hahaaa sa naiv qe je. Mire do ishte po eshte pune qe nuk behet ajo se shkakton trazira te medhaPostuar më parë nga derjansi
hahaaa sa naiv qe je. Mire do ishte po eshte pune qe nuk behet ajo se shkakton trazira te medha
Revolution 1848
car problemesh shkaktun vullnetaret ruse ose grek qe luftun bashk me qetniket serb?
shqiptaret historikisht kan luftu lokalisht
JO NEGOCIATA VETËVENDOSJE
Ajo ne bold vlen vetem per Shiperine si duket o EurostarBile greku as qe eshte nga gjaku me serbin ne lidhje dhe prap dergoi ushtare ne ane te serbeve , edhe pse , shtet i NATO-s ..
Me pakice kan qen edhe vullnetaret Ruse dhe Greke per te mos thene te paperfillshem. Si kujton se nuk ja kishte qefi Rusit apo Grekut te fusi Armate ne Serbi ? Si kujton ti se Serbi kishte nevoje per armaten Ruse apo Greke per te mposhtur Shqiptaret ? Per 24 ore po ti lihej mundesia , Serbet te hyjne edhe ne Shqiperi per aq force dhe unitet qe kemi. Por nuk te lene nderkombtaret o shoku im.
Ti thuaj shyqyr qe perkojne interesat e Amerikes dhe te disa vendeve Europiane me ato te tonat, se ne do ishim zhdukur si popull me kohe. Tani le te dalin patriotat tone te forumit dhe te thone qe ne i hajm me dhembe Serbet dhe Greket dhe te gjithe ata qe e krujn me ne
p.s
Gent vlen e njejta pergjigje edhe per ty pergjigja qe i dhash derjansit
d.m.th kan qen inisiativa individuale dhe jo te organizuara nga Rusia apo Greqia ( ashtu si organizimet e vullnetareve te Shqiptareve te Shqiperise
Revolution 1848
un ate po them se nuk kemi unitet se se kush shef veq mhallen e vet. 10 milion shqiptar ne ballkan ishte dasht me i qu te pakten 100000 luftetar ne luft. po shqitarve po su erdh zjarmi ne oborr te vet nuk i han palla per tjeter kan.Me pakice kan qen edhe vullnetaret Ruse dhe Greke per te mos thene te paperfillshem. Si kujton se nuk ja kishte qefi Rusit apo Grekut te fusi Armate ne Serbi ? Si kujton ti se Serbi kishte nevoje per armaten Ruse apo Greke per te mposhtur Shqiptaret ? Per 24 ore po ti lihej mundesia , Serbet te hyjne edhe ne Shqiperi per aq force dhe unitet qe kemi. Por nuk te lene nderkombtaret o shoku im.
Ti thuaj shyqyr qe perkojne interesat e Amerikes dhe te disa vendeve Europiane me ato te tonat, se ne do ishim zhdukur si popull me kohe. Tani le te dalin patriotat tone te forumit dhe te thone qe ne i hajm me dhembe Serbet dhe Greket dhe te gjithe ata qe e krujn me ne
p.s
Gent vlen e njejta pergjigje edhe per ty pergjigja qe i dhash derjansit
d.m.th kan qen inisiativa individuale dhe jo te organizuara nga Rusia apo Greqia ( ashtu si organizimet e vullnetareve te Shqiptareve te Shqiperise
JO NEGOCIATA VETËVENDOSJE
@EuroStar1
Miko , e organizuar nga shteti grek ka qene !
Argumente :For Milosevic's Sake
A riveting new book exposes Greek support for the Serbian strongman's regime.
by Tim Judah
Unholy Alliance: Greece and Milosevic's Serbia in the Nineties, by Takis Michas. To be published on 21 May. Texas A&M University Press, 192 pp.
As the butchery in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica proceeded, the Greek newspaper Ethnos reported on 13 July 1995 that the Greek and Serbian flags "are flying now side by side, a living proof of the love and solidarity of the two peoples and the gratitude that Serb soldiers feel for the help from the Greek volunteers who are fighting on their side."
Fast forward to the beginning of May 2002, when a Greek military band marched down Knez Mihailova street in the center of Belgrade. Some may have remarked that they, or at least Greek soldiers, were among the Serbs for the second time in recent history. Meanwhile, at the same time as the parade, Kostas Simitis, the Greek prime minister, was meeting with his Serbian counterpart, Zoran Djindjic.
While Djindjic may have lamented to Simitis about the pressure he was under to hand over war crimes suspects to The Hague-based International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), it would be interesting to know whether Simitis had anything to say about those Greeks who fought in General Ratko Mladic's Bosnian Serb army, when Srebrenica was taken in July 1995 and 7,500 Bosniak (Bosnia's Muslim population) men and boys were murdered.
Mladic is now one of two dozen fugitives of international justice whose arrest and extradition the West demands from the authorities in Belgrade.
Greek involvement in the fall of Srebrenica and the subsequent massacre is one of the subjects examined in an explosive new book by Takis Michas, a Greek journalist. Michas is known as a "black sheep" among Greek journalists for refusing to tow the Greek politically correct line of full support for fellow Orthodox Serbs during the wars of the former Yugoslavia. His book, Unholy Alliance: Greece and Milosevic's Serbia in the Nineties, is a major exposé of the way Greece supported both former Yugoslav and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and the Bosnian Serbs during their campaigns.
Early in the book, Michas quotes one of the Greek fighters who participated in the conquest of Srebrenica. He was interviewed on television just after it fell, his voice trembling with excitement: "After the artillery stopped its bombardment we moved in and 'cleaned up' the place!"
The fighter was a member of the Greek Volunteer Guard, a unit based in Vlasenica. According to the book, the Guard was formed in March 1995 at the request of General Mladic, the Bosnian Serb Army commander, and was fully integrated into his forces.
Only about one hundred men fought with this unit, but, following the fall of Srebrenica, the Greek media celebrated their great "victory" symbolized, they claimed, by the fact that the Greek flag was planted next to the Serbian one above the conquered town. And in September 1995, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic decorated four members of the Guard with the medal of the "White Eagle."
Karadzic and Mladic were indicted by The Hague tribunal in 1995. Karadzic is also still at large and is thought to be hiding in Republika Srpska, an entity which together with the Bosniak-Croat federation constitutes today's Bosnia.
BOTH QUIET AND LOUD
Unsurprisingly, Michas has sometimes run into a wall of official silence. His attempts to discover whether members of the Greek Volunteer Guard actually participated in the Srebrenica slaughter came to nothing.
When he asked a Greek government spokesman in 1996 if the authorities intended to investigate the matter, he was told, "Greece does not have any evidence concerning the involvement of Greek citizens in war crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina."
A few weeks after the fall of Srebrenica, NATO was gearing up to bomb the Bosnian Serbs. At that point, Aris Mousionis, the founder and president of the government-subsidized Greek-Serb Friendship Association, was staying in Bosnia as a guest of General Mladic.
Mousionis boasted to Michas how he had passed NATO military secrets to Mladic--secrets obtained from Andreas Papandreou, the Greek prime minister. Mousionis told Michas that NATO had given the details to the Greek authorities and that Papandreou gave them "in a sealed envelope" to an intermediary, "who took it to the military headquarters in Athens from where its contents were relayed to me."
"We used three codes because we had learned that the Americans had broken one," Mousionis told Michas. "I received and immediately decoded the messages. I then gave them to Ratko Mladic's deputy commander, who delivered them personally to the general. Later, during the bombings, NATO intelligence found out that its plans were being leaked to the Bosnian Serbs and they stopped informing the Greeks, an event which led to strong protests by the latter."
Michas stresses that he has not been able to obtain independent confirmation of Mousionis' claims.
CARVING UP MACEDONIA
Michas argues that one of the reasons that the vast majority of Greeks were so fanatically pro-Serb during the wars was because the Greek media "downplayed" or even failed to report atrocities.
Athanasios Papandropoulos, a former president of the European Union of Journalists told him, "The way most media downplayed or failed to mention the horrors of Srebrenica and other sites of crimes reminds me of the way some neo-revisionist historians downplayed or denied the existence of Auschwitz."
Michas also gives details of an alleged 1991 offer from Milosevic to Antonis Samaras, then the Greek foreign minister, to provoke a conflict in Macedonia. The conflict would then lead to Macedonia's collapse, Yugoslav army intervention--and a common frontier between Serbia and Greece.
Michas source for the contention is a book written by Alexandros Tarakas, a former senior policy advisor to Samaras, who wrote the foreword to Tarakas's book. In it, Tarakas describes a meeting that took place on 4 September 1991 between Milosevic and Samaras. After dinner, Milosevic led the Greek foreign minister into his office and then into a "smaller and darker room," in the center of which was a map of the Balkans.
Milosevic then outlined a two-step strategy: "inflating beyond recognition the number of ethnic Serbs residing in the area and, at the same time, instigating a massive influx of civilians to Macedonia from Serbia. The final step would involve, as happened elsewhere, sending the Yugoslav army to 'protect' the Serb minority. This would result in the collapse of Macedonia as an independent entity and its absorption into Serbia."
Michas says tartly that "Milosevic's proposal did not totally surprise his Greek friends ... In fact similar ideas were being entertained at the Greek foreign ministry."
Greece's role in sanctions-busting during the wars is well known but the book for the first time records examples for an English-reading public. Three days before he was gunned down in October 2000, Vladimir Bokan, a Serbian businessman and underworld figure, gave an interview to Michas. Bokan had moved to Greece in 1992 and was given Greek citizenship two years later. He told Michas about how the Greek authorities helped break the wartime oil embargo to Serbia and Montenegro.
Bokan explained how in 1994, for example, he had bought a vessel to ship petroleum from a state-owned oil refinery in Greece to the port of Bar in Montenegro from where it would move on to Serbia. Michas recounts, "The Greek authorities never gave him any trouble. On the contrary he said, they 'did everything in their power to facilitate the violations of the embargo. For example, they never asked for Letters of Discharge...[They] believed that the imposition of the embargo was unjust."
THE WAY THE WIND WAS BLOWING
A little later, we get to hear the views of famous such famous Greeks as the veteran composer Mikis Theodorakis. During NATO's Kosovo campaign he said, "I hate Americans and everything American. I hope that the youth will begin to hate everything American." Imagine the fuss if Madonna had said: "I hate Greeks and everything Greek. I hope that the youth will begin to hate everything Greek."
Michas also cites opinion polls that show just how unpopular NATO and the EU and its policies were, and perhaps remain, in Greece.
Michas contends that the Greeks' lack of any expression of sympathy with the besieged Sarajevo or the Albanians who were expelled or fled from Kosovo in 1999 was not based solely on Orthodox Christian solidarity, although this was important.
The key, he argues, is that Greece itself is an "ethnonational state" and that meant that Greeks could not see "as a crime something that they, in many respects, viewed as natural. In ethnonational states, violating the rights of a person who does not share the ethnic markers of a group is not considered a crime on a par with violating the rights of a person belonging to the same group."
When a major Greek business led by metals baron Evangelos Mytilineos invested in Kosovo's Trepca mines in 1997, Albanian miners appealed to Greek Trade Unions to use their influence to block the deal. But their call fell on deaf ears: "The days of international worker solidarity were definitely over," Michas says.
"Worker solidarity had given way to ethnic solidarity," he writes, "the red flag had been replaced by the Byzantine Orthodox double-headed eagle and cross. No longer did miners singing the 'International' lead the demonstrations. Instead, dark-clad priests and voter-hungry politicians chanted religious hymns mourning the fall of Constantinople."
Michas asked Mytilineos why he had invested in Trepca even after he had received a warning from Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of the province's ethnic Albanian majority, that the proposed deal would be illegal. Mytilineos explained that, at that point, he had asked for advice from the foreign ministry. They told him not to worry about Rugova and proceeded to grant him export guarantees.
THE END OF DAYS
"The final days of the Milosevic regime," writes Michas, "were greeted throughout the free world with feelings of relief if not euphoria." Except, of course, in Greece. When Otpor, the Serbian student resistance movement, decided to organize a rally in Thessaloniki in the run-up to the September 2000 presidential elections in Yugoslavia, Michas argues that they utterly failed to understand what was happening in Greek politics. "Greece's sympathies lay not so much with Serbia in general as with the Milosevic regime and its henchmen in Bosnia and Kosovo."
So, he writes, "needless to say, none of the major Greek music groups or artists that had distinguished themselves in anti-NATO events during the wars in Kosovo and Bosnia agreed to take part... Moreover, the few minor music groups that did were subjected to all forms of threats and harassment aimed at discouraging their participation."
They need not have bothered. The rally was banned, with the authorities explaining that such a gathering would have amounted to an interference into the internal matters of another state.
At one point Milosevic had suggested a Greek-Serbian federation to his Greek partners. Michas writes: "Surely Milosevic feels sorry that he did not pursue the matter. Had his plan ... materialized, he might well have won the 2000 election. The majority of Greeks would have voted for him at any rate."
Pjesa 2 dhe 3 , sepse forumi si lejon dy ose tre video :
Argumente :For Milosevic's Sake
A riveting new book exposes Greek support for the Serbian strongman's regime.
by Tim Judah
Unholy Alliance: Greece and Milosevic's Serbia in the Nineties, by Takis Michas. To be published on 21 May. Texas A&M University Press, 192 pp.
As the butchery in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica proceeded, the Greek newspaper Ethnos reported on 13 July 1995 that the Greek and Serbian flags "are flying now side by side, a living proof of the love and solidarity of the two peoples and the gratitude that Serb soldiers feel for the help from the Greek volunteers who are fighting on their side."
Fast forward to the beginning of May 2002, when a Greek military band marched down Knez Mihailova street in the center of Belgrade. Some may have remarked that they, or at least Greek soldiers, were among the Serbs for the second time in recent history. Meanwhile, at the same time as the parade, Kostas Simitis, the Greek prime minister, was meeting with his Serbian counterpart, Zoran Djindjic.
While Djindjic may have lamented to Simitis about the pressure he was under to hand over war crimes suspects to The Hague-based International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), it would be interesting to know whether Simitis had anything to say about those Greeks who fought in General Ratko Mladic's Bosnian Serb army, when Srebrenica was taken in July 1995 and 7,500 Bosniak (Bosnia's Muslim population) men and boys were murdered.
Mladic is now one of two dozen fugitives of international justice whose arrest and extradition the West demands from the authorities in Belgrade.
Greek involvement in the fall of Srebrenica and the subsequent massacre is one of the subjects examined in an explosive new book by Takis Michas, a Greek journalist. Michas is known as a "black sheep" among Greek journalists for refusing to tow the Greek politically correct line of full support for fellow Orthodox Serbs during the wars of the former Yugoslavia. His book, Unholy Alliance: Greece and Milosevic's Serbia in the Nineties, is a major exposé of the way Greece supported both former Yugoslav and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and the Bosnian Serbs during their campaigns.
Early in the book, Michas quotes one of the Greek fighters who participated in the conquest of Srebrenica. He was interviewed on television just after it fell, his voice trembling with excitement: "After the artillery stopped its bombardment we moved in and 'cleaned up' the place!"
The fighter was a member of the Greek Volunteer Guard, a unit based in Vlasenica. According to the book, the Guard was formed in March 1995 at the request of General Mladic, the Bosnian Serb Army commander, and was fully integrated into his forces.
Only about one hundred men fought with this unit, but, following the fall of Srebrenica, the Greek media celebrated their great "victory" symbolized, they claimed, by the fact that the Greek flag was planted next to the Serbian one above the conquered town. And in September 1995, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic decorated four members of the Guard with the medal of the "White Eagle."
Karadzic and Mladic were indicted by The Hague tribunal in 1995. Karadzic is also still at large and is thought to be hiding in Republika Srpska, an entity which together with the Bosniak-Croat federation constitutes today's Bosnia.
BOTH QUIET AND LOUD
Unsurprisingly, Michas has sometimes run into a wall of official silence. His attempts to discover whether members of the Greek Volunteer Guard actually participated in the Srebrenica slaughter came to nothing.
When he asked a Greek government spokesman in 1996 if the authorities intended to investigate the matter, he was told, "Greece does not have any evidence concerning the involvement of Greek citizens in war crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina."
A few weeks after the fall of Srebrenica, NATO was gearing up to bomb the Bosnian Serbs. At that point, Aris Mousionis, the founder and president of the government-subsidized Greek-Serb Friendship Association, was staying in Bosnia as a guest of General Mladic.
Mousionis boasted to Michas how he had passed NATO military secrets to Mladic--secrets obtained from Andreas Papandreou, the Greek prime minister. Mousionis told Michas that NATO had given the details to the Greek authorities and that Papandreou gave them "in a sealed envelope" to an intermediary, "who took it to the military headquarters in Athens from where its contents were relayed to me."
"We used three codes because we had learned that the Americans had broken one," Mousionis told Michas. "I received and immediately decoded the messages. I then gave them to Ratko Mladic's deputy commander, who delivered them personally to the general. Later, during the bombings, NATO intelligence found out that its plans were being leaked to the Bosnian Serbs and they stopped informing the Greeks, an event which led to strong protests by the latter."
Michas stresses that he has not been able to obtain independent confirmation of Mousionis' claims.
CARVING UP MACEDONIA
Michas argues that one of the reasons that the vast majority of Greeks were so fanatically pro-Serb during the wars was because the Greek media "downplayed" or even failed to report atrocities.
Athanasios Papandropoulos, a former president of the European Union of Journalists told him, "The way most media downplayed or failed to mention the horrors of Srebrenica and other sites of crimes reminds me of the way some neo-revisionist historians downplayed or denied the existence of Auschwitz."
Michas also gives details of an alleged 1991 offer from Milosevic to Antonis Samaras, then the Greek foreign minister, to provoke a conflict in Macedonia. The conflict would then lead to Macedonia's collapse, Yugoslav army intervention--and a common frontier between Serbia and Greece.
Michas source for the contention is a book written by Alexandros Tarakas, a former senior policy advisor to Samaras, who wrote the foreword to Tarakas's book. In it, Tarakas describes a meeting that took place on 4 September 1991 between Milosevic and Samaras. After dinner, Milosevic led the Greek foreign minister into his office and then into a "smaller and darker room," in the center of which was a map of the Balkans.
Milosevic then outlined a two-step strategy: "inflating beyond recognition the number of ethnic Serbs residing in the area and, at the same time, instigating a massive influx of civilians to Macedonia from Serbia. The final step would involve, as happened elsewhere, sending the Yugoslav army to 'protect' the Serb minority. This would result in the collapse of Macedonia as an independent entity and its absorption into Serbia."
Michas says tartly that "Milosevic's proposal did not totally surprise his Greek friends ... In fact similar ideas were being entertained at the Greek foreign ministry."
Greece's role in sanctions-busting during the wars is well known but the book for the first time records examples for an English-reading public. Three days before he was gunned down in October 2000, Vladimir Bokan, a Serbian businessman and underworld figure, gave an interview to Michas. Bokan had moved to Greece in 1992 and was given Greek citizenship two years later. He told Michas about how the Greek authorities helped break the wartime oil embargo to Serbia and Montenegro.
Bokan explained how in 1994, for example, he had bought a vessel to ship petroleum from a state-owned oil refinery in Greece to the port of Bar in Montenegro from where it would move on to Serbia. Michas recounts, "The Greek authorities never gave him any trouble. On the contrary he said, they 'did everything in their power to facilitate the violations of the embargo. For example, they never asked for Letters of Discharge...[They] believed that the imposition of the embargo was unjust."
THE WAY THE WIND WAS BLOWING
A little later, we get to hear the views of famous such famous Greeks as the veteran composer Mikis Theodorakis. During NATO's Kosovo campaign he said, "I hate Americans and everything American. I hope that the youth will begin to hate everything American." Imagine the fuss if Madonna had said: "I hate Greeks and everything Greek. I hope that the youth will begin to hate everything Greek."
Michas also cites opinion polls that show just how unpopular NATO and the EU and its policies were, and perhaps remain, in Greece.
Michas contends that the Greeks' lack of any expression of sympathy with the besieged Sarajevo or the Albanians who were expelled or fled from Kosovo in 1999 was not based solely on Orthodox Christian solidarity, although this was important.
The key, he argues, is that Greece itself is an "ethnonational state" and that meant that Greeks could not see "as a crime something that they, in many respects, viewed as natural. In ethnonational states, violating the rights of a person who does not share the ethnic markers of a group is not considered a crime on a par with violating the rights of a person belonging to the same group."
When a major Greek business led by metals baron Evangelos Mytilineos invested in Kosovo's Trepca mines in 1997, Albanian miners appealed to Greek Trade Unions to use their influence to block the deal. But their call fell on deaf ears: "The days of international worker solidarity were definitely over," Michas says.
"Worker solidarity had given way to ethnic solidarity," he writes, "the red flag had been replaced by the Byzantine Orthodox double-headed eagle and cross. No longer did miners singing the 'International' lead the demonstrations. Instead, dark-clad priests and voter-hungry politicians chanted religious hymns mourning the fall of Constantinople."
Michas asked Mytilineos why he had invested in Trepca even after he had received a warning from Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of the province's ethnic Albanian majority, that the proposed deal would be illegal. Mytilineos explained that, at that point, he had asked for advice from the foreign ministry. They told him not to worry about Rugova and proceeded to grant him export guarantees.
THE END OF DAYS
"The final days of the Milosevic regime," writes Michas, "were greeted throughout the free world with feelings of relief if not euphoria." Except, of course, in Greece. When Otpor, the Serbian student resistance movement, decided to organize a rally in Thessaloniki in the run-up to the September 2000 presidential elections in Yugoslavia, Michas argues that they utterly failed to understand what was happening in Greek politics. "Greece's sympathies lay not so much with Serbia in general as with the Milosevic regime and its henchmen in Bosnia and Kosovo."
So, he writes, "needless to say, none of the major Greek music groups or artists that had distinguished themselves in anti-NATO events during the wars in Kosovo and Bosnia agreed to take part... Moreover, the few minor music groups that did were subjected to all forms of threats and harassment aimed at discouraging their participation."
They need not have bothered. The rally was banned, with the authorities explaining that such a gathering would have amounted to an interference into the internal matters of another state.
At one point Milosevic had suggested a Greek-Serbian federation to his Greek partners. Michas writes: "Surely Milosevic feels sorry that he did not pursue the matter. Had his plan ... materialized, he might well have won the 2000 election. The majority of Greeks would have voted for him at any rate."
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