mitrovicė. Zonja Ramet vlerėson punėn e autoriteteve ndėrkombėtare nė kėtė drejtim dhe bėn thirje pėr mė shumė angazhim nga tė dyja palėt drejt pajtimit dhe bashkėjetesės:

    “Mendoj se Unmiku ka bėrė njė punė shumė tė mirė nė kushte mjaft tė vėshtira. Regjimi i Millosheviēit la pas njė atmosferė mosbesimi ndėrmjet dy grupeve etnike. Aktet e dhunės janė ēėshtje kohe. Ėshtė e vėshtirė tė gjendet njė zgjidhje e shpejtė pėr vuajtjet qė kanė pėrjetuar tė dyja palėt. Pėr tė zgjidhur kėtė situatė do tė duhet njė angazhim serioz i tė dyja palėve,” thotė analistja.

    Zonja Ramet pohon se qeveria e re e Kosovės nuk gėzon kompetenca tė plota, por shton se autoritetet vendore mund tė shfrytėzojnė kompetencat qė kanė, si pėr shembull arsimin dhe kulturėn pėr tė nxitur njė atmosferė paqėsore dhe pėr t’i shėrbyer krijimit tė njė shoqėrie mė tolerante nė Kosovė.

    Studiuesja vė nė dukje me shqetėsim se autoritetet ndėrkombėtare duket se po pėrpiqen ta lėnė nė harresė ēėshtjen e statusit tė Kosovės:

    “Komuniteti ndėrkombėtar, pėrfshirė edhe Bashkimin Evropian dhe zotin Solana, po pėrpiqen ta mėnjanojnė ēėshtjen e statusit pėr fundimtar duke i dhėnė Kosovės njė nivel tė konsiderueshėm vet-qeverisjeje pėr tė kėnaqur shqiptarėt, por nga ana tjetėr duke ruajtur disa lidhje me Serbinė, nė mėnyrė qė Beogradi tė jetė i kėnaqur. Por kjo zgjidhje, thotė profesorja e shkencave politike, nuk besoj se mund tė japė rezultat.”

    Zonja Ramet sugjeron se pėr momentin ėshtė nė interes tė popullit tė Kosovės dhe aspiratave tė tyre pėr pavarėsi tė tregojnė njė shpirt bashkėpunimi dhe harmonie dhe tė mos pėrqėndrohen nė ēėshtje qė mund tė sjellin ndėrlikime: “Qėndrimi i Asamblesė sė Kosovės nė javėt e ardhshme do tė jetė pėrcaktues. Vota e Asamblesė pėr tė shpallur kufirin me Maqedoninė si tė papranueshėm ishte e papeshuar mirė, pasi komuniteti ndėrkombėtar priste nga parlamenti i ri bashkėpunim dhe harmoni dhe jo ndėrlikimin e gjendjes. Pėr kėtė arsye vota e tyre nuk u njoh nga UNMIK-u, Bashkimi Evropian, si dhe qeveria e Shteteve tė Bashkuara. Nėse parlamenti i Kosovės do tė mbėshteste me kėmbėngulje kėtė qėndrim, mund tė krijonte ndėrlikime nė pėrpjekjet pėr pavarėsi. Pavarėsia mund tė arrihet mė me lehtėsi nėse qeveria e Kosovės tregon se i pranon kufijtė e tanishėm.”

    Kohėt e fundit revista Lobi nė Maqedoni botoi njė intervistė tė sajuar me zonjėn Ramet. Redaksia e revistės botoi mė pas njė sqarim ku i kėrkon falje analistes pėr kėtė incident. Nė intervistėn e paqėnė, tė revistės Lobi, thuhej se zonja Ramet mbėshteste idenė e njė Federate Ballkanike, tė cilėn, siē shpjegon analistja nė bisedė me Zėrin e Amerikės, ajo nuk e ka sugjeruar asnjėherė: “Nė intervistė ngrihej ideja e njė Bashkimi Ballkanik, qė shtrihet nga Sllovenia nė Turqi, si njė mėnyrė pėr tė pėrshpejtuar pranimin e kėtyre vendeve nė Bashkimin Evropian. Nuk mendoj se kjo do tė ishte njė ide e mirė, pasi ky bashkim do tė bazohej nė parimin e hallkės mė tė dobėt. Pra i gjithė bashkimi do tė vuante tė metat e hallkės mė tė dobėt, tė cilat do tė pengonin pėrparimin e tė gjitha vendeve nė kėtė bashkim,” shprehet zonja Ramet.

    Analistja thotė se mėnyra mė e mirė pėr tė siguruar njė pėrparim nė rajon ėshtė qė secili nga vendet tė pėrqėndrohet nė zgjidhjen e problemeve tė brendshme dhe pėrmbushjen e parametrave tė institucioneve ndėrkombėtare ku kėrkon tė antarėsohet.

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