March 2001
GREATER ALBANIA OR POLITICAL SUICIDE?
Janusz Bugajski
For over a decade, political analysts have been warning that any armed conflict in Macedonia will rapidly precipitate a wider Balkan war by inevitably drawing in neighboring Albania, Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey. The same commentators now claim that the conflict has finally begun with the eruption of an Albanian insurgency in northern and western Macedonia. Are we indeed witnessing the beginning of the third Balkan war over Macedonia that many have been forecasting, stemming from the alleged inability of Albanians to co-exist with their Slavic neighbors? Or is the fighting in Macedonia, on the contrary, a deeply camouflaged political strategy designed to permanently damage the Albanian cause throughout the region? And will the end result be a "Greater Albania," the achievement of greater "group rights" for Albanians in Macedonia, or collective political suicide?
Albanian Grievances and Ambitions?
The Albanian population in Macedonia harbors some justifiable grievances against the Macedonian government. They criticize the Macedonian constitution for defining the republic as a state of "Macedonians, and other minorities." They demand that the document be redrafted so that Macedonia becomes a state of "Macedonians, Albanians and other minorities," or indeed a state not defined by nationality but by citizenship. Albanian leaders allege that the constitution reduces them to second-class citizens and must be amended; they also contend that Albanian should become a second official language.
Although the government of President Boris Trajkovski has made some moves to integrate Albanians into various state institutions, and indeed maintains a coalition with the largest Albanian party, the majority still feels excluded from decision-making. Indeed, many poor Albanians consider themselves subordinates with little opportunity for improvement. And given the large number of young Albanians in Macedonia with minimal economic prospects, the attraction of armed insurgency can prove overwhelming.
On the other side, Slavic Macedonians point out that it is the generally unfavorable economic conditions that affect all citizens regardless of ethnicity or religion and that Albanians are not being especially singled out for discrimination. Slav Macedonians also fear that any further "group rights" or "concessions" to the Albanian community will simply provoke more far-reaching demands for territorial or political autonomy, the federalization of the state, and eventual separation. Such a step-by-step disintegration of Macedonia could enmesh neighboring countries in a potential land grab, leaving the Macedonian Slavs as minorities in several enlarged Balkan states. This in turn would breed new forms of Macedonian revanchism, terrorism, and conflict for the next generation.
Although Albanian spokesman do have some credibility in claiming unfair and often unequal treatment in employment, housing, social services, and other arenas, and do not benefit from the full plethora of groups rights, Macedonia is clearly not Milosevic's Serbia. In fact, by comparing the situation in Macedonia to that of Kosova under Serbian rule before the NATO intervention, the guerrillas may actually play into the hands of Serbian nationalists and assist in the international obstruction of Kosova's independence.
If indeed, Macedonia is just like Milosevic's Serbia, the argument will be heard, then what on earth are the Albanians complaining about? A few legal changes here, a little less discrimination there, a bit of educational autonomy and comprehensive bilinguism and the Kosovar Albanians should be satisfied to inhabit Kostunica's Serbia. Hence, any comparison of Macedonia and Serbia actually serves to minimize the degree of Serbian repression under the Milosevic regime and reinforces Belgrade's contention that Kosova's return to its "motherland" is an acceptable solution.
Meanwhile, the Macedonian government is caught in a vicious dilemma, between Albanian and Macedonian nationalism. A weak response against the guerrillas could alienate it from the Slav population and lead to its downfall. But an overly strong response could alienate it from its Albanian allies and also lead to its collapse. To try and achieve a proper balance, Skopje needs to act tough with any gunmen while launching a bold initiative calling for a far-reaching dialogue with Albanian leaders in Macedonia in order to forge a new national contract. No issue should be left off the table for discussion and reformulation. The message must be clear: no tolerance for violence, whether by Albanian or Macedonian gunmen, and complete openness to valid Albanian demands.
Anti-Albanian Campaigns
Albanian insurgents in Macedonia and their supporters in Kosova and elsewhere are playing directly into the hands of the anti-Albanian lobby clustered primarily around Belgrade and Moscow but with its influences throughout the Balkans and in the West. This lobby has been active in turning the perceptions of Albanians from that of victims of ethnic war and barbarism into terrorists and conspirators hell-bent on destabilizing the entire region. What better proof, they will say, than the current rebellion in Macedonia?
Allegedly, according to these theorists, the Albanian political leadership in each south Balkan state is hiding behind soothing words while secretly planning for a "Greater Albanian" imperium. Even condemnations of guerrilla attacks in Macedonia by Albanian politicians are considered to be duplicitous, thus feeding the negative images of Albanians as terrorists, criminals, drug-smugglers, and Islamic fundamentalists. In the popular imagination, the Albanians will be destined to play the role of Afghanistan's Taliban militants or vengeful Kurdish extremists.
The anti-Albanian lobby claims that the Albanians are incapable of democratic government or the rule of law but are primitive, patriarchal, violent, and fundamentally anti-Western. They point to developments in Albania itself in the past four years and the growth of the "terrorist" Kosova Liberation Army and its allegedly vast criminal empire. In this scenario, if an expanded Albanian state were to be formed in the Balkans then it would not only generate instability throughout the region, it would undermine the process of European expansion, act as a conduit of illicit materials throughout the continent, and provide a gateway for fundamentalist anti-American and anti-European Islamic forces.
This concerted campaign of besmirching and scapegoating Albanians as a collectivity is now in full swing, feeding off the planned murders of Serb civilians in Kosova and the guerrilla offensives in southern Serbia and Macedonia. Indeed, any act of violence in the region can now be linked directly or indirectly to purported "Albanian extremism" and criminality.
Dramatic developments in and around Macedonia are not only undermining the relative peace in the Balkans, but they may also seriously damage the Albanian cause. American and European policy makers are now concluding that with the demise of Milosevic, the major source of insecurity and conflict in the region are radicalized Albanians. Militants and extremists have apparently hijacked Albanian politics throughout South East Europe, while the former pacifists and democrats are either helpless bystanders or willing accomplices.
The voice and authority of Albanian democrats is evidently being submerged by gunmen intent on provoking violent confrontations that will ultimately undermine Kosova's drive for independence, provoke a crackdown on Albanian activists in Macedonia and Serbia, and alienate the Albanian nation itself from the sympathy of the international community. In sum, the strategy of violence in Macedonia and southern Serbia is either incredibly shortsighted or it is deliberately intended to assist Belgrade in regaining Kosova and in precipitating a major crackdown against Albanian activism with the full support of the international community.
The Guerrilla Conundrum
The masterminds of guerrilla attacks in Macedonia belong to one of three categories. First, they may be simply unsophisticated gunmen with little to loose and possible glory to gain. They are seeking to transform themselves into national heroes by precipitating an ethnic war through which a recognized larger Albania will eventually emerge and they will gain important leadership roles. Second, guerrilla leaders may be primarily criminal elements tied with radical political interests who are intent on spreading lawlessness and chaos in the region as a useful cover for expanding their underground operations. Or third, the leaders are in effect paid mercenaries who will profit handsomely from a "bought insurgency" regardless of the source of funding or the eventual outcome of their provocations.
In all three instances, susceptible potential supporters must beware lest they are led into a nightmare in which there is no escape. The young guerrillas and recruits who became caught up in the "Macedonian war" are likely to be exploited by seasoned operatives with personal or financial ambitions regardless of the cost to Kosova or to their community. Will history judge them as courageous heroes or as traitors to the Albanian people who willingly or unknowingly sacrificed Kosova's aspirations for independence for their own misguided ambitions or personal interests?
The scenario that has developed in the past few weeks in Macedonia could not have been better scripted by Belgrade and by Moscow, if indeed evidence ever emerges that Serbia and Russia were directly or indirectly involved. First, it shifts attention away from the problems in Serbia and the unwillingness of Belgrade to surrender Milosevic and other high-ranking war criminals to The Hague tribunal. In fact, it buttresses those who are calling for greater economic and military assistance to Belgrade as a counterweight to growing "Albanian extremism."
Second, the Macedonian crisis undercuts the position of those calling for Kosovar statehood and independence as this can now be depicted as simply promoting militancy and regional instability. On the contrary, it reinforces those who claim that Albanians are ill suited for self-government and must remain under international wardship and eventual Serbian-Yugoslav control. The National Liberation Army is thereby described as an essentially Kosovar movement enlisting local Albanians in Macedonia and determined to provoke ethnic war inside the vulnerable state.
And third, the Albanian rebellion reinforces calls for the preservation of the Yugoslav state as an important counterweight to the specter of "Albanian expansionism" throughout the region. Indeed, Belgrade will aim to forge a closer link with Macedonia and maintain pressure on Montenegro to stay within a "Yugoslav federation" as an evident bastion against rising pan-Albanianism.
With an internationally relegitimized Serbia, Russia is assured of a major ally in the Balkans from where it can exert influence further afield. Moscow has interests throughout a much wider region, and in particular it seeks to prevent any further NATO expansion in a zone it considers to be its "sphere of influence." Under President Putin, Moscow has stepped up its attempts to unseat the democratic government in Bulgaria, to shore up the Kostunica administration in Serbia, and to create broader problems for NATO in South East Europe.
The Kremlin charges K-FOR with failing in its mission in Kosova, of tolerating Albanian militancy, and of promoting regional destabilization. It is thereby challenging NATO to either destroy the Albanian guerrillas and their support base or to abandon the Balkans altogether, thereby opening up the terrain to Serbian security forces and their allies to deal once and for all with the "Albanian question."
Moscow clearly wants to make the Balkans safe for its oligarchic lobbies and criminal cartels. Given these objectives, funds channeled to mercenaries in the region through Russia's extensive intelligence network would bring a bonanza for its political interests. Above all, it could prevent the disintegration of Yugoslavia and bring Macedonia into a tighter Serbian-Russian orbit, thus increasing pressures on a currently pro-western Bulgaria. The guerrilla attacks in Macedonia would fit perfectly into such a strategy of deliberate destabilization and "reimperialization."
NATO's Dilemmas
Unlike during the war with Serbia over Kosova, NATO and the rest of the international community will undoubtedly lend its support to the government in Skopje and not to Albanian rebels. Noone should be fooled into believing that the international community will recognize any possible territorial land grabs or the demographic results of "ethnic conflict" in Macedonia. If the rebellion escalates, sufficient support will be forthcoming for Macedonia to conduct an extensive military operation against rebel positions and their supporters, and above all to ensure that important supply lines across Macedonia to the Aegean remain open.
If handled adroitly, the Macedonian conflict could provide the very opportunity that NATO needs to send a warning to other potential armed groups throughout the region that rebellion against any democratic state accepted by the international community will not be tolerated. While NATO's last lesson was directed against state-sponsored war and genocide orchestrated by Belgrade, the current message will be aimed against sub-state groups who believe that violence and bloodshed pays dividends. NATO commanders know full well that rebels would like Skopje to over-react and recklessly murder some innocent villagers, thus provoking a wider conflagration and a NATO intervention against the incumbent government.
Rather than allowing for such a scenario, Washington and Brussels will try to prevent Skopje from acting like Belgrade. NATO needs to monitor closely the unfolding conflict and help Macedonian security forces through the provision of weaponry, resources, logistics, communications, and intelligence to curtail the rebellion while avoiding random or systematic civilian casualties. NATO forces do not want to be drawn into the conflict as either peace-makers or peace-keepers but if the insurgency escalates they will give all necessary assistance to Skopje. They will also crack down more resolutely against weapons stores and smugglers in Kosova.
Indeed, one effect of the guerrilla action in Macedonia may be a closer monitoring of ex-KLA leaders and less inclination to build up an indigenous security force. Critics will argue that weapons and training for any planned Kosova army will simply be misused to promote insurgency in neighboring states. However, NATO commanders also fear that their troops could become targets for disgruntled Albanian guerrillas, provoking a conflict inside Kosova with the very people they sought to protect by launching the war against Belgrade. The accompanying sense of betrayal could diminish the standing of all Kosovar leaders while increasing calls for an early NATO pullout and a "democratic Serbian" takeover. In such a scenario, the Kosovars should begin to pack their bags in preparation for another exodus.
Turning Disaster into Opportunity
Rebel leaders in Macedonia may be delusional if they believe that NATO will intervene on behalf of their aspirations or that they will provoke a new war between Macedonia and NATO or between Serbia and NATO. On the contrary, they are pushing NATO and the Serbian military into closer collaboration, and helping to forge a broader Slavic front in the region. Any further escalation of violence will ensure increasing Western support for both Belgrade and Skopje. Violence will primarily strengthen the hand of those who argue that the Kosovars are simply incapable of democratic self-government or should be placed under stricter Serbian and Macedonian control.
To prevent this scenario from unfolding, Albanian leaders across the region must act to prevent any fatal damage to their nation's cause. All Albanian democrats must condemn the activities of reckless gunmen who are hiding behind Albanian patriotism in order to provoke a new Balkan war. They must offer to NATO all their help and assistance to build a secure environment for democratic and economic development.
Albanian leaders must also underscore to the international community that a durable peace and a secure region ultimately depends on the recognition of Kosova's drive for independence. The current ambiguity in Kosova's status and the potential fluidity of borders is exploited by militants and criminals, undermines the nation's democrats, encourages Serbian nationalists, and jeopardizes NATO's mission throughout the southern Balkans. An authoritative and empowered Kosova government will pledge itself to undercut and eliminate violent elements in the new state, working in tandem with the internationals.
In this context, all responsible Albanian leaders must declare their unequivocal recognition of Macedonian, Montenegrin, and Serbian independence and territorial integrity in currently existing borders between Kosova and its neighbors. They must openly state that they harbor no designs or pretensions to these states and do not support any violent groups along Kosova's frontiers.
The undermining of Macedonia's sovereignty will simply stiffen resistance to Kosova's statehood, imperil inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia itself, and eliminate all vestiges of international sympathy for the Albanian community. Macedonia cannot become a bargaining chip for either Belgrade or Prishtina because its integrity remains vital for Balkan security.
NATO leaders have clearly made mistakes in their handling of the Kosova question and have failed to remove the territory from the Serbian agenda. Radicals in Mitrovica must be dealt with promptly and talk of partition must be resolutely thwarted. Above all, Washington and its Allies must give the population of Kosova a clear perspective for their political future and accelerate the creation of state institutions that will give authority to the democrats and substance to new institutions.
The current crisis presents an opportunity to dispel the claim that an independent Kosova will lead to political instability. It is the lack of a credible political future that has embroiled Kosova and its neighborhood in instability. The prospect of democratic statehood can and must eradicate radicalism and chaos.
For its part, the Macedonian government must adopt a dual track approach. Obviously it cannot tolerance lawlessness, armed chaos, and the rule of the gun, regardless of the stated objectives of guerrilla leaders. Skopje must cooperate closely with NATO and individual Allied countries in an effective counter-insurgency operation that aims to avoid civilian casualties.
On the other hand, Skopje must offer the Albanian community a more durable stake in Macedonia by proposing a national dialogue with all Albanian leaders on the issues of most concern to them. This will help to outlaw the politics of violence and reinforce the politics of compromise. International mediation in this process cannot be excluded and may indeed be indispensible to both sides
It is equally important for responsible Albanian leaders in Macedonia, from all political parties, to take the initiative by forming a national front and offering a comprehensive dialogue with their Slavic counterparts before they themselves become the hostages of violence, gunmen, and war. Only such a strategy can rescue Macedonia's multi-ethnic society from a dangerous spiral of civil war and a permanent split into two hostile communities in which politically, economically, and strategically the Albanians are likely to emerge as the biggest losers in the Balkans.
__________________________________________________
Artikull i Janusz Bugajskit,drejtori i projektit per Europen Lindore prane Qendres per studime strategjike dhe nderkombetare ne Washington.
__________________________________________________
Kontribut i Tear-Drops te cilen e falenderoj per kete shkrim.
Pėrgjigju Duke Cituar
Krijoni Kontakt