Mbi politikën e jashtme të SH.B.A.-së

[Eni]

Albasoul
9/3/01 8:59:40 pm)
Reply
Community Supporter
Mbrojtja atomike amerikane
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nje nga pikat me te perfolura ne shtypin boteror kohet e fundit eshte edhe plani i presidentit Bush per te ndertuar nje sistem mbrojtje ndaj raketave berthamore qe mund te leshohen drejt territorit amerikan. Kjo ka ngritur shqetesime te medha si ne Europe edhe ne Azi e ne mbare boten. Ka analiste qe e mbeshtesin ka edhe nga ata qe e kundershtojne nje politike te tille agresive.

A eshte kjo nje politike e drejte e amerikaneve dhe cilat do te jene konseguencat e saj ne diplomacine boterore?



ReEdD
(9/3/01 11:44:34 pm)
Reply Re: Mbrojtja atomike amerikane
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pikerisht ne termin politike agresive gabohet. Vetembrojtja tani quhet agresivitet. Me sa duket amerikanet qe si gjithmone kane pare me larg se te tjeret e kane kuptuar qe lufta e ftohte nuk ka perfunduar akoma. Dyshojne qe ne nje te ardhme ndofta mund te shpertheje perseri. Dhe per mendimin tim nuk e kane gabim. Mburoja spaciale u zbulua dhe u diskutua qe ne kohen e Klintonit, pavaresisht qe nuk u vu ne perdorim. Bush me te marre fuqine dha urdher per instalimin e saj. Pra kjo tregon qe konfliktet ne bote nuk jane shuar akoma dhe vazhdojne te ekzistojne si ai prushi i mbuluar me hi dhe nuk duket.
Dyshimi im dhe shpresoj te gabohem per kete, eshte qe shikohet nje tendence ne rritje e frymes majtiste protestuese sot ne Bote, si ajo e viteve 60. Si gjithmone te majtet, komunistet dhe bashke me to edhe anarkistet shfrytezojne momente per te treguar qe ata ekzistojne dhe nuk kane vdekur. Mjafton te kujtojme se cfare ndodhi ne Seattle dy vjet perpara dhe ne Genoa tani para nje muaji. Te majtet duke u hequr si liberal dhe duke trumbetuar te drejtat e individit, sic eshte edhe ajo e te protestuarit, e kane bere te qarte qe nuk kane vdekur, por jane me te gjalle se kurre. Te bashkuar nga te gjitha vendet e Botes dhe me flamujt e kuq me figurat e Marksit dhe Che Guevares protestat paqesore i kthejne ne nje beteje te vertete. Pra ne nje fare menyre po ja arrine qellimit te tyre. Po sensibilizojne opinionin qe edhe ata ekzistojne. Keta grupe me sa eshte pare dhe degjuar kane nje mbeshtetje mjaft te madhe politike sot ne Europe neper partite e majta. Kjo vjen edhe si pasoje e politikes klintoniane. Prandaj edhe Bush po tregon qe nuk ka ndermend te ndjeke ate politike. pra po ben cmos qe ti tregoje cdokujt qe SHBA ekziston dhe nuk ka ndermend ti marre doren askujt.

Dr Rieux
(9/5/01 9:13:42 am)
Reply Re: Mbrojtja atomike amerikane
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Une mendoj se me teper se nje ceshtje sigurie, mbrojtja atomike eshte per Ameriken nje ceshtje muskujsh per te treguar qe ajo eshte superfuqia e vetme e mbetur nga nje marreveshje me nje ish-shtet dhe ish-superfuqi. Nga njera ane, Amerika eshte e sigurte qe sdo te kete konkurrence qe per pasoje te mund te sjelle nje gare te re te ngjajshme me ate luftes se yjeve. Nga ana tjeter ajo duket se do ta vere perfundimisht me shpatulla pas tokes Rusine dhe ekonomine e saj te ndryshkur.
Nje tjeter pike e rendesishme eshte se W. Bush gjithashtu e konsideron kete ceshtje si nje test per suksesin e tij personal ne politiken e jashtme e cila deri tani nuk mund te thuhet se ka qene e shkelqueshme. "Humbje" ne konfliktin me Kinen dhe relatat e ftohta me BE jane nje shtyse e metejshme qe te pakten ne kete front kesaj rradhe administrata e tij te "fitoje".

Albasoul
(9/7/01 10:03:31 am)
Reply
Community Supporter
Re: Mbrojtja atomike amerikane
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ky plan nuk ka si qellim futjen e frikes Rusise, apo aleateve, perkundrazi, ka per qellim dhenien fund te epokes atomike. Bushi ne planin e tij te pare piketonte Korene e Veriut si nje kercenim berthamor per vete US dhe aleatet e saj aziatike. Kufiri midis Korese se Jugut dhe Veriut ngelet edhe sot e kesaj dite pika me e nxehte e globit dhe ende atje ngelen te stacionuar trupa te shumta amerikane.

Ky plan ka si per qellim qe te dekurajoje vende si Pakistani, India, Koreja e Veriut, Kina, nga gara e ndertimit te armeve berthamore. Plani i Bushit eshte i limituar, qe do te thote qe perdja mbrojtese qe do te ngreje mbi US mund ta mbroje US vetem nga nje numer i limituar raketash berthamore. As qe behet fjale te mbrohesh nga Rusia qe ka ne arsenalin e saj me shume se 2000 raketa berthamore, mese te mjaftueshme per te hedhur gjithe boten ne ere. Mbrojtja e Bushit nuk do te mund te perballte dot Rusine prandaj edhe Rusia nuk duhet te ndihet e kercenuar nga ky hap i amerikaneve.

Kina eshte mbase vendi qe duhet te shqetesohet me shume. Aktualisht ajo mendohet te kete 120 raketa ne arsenalin e saj dhe ritmet e prodhimit te raketave jane shume te uleta fale edhe kostos se larte financiare qe rendon ekonomine kineze. Shume analiste mendojne se kjo do te coje ne nje gare te re berthamore por ne fakt ky argument nuk qendron. Nuk qendron pasi vendet qe ndihen te kercenuara nuk kane mundesite financiare dhe teknologjine e duhur per te bere nje gare te tille, dhe per te sfiduar US.

Europianet dhe Rusia jane te shqetesuar jo nga rreziku qe sjell ky plan, por nga konseguencat qe ky plan do te kete ne arenen nderkombetare. Amerikanet do te behen te paaritshem edhe per vete aleatet e tyre nese ata ia dalin me sukses te ndertojne nje sistem te tille mbrojtes. Te gjitha vendet e botes nuk do ti kthejne me syte nga Europianet per ndihme, por vetem drejt US. Influenca e Europianeve ne arenen nderkombetare do te binte ndjeshem, me keq se c'ka rene ne keto momente. India dhe Pakistani nuk do te merreshin me te mire nga Amerikanet, sic eshte bere deri me sot pasi testuan me sukses bomben atomike, por do tu diktohej te ndalonin garen e armatimit, dhe keto vende do te nxitonin ti puthnin kemben US, me shprese qe ata do te gjejne aleancen e US.

Per ti qetesuar europianet dhe ruset, sekretari amerikan i mbrojtjes u premtoi qe sapo sistemi te testohej me sukses, aleatet dhe Rusia do te ishin nder te paret qe te mund ta blinin dhe instalonin kete teknologji ne vendet e tyre. Perseri europianet nuk mund ti gezoje ky premtim pasi edhe nese amerikanet ia dalin me sukses, europianet nuk mund te jene te gjendje ta blejne dot kete teknologji fale kostos se saj te larte. Ne te njejten kohe, planet e ngritjes se "nje force ushtarake te perbashket europiane" bien si kallep sapuni para planeve amerikane.

Fjalet qe Bush zgjodhi per te mirat e nje plani te tille per Ameriken, ishin "beyond challenge", qe me fjale te tjera, askush nga peshqit e vegjel nuk mund te sfidoje apo kercenoje sigurine amerikane ne vend dhe ne arenen nderkombetare nese ky plan arrihet me sukses.


P.S "Star Wars" ishte plani qe presidenti Regan ideo dhe financoi ne mesin e viteve 80 dhe qe prej atehere shteti amerikan ka derdhur mesatarisht rreth $ 5 miliarde ne vit nga buxheti i shtetit ne kete program. Pra me shume se $ 70 miliarde jane shpenzuar deri me sot.

[alumni]

http://www.thenewrepublic.com/doc.mh...s=kaplan032502

HOW THE ARMY DITCHED THE POWELL DOCTRINE.
Troop Movement
by Lawrence F. Kaplan
Post date 03.14.02 | Issue date 03.25.02

Last week, in the middle of the Battle of Gardez, theater commander Army General Tommy Franks expressed his condolences to the families of American soldiers who lost their lives "in our ongoing operations in Vietnam." It was a strange slip. In truth, recent ground operations in Afghanistan have had exactly the opposite resonance: Never in the past 30 years has the specter of Vietnam been further from the minds of American military planners. The involvement of sizable numbers of conventional Army forces in sustained combat is a remarkable development in itself, one not seen since the Gulf war. More remarkable still was the sheer audacity of the effort--which involved helicopters operating at maximum altitudes; regular Army forces from the 10th Mountain and 101st Airborne divisions battling Al Qaeda fighters at close range; and Army commanders improvising as they went along. The officers who planned the operation at Gardez weren't reliving Vietnam. They were banishing it.

From its inception, Operation Anaconda was very much an Army product. The initial plan for rooting out Al Qaeda and Taliban forces that had regrouped in the caves of eastern Afghanistan was drafted by General Franklin Hagenbeck of the Army's 10th Mountain Division. From there it was passed up to Central Command's land component commander, Army Lieutenant General Paul Mikolashek, before landing on Franks's desk. The decision to rely heavily on regular Army forces has stirred considerable speculation. An article last week in The Washington Times provoked an uproar at the Pentagon by quoting an accusation (from what sounded like an Air Force officer) that an "Army mafia" was pressing for the use of conventional forces on parochial grounds. That is, having sat out every American combat action since Somalia (including most of the war in Afghanistan), the Army felt it couldn't afford to sit out another.

That's not quite right. In fact, the original request for the plan came from Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, after intelligence indicated an Al Qaeda buildup back in January--only one month after Tora Bora, where America's reliance on Afghan proxies allowed much of the enemy to escape. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Air Force General Richard Myers flew all the way to Afghanistan to review the plan, and the president himself approved it. Still, the allegation contained a kernel of truth: Army leaders did want their troops in the fight. And, given the Army's institutional trajectory over the past decade, that itself is news. Good news.

he Army's eagerness to play a role in Afghanistan derives, in part, from the reality of a war being fought in self-defense. But it also reflects the accumulation of past experiences. First, of course, there was Vietnam. The "lessons of Vietnam" usually conjure up a reflexive opposition to military intervention on the part of civilian policymakers. But nowhere was the Vietnam syndrome felt more deeply than among the post-Vietnam officer corps, particularly in the Army, which bled the most in Southeast Asia. The understandable reluctance to repeat the experience yielded, among other things, the restrictive doctrine for the use of force popularized by Colin Powell, the most powerful Army general of the post-Vietnam era. Many would later invoke the Powell Doctrine's strict "national interest" criteria to explain the Army's reluctance to intervene in places like Bosnia and Kosovo. But it's worth remembering that Powell argued that the defense of Kuwait didn't meet the criteria either.

After the first President Bush launched the war nonetheless, he declared that the United States had finally "licked the Vietnam syndrome." But, for senior Army officials, America's liberation of Kuwait only reinforced it. Operation Desert Storm, which was designed to minimize the risk to U.S. ground troops, set a nearly impossible standard for an already cautious Army leadership. As a result, recalls author and retired Army Colonel Ralph Peters, "After Desert Storm, Army generals carried force protection [i.e., safeguarding one's own troops] to extremes." And when they failed to meet the Gulf war standard two years later in Somalia, where the loss of 18 American soldiers elicited a public outcry and prompted President Clinton to abandon the mission, the Army brass grew even more risk-averse. Indeed, Clinton's preoccupation with casualties only encouraged an existing ethos that equated them with failure.

It surfaced again during the mid-1990s when Army generals argued against putting troops on the ground in Bosnia. When U.S. troops finally did set foot in the Balkans in 1995, the Army kept them on a short leash, openly declaring that their primary mission was force protection. Not surprisingly, a massive survey conduced by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies during Clinton's second term (the results of which will be included in a forthcoming book by Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelpi) found that military officers were far more casualty-averse than their civilian counterparts; that senior officers were more casualty-averse than junior officers; and that senior Army officers were among the most casualty-averse of all.

Nowhere was this more evident than in Kosovo. When President Clinton declared: "I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war," Army leaders proved eager to oblige--even after his resistance to the idea softened. The most memorable example came when Army Chief of Staff Dennis Reimer opposed General Wesley Clark's request to employ Apache helicopter gunships against Serb forces. According to The Washington Post, Reimer "worried that the Army's Apaches would be a step toward the use of ground forces, something the Army leadership did not favor." And indeed, when Clinton ultimately authorized the dispatch of 24 Apaches to Albania, the Army dragged its feet--taking one month to deliver them, and then only in the company of more than 5,000 Army personnel, 15 tanks, a mechanized infantry company, an engineer company, and an air-defense battery. None were ever used. The saga embarrassed the United States and humiliated the Army. Of his service's performance in Kosovo, then-Army Secretary Louis Caldera remarked, "We seem to be more willing to suffer casualties in training than in real operations."

The Army's marginal role in Kosovo proved to be, if not a turning point, at least an opening for institutional selfcriticism. The problem in Kosovo was not a lack of capability but, as retired Colonel Richard Hart Sinnreich put it recently in Army magazine, "the mental processes of some of its senior leaders." Adds former Army officer and Boston University Professor Andrew Bacevich, "Among the more perceptive leaders of the officer corps, it was becoming evident as early as Bosnia that having an Army unwilling to take risks is pointless." The Kosovo embarrassment brought these fights into the open, spurring a serious debate in the Pentagon about whether the Army was even relevant anymore.

With this debate came an opportunity to revisit Army doctrine. Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki (who replaced Reimer in 1999), along with his deputy, General John Keane, seized upon the Army's failure in Kosovo to unveil a plan to transport Army forces to combat theaters within 96 hours and to begin the process of transforming heavy armor units into lighter brigades. "When ordered," Shinseki says, "we intend to get to trouble spots faster than our adversaries can complicate the crisis." Pointing to the vulnerability of these lighter brigades, critics within the Army have derided Shinseki's vision as a recipe for significant casualties--an argument bolstered by recent Army war games. But while the plan's particulars may be subject to debate, the rationale behind it is not. Army leaders, after all, are now talking openly about the imperative of getting to war zones rather than staying out of them. "Soldiers from rapid deployment units tend to be risk-takers and aggressive," says Robert Killebrew, a former Army colonel and one of its most innovative thinkers. "And as the Army moves toward a lighter, more mobile structure, it will begin to look and think the same way."

September 11, then, may have been what Peters calls an "accelerator" for a process that was already underway, with many Army leaders having openly acknowledged that putting troops on the ground only as a last resort and then subordinating their mission to force protection undercut the Army's own mission. But Franks, the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and a career artillery officer, wasn't one such leader. Consequently, the evolution of the Army's involvement in Afghanistan over the past five months has closely mirrored the evolution of Army thinking over the past five years--from excessive caution, to embarrassment, to a more robust stance.

According to officers at Central Command and on the Army Staff--as well as civilian policymakers--Franks's early stewardship of the war was characterized by tentativeness. Among other things, he initially proposed a days-long air campaign confined to the suppression of Taliban air defenses; declined for weeks to use the JSTARS surveillance aircraft (an essential tool in the U.S. arsenal that illuminates enemy activity over a wide area on radar); sought legal counsel before targeting Taliban leader Mullah Omar (who escaped in the meantime); and his team turned down a request for air support from imperiled opposition leader Abdul Haq (who was quickly captured and killed). During the first months of the war, instances of excessive caution like these regularly became the centerpiece of twice-daily telephone conversations between Rumsfeld, Myers, and Franks--during which Rumsfeld often had to prod Franks to be more aggressive. And when Franks chose to deploy Marines to landlocked Afghanistan ahead of the Army, senior members of his own service began to echo Rumsfeld's concerns.

No operation provoked more second-guessing than the December assault on Tora Bora, where Franks relied on a combination of Afghan proxies and small numbers of Special Operations Forces. The mix wasn't right. The Afghan troops, whose aims no longer coincided with our own, proved less eager to comb the caves of Tora Bora than they were to smuggle Al Qaeda members across the border. The operation embarrassed everyone involved: Central Command, which devised it; Rumsfeld's team, which endorsed it; and the Army, which could have played a valuable role but, aside from fielding Special Forces teams, played none.

Nonetheless, the Bush team's unflinching support for the war effort has emboldened ground forces. Hence, while the initiative for putting Army troops into Gardez came from Rumsfeld, Army sources say Franks adapted quickly to the new strategy as well as to the surprises and last-minute tactical imperatives of the battle itself. As the war in Afghanistan extends into its fifth month, the Army's institutional reflexes are rapidly yielding to operational requirements. But the Army's performance also reflects a gradual erosion of the old verities. "The idea that some element of risk-taking is a punishable offense has been losing stock for years," says one mid-level officer. "The aggressiveness you see in [Gardez] is a symptom of that." Indeed, critics may fault the Army for its tactics in Gardez, but they can hardly accuse it of avoiding risks. And in the end, that may prove even more significant than the outcome of the operation itself. "There probably never should have been a debate about putting forces on the ground [in Afghanistan]," says Mackubin Thomas Owens, a professor of strategy at the Naval War College, "but if there was, Gardez has put it to rest." Hopefully forever.

[alumni]

http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/20...2002170333.asp

World: French Islamic Scholar Cautions Against 11 September 'Illusions'
By Virginie Coulloudon

Prague, 10 September 2002 (RFE/RL) -- Olivier Roy is an Afghan and Central Asian specialist at France's National Center for Scientific Research. Roy is the author of many books on Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Islam, including "The Failure of Political Islam" and "The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations." In an interview with RFE/RL, Roy discusses the events of 11 September and radical Islam, topics he develops in two books he has just published in France: "The Illusions of 11 September: The Strategic Debate in the Face of Terrorism" and "The Globalization of Islam."

Q: What, in your opinion, are the "illusions" of 11 September?

A: The first illusion of 11 September is to believe that these events have changed the face of the world. What I mean is that almost all decisions that are generally ascribed to 11 September had been, in fact, made before that date. This applies, for example, to the decision to attack Iraq or to let [Israeli Prime Minister] Ariel Sharon have a free hand in Israel, or to the U.S.-Russian rapprochement. The only direct consequence of 11 September is the military campaign against Afghanistan.

Q: Does that mean that the new world configuration is, in fact, determined by economic factors?

A: No, no. I do not believe the [upcoming] campaign against Iraq has any economic element in it. I do not believe that what is at stake in Iraq is oil. In my view, oil rather serves as a postfact rationalization to try to understand why the Americans have focused on Iraq. But, if one takes a rational approach, one has to conclude that there is no oil factor. If that were the case, it would have been much more logical for the Americans to work closer with the Saudis or to prompt a change of political regime in Saudi Arabia, rather than pitch into a war with Iraq, with all its unpredictable consequences.

Q: So these are strictly political decisions?

A: Yes, absolutely. Behind these decisions stand extremely complex, but mainly ideological, reasons. The American doctrine reads that the main threat today is represented by mass-destruction weapons in the hands of hostile states or terrorist groups. This is the so-called "rogue states" theory that, by the way, was elaborated under [U.S. President Bill] Clinton. According to this doctrine, it is necessary to neutralize all hostile states that possess weapons of mass destruction. As of today, there are three states that are suspected of hoarding weapons of mass destruction: Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. North Korea will be the last target. The main problem for the [U.S.] now is Iraq. From an American perspective, Iran is next.

Q: What are the other "illusions" of 11 September?

A: Another illusion is to say that [Osama] bin Laden's terrorism originates from the Middle East conflicts, that it is intimately linked with the Palestinian conflict and with a possible war on Iraq. Bin Laden's strategy, battlefields, and recruitment system are absolutely not rooted in the Middle East. They are totally globalized. Look at those places in the world where bin Laden has left his imprint: the U.S., London -- which serves as one of his recruiting centers -- Western Europe [in general], Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and the Philippines.

By contrast, no terrorist attack masterminded by bin Laden has ever been reported in Jerusalem or Cairo. I would add that bin Laden's people -- at least the cadres of bin Laden's "new generation" -- have all turned radical while they were living in the West. The only exception is provided by the Saudis. But you would never find [in bin Laden's network] any Palestinian who resides in the Gaza Strip or the West Bank, nor would you find any militant of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, which has distanced itself from bin Laden.

And, as I said, all [of bin Laden's people] -- whether [Mohamed] Atta, [Marwan] al-Shehhi [eds: two of the 11 September hijackers], or [Zacarias] Moussaoui [eds: an Arab-born French citizen who is under arrest in the U.S. in connection with the 11 September attacks] -- have re-Islamicized themselves in the West. And I am not even speaking of all those militants who have converted to Islam and who add to the global dimension [of bin Laden's network].

Q: This is precisely the argument you develop in your second book, "The Globalization of Islam." But you also argue that Islamism, and not only Islam, is turning global. What do you think of the confusion that is still being made between Islam and fundamentalism?

A: In my view, radical Islam is following various and extremely different paths. On the one hand, you have some groups, which have remained confined to a national framework and which have progressively turned into moderate, though conservative, [political] parties. This is notably the case of Turkey's Refah [eds: Welfare Party, which was banned in 1998]; the Muslim Brotherhood movement, which has ramifications in many countries; Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front; Iran's Islamic Revolution.

On the other hand, there are [fundamentalist] groups, which have no national roots -- such as bin Laden's network, the London-branch of the Hizb-al Tahrir, the Jama'at Al-Muhajirun [eds: a Saudi-born movement with offshoots in Western Europe), or the Hizb ut-Tahrir in India and Pakistan. These movements are based on what I call an "imaginary ummah," that is, a Muslim community with no concrete reality. In any case, not in the Middle East."

Q: When did Islam become extraterritorial, and to what extent is this extraterritoriality the consequence of Western immigration policies?

A: Of course, this is largely due to immigration. But it would be a mistake to see that extraterritoriality as the sole consequence of immigration. There are other aspects such as the circulation of people, which is not precisely a migration flow. There are people who, for example, study in one country, find a job in another country, and then move to a third country.

Citizenship and nationality crises, which are also a characteristic of the Middle East, should also be taken into account. Look at the Palestinians. They provide a very good example of that. But there is also all these displaced persons and refugees who represent a stateless population.

In addition, we are confronted with a globalization of cultural and social behaviors or, to put it more simply, to a Westernization of the world. This is noticeable in a number of social behaviors, in the decrease of fertility, the predominance of couples over families, or the greater access to higher education offered to women.

Although the pace of this evolution is not the same everywhere, it nevertheless leads to a sociological Westernization of populations. Last but not least, one should not forget consuming habits both on the economic and cultural levels. The expansion of McDonald's and the spread of the Internet do refer to global models.

Q: Still, the extraterritoriality of Islam does not represent a threat in itself, does it? A: No. Besides, I do not perceive bin Laden as being a strategic threat. He certainly represents a security issue. But he does not represent a strategic threat, precisely because this extraterritoriality [of Islam] goes in parallel with Westernization, not with the Islamicization of the West. Bin Laden will never topple the U.S. government and replace it with an Islamic cabinet. This is not even an issue.

Q: However, you consider Islamic fundamentalism to be inherent in Western globalization?

A: Yes, it is both a symptom and an agent of globalization. Bin Laden is taking up the anti-American protest that, up until now, was the privilege of ultraleftists in the West and supporters of the Third World elsewhere. Of course, bin Laden has Islamicized this space with his discourse and references. But he also occupies a space, which is a product of the modern world, of the Western world, and which is not the space of traditional Islam."

Q: Is there a way out of this situation?

A: We are witnessing the expression of a transition crisis. Bin Laden represents both the morbidity and the climax of this crisis. The acceleration of the Westernization process inevitably leads Islam to make compromises and try to integrate. This is what the majority of Muslims have already done. But the same process will inevitably lead to creating a small, marginalized group of opponents who will reject globalization -- although they themselves are products of globalization.

[Albo]

Interviste shume interesante dhe konkluzionet e autorit jane te goditura. Lufta ndaj terrorizmit eshte nderthurur me luften ndaj vendeve qe perbejne nje rrezik per sigurine e paqes ne bote.

Edhe pse mund te mos kete nje lidhje direkte te organizatave terroriste Iraku, Irani dhe Korea e Veriut jane vende qe heret e vone do te perballen me diktatin amerikan. 11 shtatori 2001 e beri shume imediate nderhyrjen e USA per te garantuar jo vetem sigurine e saj por te gjithe botes se qyteteruar.

Persa i perket qyteterimit islamik, 11 shtatori jo vetem qe i fali nje vemendje te jashtezakonshme por nxorri ne pah edhe burimin e gjithe ketyre forcave destruktive qe nuk perballin thjeshte politikat globale por edhe vete qyteterimin e krishtere. Qyterimi islamik eshte ne krize identiteti dhe ende nuk ka arritur te gjeje veteveten ne mijvjecarin e trete. Ndryshimet dhe reformat politike ne keto vende nuk i diktojne me vetem forcat e brendshme por edhe fuqite e medha.

Per aq kohe sa bota islamike nuk zgjedh nje forme qe siguron bashkejetesen dhe partneritetin me boten e qyteruar (te krishtere), ky qyteterim do te shkoje drejt izolimit dhe regresit. Amerikanet jane gati te paguajne cdo cmim per te mos lejuar perseritjen e nje 11 shtatori te dyte.

Persa u perket iluzioneve te autorit se asgje nuk ndryshoi ne politiken e jashtme amerikane pervec Afganistanit, une do te thosha qe shume gjera kane ndryshuar per 1 vit. Politika e jashtme amerikane shtrihet ne afate kohore qe arrijne deri ne nje dekade, dhe ky eshte vetem fillimi i nje procesi qe ka si per qellim vendosjen e sigurise kudo ne bote.

Ndryshimi me i madh ne politiken e jashtme amerikane qe autori me sa duket nuk e shikon ka te beje me flakjen tej te mentalitetit izolues nga e cila amerikanet jane karekterizuar prej kohesh. Forcat amerikane jane shperndare ne cdo kontinent dhe ne cdo vend ku ka probleme sigurie, hap qe administrata e Bush as qe mendohej ta ndermerte ndonjehere. (Kujtoni deklarimet e Bush dhe keshilltareve te tij gjate fushates presidenciale ne US).

Amerikanet problemin e sigurise globale e kane lidhur direkt me sigurine territoriale te Shteteve te Bashkuara. Nuk mund te tolerohen me as organizatat terroriste dhe as konfliktet sado larg kontinentit amerikan ato mund te jene.

[alvi]

A, ca ti bojn politikanet e Amerikes, se e kane te keqen perbrenda, te liberalet.
Amerika mund ti zgjidhe shume thjesht keto ceshtje, por ja qe vullneti politik mungon, pasi demokratet, si pasoje e interesave te tyre ne grupe te caktuara te shoqerise amerikane, nuk lejojne ndryshime thelbesore, por thjesht kozmetike.
1) Menyrat kryesore te hyrjes st terrorristave ne Amerike te padiktuar jane dy. Meksika dhe Kanadaja. Per sa i perket kufirit MEX-ISA, kjo ceshtje do te ishte shume e kehte per tu zgjidhur, duke vendosur ushtrine ne kufi. Me aftesite teknologjike qe ka USA, e ruan kufirin me se miri, po te aplikohej ne kete drejtim. Per sa i perket Kanadase, shume Amerikaneve u duket sikur Kanadaj i ka qelluar me thike pas shpine. Kushdo mun te hyje ne Kanada, dhe te qendroje atje per minimumi 1 vit. Natyrisht qe nderhyrje direkte ne Kanada per ndryshimin e politikes se emigracionit nuk mund te kete nga USA, por presione mund te behen kollaj ndaj qeverise Kanadeze, qe te mos behet han me dy porta. Natyrisht, per te paren jane fajtore demokratet qe ke emigrantet nga Mexika, kane nje bllok te fuqishem votues, gje qe i pengon ata te marrin masa per mbylljen e kufijve.

2) Keto dite po diskutohet mohimi i vizave per shtetasit e vendeve Islamike. Kjo ne vetvete nuk do te ishte nje mase e mjaftueshme, por e gershetuar me masen e pare do te ulte paksa rrezikun e terrorrizmit. Perseri, liberalet, duke dhene pretekstin e "profilizimit racor" nuk e bejne te mundur kete ide, ndonese te gjithe e dime, qe nuk ke per tu ruajtur nga terrorrista suedeze, pasi ne 20 vitet e fundit, me shume pak perjashtime, Islamizmi ka patur monopol mbi terrorrizmin. Nje arsye tjeter, ne favor te mohimit te vizave, eshte dhe fakti qe asnje nga shtetet islamike nuk e ka perkrahur Ameriken ne kete lufte kunder terrorrizmit, pra po te gjykojme nga fjalimi i XH. Bush, ne se nuk je me ne (USA) atehere je kundra nesh. Nje analogji, do te behej me gjermanine naziste dhe JAponine gjate luftes II boterore. Atehere ishte e pakonceptueshme qe nej qytetar japonez apo gjerman te kerkonte dhe merrte vize amerikane.

3)Natyra shume e shperqendruar e publikut amerikan, ka bere te harrohete disi 11 Shtatori, dhe zemerimi i drejte qe njerezit ndjen ne ate kohe. Sot per 11Shtatorin flitet ne menyre anekdotale(?!) aq sa ka njerez qe akoma dyshojne dhe nuk jane te sigurt nese duhet rrezuar Sadami apo jo.

4) Mentaliteti amerikan, qe i pengon njerezit ta shohin boten sic eshte, por ashtu si u pelqen atyre. Amerikanet, ne ndryshim nga ne, jane shume naive. Ata nuk e kane pare ndonjehere djallin te misheruar, si popujt e botes. Ata jane akoma idealiste qe besojne ne triumfin e te mires ndaj te keqes, dhe kjo, kryesisht e arritur me metoda paqesore. Ata nuk e njohin shprehjen, "dajaku ka dal nga xheneti" dhe mendojne se duke u perpjekur "ti kuptojne" arsyet e terrorristeve, ndoshta ata do te heqin dore. Naiviteti i tyre arrin deri aty sa te mos kuptojne se , per terrorristat islamike, qellimi i rezimit te amerikes, mnbeshtetet mbi faktin qe atyre nuk u pelqen se c'simbolizin amerika. Liri, barazi, dhe mundesira per kedo. Atyre, amerika dhe fakti qe ajo eshte e suksesshme, u hedh poshte pretendimin se shoeria e tyre fetare, ofron me shume. Kur njerezit shohin, se si jetohet dhe punohet ne amerike, se si gruaja ka pothuajse te njejtat te drejta si dhe burrat, se si femijet nuk vdesin nga uria, apo sepse do ishte sakrilegj ti shihte doktorri, se grate nuk behen synet me menyra cnjerezore, se njerezit nuk shiten si baget etj, atehere ajo u hap syte, dhe feja, realisht, e urren mendimin e lire dhe mbeshtet injorancen.

5) Amerika, dueht qe ose te mbyllet ne "kullen e fildishte" ose te vendose kemben e saj kudo ne bote, gje qe do te kerkoje me shume kohe, pasi administrata liberale e Klintonit, e ka pergjysmua forcen ustarake amerikane, sidomos marinen, qe eshte baza e fuqise amerikane. Me ane te aviacionit dhe kembesorise, mund te paraqesesh force, por nuk e projekton dot, pasi 2/3 e tokes jane oqean. Prandaj dhe duhet rindertuar sa me shpejt marina ushtarake.

Partnere te rinj, jane te domosdoshem, pasi vende te cilat amerika i ka rindertuar dhe shpetuar e nxjerre nga balta, kush e di se sa here, si puna e RFGJ, sot po dalin kundra politikes amerikane. Nje perjashtim ketu eshte Anglia, e cila sipas nje marrveshje te heshtur ndihmo dhe perkrah reciprokisht USA neper aventura te tilla neper bote.
\
Dhe si perfundim, ata duhet te fillojne te perdorin taktiken e vjeter romake, Perca e sundo. Duhet te nxisin sa me shume konflikte nderrajonale, dhe nga to te dalin te fituara, mesim ky i nxjerre nga lufta II boterore. Pra leje Kosoven te luftoje me Jugosllavine, Kinen me Taivanin, Izraelin me Arabet, Indine me Pakistanin, dhe kush ofron me shume, beju mik.
Kete keshille do i jepja un presidentit amerikan, si platforme per politiken e jashtme per 10 vjetet e ardhshem.

[Beqari002]

Mandela: SHBA kërcënon paqen në botë

Mandela i quajti ndihmësit e presidentit Bush 'dinosaurë'

Ish presidenti i Afrikës së Jugut, Nelson Mandela, ka thënë se Shtetet e Bashkuara përbëjnë një kërcënim për paqen në botë.

Në një intervistë të botuar në revistën amerikane, Newsweek, zoti Mandela ka thënë se tendenca amerikane për të ndërmarrë veprime të njëanëshme, pa mbështetjen e Kombeve të Bashkuara, duhet dënuar me termat më të ashpra.

Ai tha se politika e jashtme amerikane, që nga mbështetja për Shahun e Iranit e deri te pengimi i tërheqjes së trupave sovjetike nga Afganistani, ka qenë katastrofike.

Në intervistë, zoti Mandela shprehet se presidenti Bush është i motivuar nga dëshira që të kënaqë interesat e industrisë së armëve dhe të naftës.

[alvi]

Në një intervistë të botuar në revistën amerikane, Newsweek, zoti Mandela ka thënë se tendenca amerikane për të ndërmarrë veprime të njëanëshme, pa mbështetjen e Kombeve të Bashkuara, duhet dënuar me termat më të ashpra.


Po nderhyrja ne Kosove c'ishte sipas Zotit Mandela? Sipas tij, Amerika duhej te priste miratimin e Ruseve dhe Kines?
C'po ndodh me kte bote?
Sa bukeshkale po dalin sot. Gjermania, qe pa Ameriken do ishte nje grumbull germadhash, dhe e pergjysmuar, Mandela, te cilin Amerika e nxorri nga burgu.
Pse?
Sa zili qe na kane.

[xhelil]

Rreziku anglo-amerikan per kolianizimin e ri
ose anglo-amerikanet neokolianistet e botes


Ftoj te gjithe antaret e forumit ne se do te deshironin dhe nese do te kishin kohe te volitshme te debatojme mbi kete teme te re duke merre shkas dhe nga pozicioni qe qeveria e LONDRES DHE E USA kan mbajtur ndaj sheshtjes se IRAKUT.

[trinity]

Kush te tha se anglo-amerikanet po kolonizojne boten ??

Ndoshta eshte vete bota ajo qe po kerkon kolonizimin prej anglo-amerikaneve.

[xhelil]

trinity

Ska nevoje qe te me tregoje kush se ajo duket sheshit ,por sigurisht qe edhe juve keni te drejten tuaj te mendimit keshtu qe zere se bota deshka te kollianizohet nga amerikanet.

[Ushtari i mire]

E vertete Xhelil.
Nuk e di ne se te kujtohet se si u zhgenjyen Shqiptaret se USA na dha vetem 20 milione dollare ndihme.
A na e kishte per borxh USA neve? Ne na vinte inat pse vetem 20 milion?
Apo ishim ne ata qe gerthisnim USA, USA?
Erdhi 99.
C'fare borxhi apo detyrimi te kishte USA ty per te te shpetuar koken, nga dalin kto pare, taksat e amerikaneve, prape nuk ta ka per borxh.

Pse kaq mosmirenjohes?

Shpresoj se di anglisht dhe lexoje kete qe do te postoj me poshte se eshte shume domethenese, per te gjithe ata qe shajne ameriken:

Among the most admirable moves of President Lyndon Johnson came in the mid-1960s, following Charles de Gaulle’s announcement to withdraw France from NATO’s military alliance. As Secretary of State Dean Rusk finished briefing Johnson on the logistical details of his upcoming session with de Gaulle, the president calmly ordered something like, “Finally, Dean, ask de Gaulle if he also wants us to move the cemeteries of Americans buried there.” Rusk demurred, but Johnson made him ask. Should we also withdraw the graves of Americans who sacrificed their lives for France’s liberation from the Nazis?

[trinity]

Xhelil,ajo qe thua ti eshte e ditur por edhe kurioze.Modeli amerikan u tregua i sukseshem dhe te gjithe po e kopjojne ose zbatojne.

Reflektim i USA eahte bashkimi europian.Shikoje vete se si po prostituohen vendet e ndryshme per t'u "pushtuar" nga brukseli.
Sikoje vete se si po thyejne kryet per te kenaqur parametrat per t'u bere anetare te BE,Natos dhe me ne pergjithesi anetare te perendimit.

Te gjithe duan te ikin ne USA apo Mbreteri te Bashkuar por duke mos pasur vend per te gjithe aty atehere keto te fundit detyrohen te perhapin modellin e tyre ne menyre qe e gjithe bota te behet si Amerika.


Mos harro se kur tenton me ngulm te shkosh ne vendin e tjetrit njekohesisht ke pranuar pa kushte modellin e tij.

[xhelil]

Me behet qejfi qe po e perfaqeson shume mire dhe qarte psikollogjine e nje emigranti te mjeruar shqiptare qe eshte bere prostitute per te mbushur mendjen e vet dhe po munde dhe te atyre te huajve ku jeton se je i denje per ate vend ku jeton se nuk e di z.Trinity se ne c`shtete je .
C`fare mundem une te te them vec se e meritoni denjesisht nickname qe keni dhe e gezofshi.
Po mos harroni se tema eshte me e gjere dhe behet fjale per mijera viktima anekend botes te shkaktuara nga usa dhe vete populli amerikan per ket po demostron per dite.
Ketu behet fjale persulmet amerikane qe mundohet te perligje veten si vend demokratik.
Por ne fakte eshte nje vend kolianiliste qe e trashegon nga britania e madhe.
Megjithate une te kuptoj shume mire dhe nuk dua qe te ndikoj aspak ne opinionin tend per amerikanet
Vetem dua te te sqaroj nje gje se kurr nuk mundet dikush qe te me tregoje se ku mundem me shku ose ku kam te drejte me be aleanca se usa eshte shteti me i madh me emigrante qe jane irlandes,angles,francese ruse,italine afrikane ,kineze etj
Keshtu qe ne se je tifoz me usa eshte e drejta jote por mos be propagande per te se nuk besoj se ka nevoje.
Ne se deshiron te argometosh se usa nuk eshte shtet kolianiliste te mirepres ne debatin elektronik.
Faleminderit.

[xhelil]

USHTARI
Mos me keqkuptoni se ketu eshte fjala per nje teme qe mund te shprehesh lirisht ato qe mendon po kjo nuk do te thote se duhet ti jeme mirenjohes amerikes.
Mirenjohes une i jam atij qe me ben nje te mire .
GETE ka thene "Te miren qe i ben dikujte shkruaje ne rere,
te miren qe te ben dikush ngrij nje labidar"

Mos shikoni varrezat e amerikaneve ne france se ato nuk ishin per francen por per mbretin e anglise qe paguajti amerikanet me gjith floririn qe kishte mbledhur ne GANE,NIGERI,INDI,KILI,c`fare pati ia dha amerikaneve se hitleri do e bente boten te fliste gjermanisht eshte shume e komplikuar ajo cka doni me thene se anglia i leshoi kolonite tek amerikanet dhe u formua OKB etj ....prandaj ju ftoj dhe iquaj anglo-amerikane

[Ushtari i mire]

O Xhelil, po Kosoven kush ta cliroi mor mik?
Mos me thuaj te lutem e cliruam vete, se pastaj bie fare niveli i bisedes?
A ta beri USA ate te mire?
Ku e ke lapidarin?

[iliria e para]

Po Xhelil mos thuaj qe ata te detyruane te shkojsh ne UK!
Kush kenin po kolonizon?

[xhelil]

Nuk me vjen mire te pozicionoj veten si njeri qe urrej ameriken po vec dua te debatoj rreth ceshtjes qe kam shtruar me siper.
Kjo i jep te drejten qe cdo kush te mbroje dhe te respektoje mendimet e veta mua me pelqen te respektoj edhe mendimet e shqiptareve te tjere se kjo eshte dhe arsya qe hyj ne komunikim elektronik dhe por do te me pelqente qe te me paraqisni fakte per ato qe thoni se biseda do te ishte me interesante.
Ketu behet fjale per nje supershtet dhe kuptohet vetevetiu se cdo te thote supershtete ....
Pra ku eshte amerika qe po perpiqet per demokraci dhe shkaterroje mijera njerez te pa fajshem ne Japan,Vietnam,Afganistan,Iraq etje,,,.
Tani ne emer te democracise don te sulmoje perseri Irakun po bota nuk eshte me amerikanet se nuk behet fjale per problemin e popullit te Irakut por eshte nafta ,ne Londer eshte bere nje demostrate shume e madhe kundra Blair per kete ceshteje me parulla qe nuk duam te blejme nafte me gjakun e femijve te pa fajshem.
Kur Palestina edhe sot e kesaj dite rron nen sundimin Izraelit dhe amerikane asnjehere nuk nderhyne per paqe e prospekte.
Sa vende te dryshme dictatoriale perkrah amerika ne bote sidomos ne lindjen e mesme ????
Ne se amerika e cliroi kosoven me behet shume qejfi se sipas nje llogarie te thjeshte shume shpejte amerika do cliroje edhe Shqipatret e maqedonise dhe te malit te zi dhe te Camerise .
Po nuk mendoj se eshte keshtu se perpjekjet e Shqipatreve bene ate qe te kemi cka kemi fituar sot dhe perpjekjet e shqiptareve do te jene ato qe mund te bejne realitet enderren e shume shqiptareve te tjere.
Ju respektoj por deshiroj qe te mos beheni amerikonofile ose any vendi+file pervece se SHQIPTARE.
Faleminderit pres qe te degjoj dicka nga ju rreth temes me konkretishte.

[trinity]

Une e thashe qe ne fillim se jane njerezit vete ata qe e kerkojne ameriken dhe jo anasjelltas.
Kjo eshte mjaft e thjeshte per t'u kuptuar. Sistemi perendimor qe aq shume eshte ndikuar nga ai anglo-amerikan eshte i vetmi deri tani qe prodhon.
Do te thote more shoke qe nuk shet llafe por merret me krijimin e vleres se shtuar.Nuk ka ideologji por buke. Buke per te gjithe.Njerezit prej natyre shkojne atje ku gjinden ma mire dhe ku ka ma bollek.
Ajo din se si me marr i cop mineral te piste e me e ba inox te paoxidueshem e me kete me ndertu Golden Bridge.Din me marre oil me e pastru mire e mire e pastaj hopla me cadillak ne highway.din me ndertua shutlle qe ka aq shume energy sa me u shkepute prej orbites e me e pa token prej hanet. din mor shoke me ndertu edhe ate qe sta pret mendja,desha me thene ate qe nuk shihet dmth virtualitetin,software,internet,

Me nje fjale more shoke ajo prodhon drite. dhe njerezit shkojne aty ku ka drite,aty ku thithet ajer lirie,aty ku nuk ka llafe por bereqet.
Te tjeret e kane zili.I verbon drita qe ajo leshon dhe spushojne duke vjedhur vrer kunder saj.
Edhe CCCP e leshoi sputnikun ne orbite por me kete i thau arkat e shtetit,e nxorri popllin ne rruge te madhe kurse ja ku e ke Ameriken me 8.000.000.000.000.000 $ (8 mije miljard) prodhim vjetor.
E more i dashtun,eshte 80 % e popullsise boterore qe e kerkon ameriken dhe jo anasjelltas.
Ajo qe mund te duket si kolinizim jane nderhyrjet e amerikes kur keto shtete nuk mbajne rradhen per te hyre nje nga nje.

That's America.

[Eni]

Titulli i temes me rikujtoi kohet e shkuara te kolonianizimit dhe te fuqive kryesore koloniale ne Bote.

Ne rradhe te pare ishte Britania e Madhe, me pas vinin Franca, Spanja, Hollanda, Gjermamia, Portugalia, Italia apo dhe Belgjika..... keto per shek e pare qe me zbulimin e "kontinentit te ri" e deri nga shek XIX. Nga fundi i ketij shekulli del SHBA si koloni dhe kryesisht ne Azi.
Nga te gjitha kolonite, zhvillim me te mire vendet koloniale e kane pare nen anglezet, te cilet me dinakerine e tyre karakteristike, dhe ne politike, i lejuan kolonite e tyre te zbatonin zakonet e traditat vendase, por pershtatur me zhvillimin shteteror englez. Dhe rezultatet duken qarte, me ekzistencen akoma sot, te nje shteti qe zbaton demokracine sic eshte ish-kolonia engelze, India......

Xhelil, ju thoni kolonializimi i ri anglo-amerikan.

Une nuk do te flisja per kolonilanizim, sesa per zhvillim.

Vlerat dhe arritjet qe percohen nga SHBA cdo vedn sot ne bote deshiron t'i thithe e zbatoje ne vendin e vet. SHBA= Demokraci, Zhvillim,Perparim!!!

Pse SHBA nuk kane te drejte te nderhyjne ne Irak, nqs ky shtet nen thundren e Hyseinit shkel cdo norme te demokracise, duke vrare e prere nenshtetasit e vet (kurdet), duke posejduar arme te zhdukjes ne mase, duke bere nje popull te vuaje nen varferi, kur ne vend qe t'u jape ushqim, vete e urdheron ngritje te busteve e monumenteve te tjera te vetet - e kjo kur embargoja ka gjunjezuar Irakun? Udheheqes i denje ama duket!!!

Kur ishim nen sundimin e Enverit, ne shqiptaret tundnim koken me deshperim qe Malta na la jashte Evropes Perendimore, dhe lutjet tona drejtoheshin per nje nderhyrje te amerikaneve kundra rregjimit te eger kuqo-komunist, per te na sjelle demokracine.

atehere, pse kerkonim Ameriken atehere,kete "uzurpatore" te te drejtave te Hyseineve & co????

Nqs Sadam Hysein eshte diktator perse te mos e largojne nga ai post?

[xhelil]

Jam dakort se Sadami eshte diktator dhe neve nuk na mungon eksperienca per kete gje.
Une dua te shtoj dicka per hire te temes qe kam hapur senuk jam kundra kultures dhe zhvillimit perendimore dhe amerikan po mos te isha ketu ku jam tani ndofta as qe do te bisedoja per kete teme.
Vete ceshtja e irakut eshte nje fakte shume i thjeshte se ku con politika amerikane dhe angleze.
Kur mendon se Sadami ka marre pushtetin me ndihmen angleze,se Iraku ka qene nen sundimin anglez pasi ua mori turqve.
Kur Sadami ka perdorur armatimet teper vdekjeprurese qe i ka marre nga anglia dhe amerika dhe kur ai i perdori keto ne luften Irak-Iran dhe kundra Kurdeve politika angleze dhe amerikane nuk u ndje fare pervec se u be buje nga organizata jo qeveritare se si po perdhunoheshin te drejtat e njeriut ne kete vend.
Po Pakistani dhe Aabia kan nje rrekord me te dobet se Iraku dhe nuk behet gje fare per kete ceshtje .
Izraeli eshte shteti qe ka shkelur me shume rezoluta te kombeve te bashkuar dhe asnjehere nuk eshte ndeshkuar.
Por ajo cka eshte me e rendesishmja per mendimin tim Amerika si shtet me demokraci nuk duhet te flase me gjuhen e forces po me ate te paqes gje qe nuk shihet tek klika amerikane .
Kujto cfare ndodhi ne Suedi dhe Itali vjet kur Bushi ishte ne keto vende.
Nuk asnje pike dyshimi se kush eshte amerika por per mua ceshtja eshte:
1 Amerika eshte shteti i ri kolianilist?
2 Amerika eshte shteti qe me politiken e saj po lufton per demokraci dhe prosperitetin e botes?
Une per veten time mendoj se eshte e para.
Faleminderit.