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    Shpirt Shqiptari Maska e Albo
    Antarsuar
    16-04-2002
    Vendndodhja
    Philadelphia
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    Si dshtoi komploti anglo-amerikan kundr Enverit

    Plani i CIA dhe MI- 6 (SIS) britanik ne vitet 1949- 1953, synonte shkeputjen e Shqiperise nga blloku komunist. Qe si ne lojen e gureve te dominose, do rrezonte me rradhe te gjithe qeverite lindore. Diversantet e nisur nga Malta, do permbysnin Hoxhen, vendin e te cilit do e zinte qeveria e dale nga Komiteti "Shqiperia e Lire". Pse Ahmet Zogu u perjashtua nga skema dhe ne vend te tij Londra e Uashingtoni parapelqenin Mid'hat Frasherin si zevendesuesi i Enverit

    Nga Alfred PEZA

    Kur po mbushen 15 vjet nga rrezimi i Murit te Berlinit, cdo dite e me teper, po qartesohen mjaft enigma te atyre 45 viteve, te perplasjes se madhe mes Lindjes dhe Perendimit. Qeverite e te dy kampeve, nuk po ngurrojne te shkundin nga sirtaret dhe dosjet e bodrumeve te nendheshme te sherbimeve sekrete, pluhurin qe kishte mbuluar enigmat me te medha te Luftes se Ftohte. Nje lufte jo vetem ideologjike, por edhe me skema e kunderskema, komplote, spiunazh, sabotazh dhe perpjekjesh per te prishur balancat e dy boteve, te ndare artificialisht pas kapitullimit te gjermanise hitleriane.

    E kur disa te verteta dukej se do te varroseshin bashke me renien e regjimeve komuniste, ka qene kryeministri i Britanise Toni Bler, ai qe vetem pak ore me pare, ka rihapur "Kutine e Pandores" se nje kapitulli, per te cilin shqiptaret jo rralle here kane bere fajtor fuqite e medha, qe nuk kishin bere aq sa duhet, per te na nxjerre jashte kampit komunist. Por, Bler pranon se nje perpjekje e tille jo vetem eshte bere seriozisht nga bashkepunimi mes sherbimeve sekrete britanike dhe atyre amerikane, por ajo deshtoi, ne nje menyre te tille qe ai e cilesoi si "deshtimi i dyte i madh ne histori".

    Ceshte ky plan?

    Atehere kur ende nuk ishin mbushur 3-4 vjet nga perfundimi i Luftes se Dyte Boterore, SHBA e Britania e Madhe vendosen nepermjet sherbimeve te tyre sekrete, te realizonin nje komplot per rrezimin e regjimit komunist te Enver Hoxhes.

    "Po. Ka ekzituar nje plan i sherbimeve sekrete amerikane, (CIA) dhe atyre britanike, SIS, (me pas MI- 6) kunder qeverise shqiptare. Nje plan per te cilin Sigurimi i Shtetit, eshte vene ne dijeni nepermjet KGB, nga agjenti i saj ne Uashington D. C, Kim Filbi",- deklaron ekskluzivisht per "Korrieri", Zylyftar Ramizi, ish shefi i Sherbimit Sekret shqiptar.

    Sigurimi i Shtetit u informua ne fundin e vitit 1949 per komplotin, nepermjet zyres se qendrore te KGB (Ljubjanka, ne Moske). Nje informacion qe prej aty eshte percjelle me lejen e njerezve te Stalinit, ne Ambasaden e Bashkimit te Republikave Socialiste Sovjetike (BRSS) ne Tirane. Prej aty, u vu ne dijeni Enver Hoxha dhe nje grup shume i ngushte drejtuesish te Sigurimit te Shtetit. Pas kesaj, u hartua dhe nisi zbatimi i operacionit nen emrin e koduar "Liqeni i Vajkalit", per shkaterrimin e bandave. Nje loje e madhe sherbimesh sekrete, qe perfundoi ne dhjetorin e 1953, kur edhe u zhvillua nje proces i madh gjyqesor kunder komplotuesve.

    Fillimi i kesaj fiaskoje duket se i dedikohet, legjendes se spiunazhit boteror, Kim Filbit, anglezit qe u ngjit ne maje te sherbimeve sekrete britanike, duke qene prej 3 dekadash, agjent i sherbimit sekret sovjetik.

    Po t'i referohesh Enciklopedise se Spiunazhit, botuar me 1996 ne SHBA, "kur Filbi ishte ne Uashington, mesoi rreth perpjekjeve anglo- amerikane per permbysjen e regjimit komunist ne Shqiperi. Sovjetiket, pjesen me te madhe te informacioneve dhe raporteve te Filbit, u'a dergonin shqiptareve".

    Ky moment, e ben edhe me te qarte, idene e ekzistences se nje plani te CIA-s dhe MI- 6 britanike, per rrezimin e regjimit komunist ne Shqiperi. Atij plani, qe Gabriel Partosh, analist i BBC per Europen Juglindore, e ka cilesuar si "nje nga fiaskot e para te CIA-s" pas Lufte se II Boterore. Ideja e se ciles sipas Eilliam Colbit, ish shefit te agjensise amerikane te zbulimit CIA, "ishte qe nese do te mund te shkeputnin nje vend nga blloku lindor, kjo mund te niste procesin e ndarjes se te tjereve prej tij". Nje proces i ngjashem me lojen e gureve te dominose, ku pas te pares, rrezohen me rradhe gjithe gurte e renditur pas tij.

    MOZAIKU I KOMPLOTIT

    Hapja e nje pjese te arkivave te CIA-s ne vitin 1994, qartesoi se "ne vitet 1949- 53, CIA dhe SIS kane nxitur nje kryengritje ne Shqiperi, duke derguar grupe te armatosura emigrantesh antikomuniste". Operacionet ushtarake ne terren, pergatiteshin paralelisht me organizimin politik te gjithe faktoreve kryesore te emigracionit antikomunist. Per kete u krijua Komiteti "Shqiperia e Lire", ne krye te te cilit u vendos Mid'hat Frasheri.

    Sipas Zv/ ndihmes Sekretarit Amerikan te Shtetit Levin Tomson, "qeveria amerikane ishte e kufizuar ne ndihmen qe mund t'i jepte Komitetit "Shqiperia e Lire", ndaj ai do te mbante lidhje me Komitetin "Evropa e Lire". Ky Konsorcium i financuar nga CIA, deri ne renien e Murit te Berlinit, i dha fonde 164 fondacioneve. Pas shume vitesh, njeriu kryesor i ketij Komiteti do te ishte Ronald Regan, Presidenti i ardhshem republikan i Shteteve te Bashkuara te Amerikes.

    Te gjitha planet per operacione ushtarake dhe organizimin politik te shqiptareve ne emigracion, nisen te zbatoheshin ne vitin 1949. Nje vit me pare, "CIA dhe MI-6 kishin ngritur ne Uashington D.C, zyren e koordinimit per veprimet e perbashketa agjenturore, ne drejtim te vendeve te lindjes komuniste". Me detyren e koordinatorit ne kete zyre, u emerua nga ana e qeverise Britanike, Kim Filbi, i cili nderkohe ishte nje nga superagjenter qe punonte per KGB-ne.

    Po ne vitin 1949, perfaqesuesit e Shqiperise sebashku me ato te 8 shteteve te tjera, moren pjese ne organizaten politike te quajtur "Asambleja e Kombeve te Roberuar Europiane" (ACEN) me qender ne Nee York. Nje organizem i perbere nga kreret e emigracionit te vendeve te lindjes ne perendim. E qe synonte organizimin e tyre, kunder regjimeve komuniste.

    Levizjet ne kete periudhe, filluan edhe brenda Shqiperise. Disa figura dhe fraksione te vogla antikomuniste, u bashkuan duke krijuar organizaten ilegale "Fronti i Rezistenes". Nje organizem qe synonte te krijonte bazat e pritjes se grupeve desante qe do te hidheshin ne Shqiperi. Koordinimi i punes mes tyre, duket se synonte organizimin e nje kryengritje antikomuniste brenda vendit. Zgjerimi i se ciles, mund te conte ne rrezimin e Enver Hoxhes, dhe zevendesimin e tij me qeverine e dale nga Komiteti "Shqiperia e Lire".

    DOSJA E OPERACIONIT

    Ai qe hedh drite me shume mbi enigmen e ekzistences se nje komploti ne fund te viteve '40 dhe fillim te viteve '50, kunder qeverise komuniste ne Shqiperi, eshte Nikolas Beathels. I cili, ne librin e tij "Tradhetia e madhe",- bazuar ne te dhenat e dokumentave autentike arkivore te sherbimeve sekrete britanike dhe amerikane,- shkruan: "Qeverite amerikane dhe britanike, kishin miratuar ne parim nje operacion te fshehte me synimin per te shkeputur nje vend te Evropes Lindore nga blloku socialist. Per shume aresye, per realizimin e ketij objektivi, ishte zgjedhur Shqiperia. Ky ishte vendi me i vogel dhe me i dobeti ne rradhen e vendeve te tjera socialiste.

    Ne jug kufizohej nga Greqia, aleate e Britanise se Madhe dhe SHBA. Teknikisht, Greqia, ne baze te ligjit mbreteror te Luftes se II Boterore, e konsideronte Shqiperine shtet armik dhe i kishte shpallur asaj lufte (nje vendim qe formalisht eshte ende ne fuqi?!). Ne veri dhe ne Lindje kufizohet nga Jugosllavia. Sipas eksperteve, Marshalli Tito, pas prishjes me bllokun socialist, do mbante nje qendrim neutral per cfaredolloj ndryshimi qe mund te ndodhte ne Tirane. Ne keto rrethana, Shqiperia dukej e izoluar dhe me mundesi te mira per t'u penetruar nga ajri dhe nga deti, prej ishullit te Maltes".

    Sipas Bethelit, "anglezet dhe amerikanet mbanin kontakte te vazhdueshme me grupet e emigranteve shqiptare, te gjithe fraksionet e te cileve filluan te bashkonin perpjekjet e tyre per ceshtjen e kunderevolucionit".

    Ne kete kohe, ne Itali ndodheshin 750 emigrante, ndersa ne Greqi, 800 shqiptare te arratisur. "Per te ndihmuar ne riorganizimin e emigracionit shqiptar, Qeveria angleze dergoi ne Rome lordin Xhulian Emer". Zv/ Ministri i Luftes ne qeverine e Londres, pas eksperiences gjate luftes ne perberje te misioneve angleze ne territorin tone, konsiderohej si njohes i mire i Shqiperise.

    Britania vuri ne dispozicion te pergatitjes se grupeve desante, ishullin e Maltes, e cila "ishte nje baze e avancuar dhe terren i pershtatshem per imbarkimet e nevojshme dhe futjen e agjenturave permes detit dhe ajrit ne Shqiperi". Oficeret britanike Maikell Bruke dhe David Smajli, u moren me pergatitjen speciale te trupave desante. Nje grup ne perberjen e te cilit bente pjese edhe gruaja e Smajlit, Moy, e cila jepte mesimet e shifrimit te radiokomunikimit.

    Ndersa Amerikanet, moren persiper pjesen me te madhe te mbeshtetjes financiare dhe logjistike te operacioneve ushtarake. Si baze prapavije dhe depo materialesh, ata vune ne dispozicion Aeroportin e Mhelus ne Libi. Gjate 5 viteve, per pergatitjen dhe realizimin e operacioneve desante per rrezimin e qeverise komuniste te Hoxhes, anglo- amerikanet angazhuan rreth 100 vete.

    Ndersa shqiptaret, krijuan per kete, nje Komunitet Kombetar ne krye te se cilit u zgjodh Hasan Dosti, nderkohe qe anglezet kishin si kandidat per udheheqje, Abaz Kupin". Nje nga partizanet e ketij komploti, cilesohet edhe Abaz Ermenji.

    Pergatitjet per rrezimin e qeverise komuniste, paralelisht me operacionet ushtarake, zhvilloheshin edhe ne rrafshin politik. Te gjitha fraksionet politike te organizuara ne emigracion, synohej te bashkoheshin, per te nxjerre ne krye te tyre, nje figure te pranueshme per Shqiperine e asaj kohe, e qe pergatitej te zevendesonte Enver Hoxhen.

    Ai u zgjodh te ishte Mid'hat Frasheri, djali i Abdyl Frasherit, kreut te Rilindjes Kombetare Shqiptare. Edhe Ministria e Jashtme shqiptare, ne nje raport te saj, pranonte ne ate kohe se "Zogu ndjek nje politike te tille, qe te detyroje grupet e tjera te bien ne preherin e tij dhe te ikin nga skena e rendesise qe mund te kene sot disa elemente si Mid'hat Frasheri, qe konsiderohen si elemente te nje kalibri te madh". Vec kesaj, perendimi nuk mund te rrezikonte ne vitet '50, deri ne ate kete pike sa te luftonte per zevendesuar regjimin komunist, me nje regjim Monarkist.

    "SHQIPERIA E LIRE"

    Qeveria e Tiranes dhe Sigurimi i Shtetit, pas sinjaleve te Kim Filbit, kishin filluar te merrnin masat. Njera prej tyre, ishte ajo e 6 shtatorit te vitit 1949. Ndoshta pakkush e mban mend ne Shqiperi, ate pasdite, kur dritat u fiken njeheresh ne te gjithe vendin. Ky "black out" total, zgjati vetem 30 minuta, gjate kohes se transmetimit e edicionit te lajmeve te BBC ne gjuhen shqipe. Ato minuta, Mid'hat Frasheri lexoi ne radio, mesazhin per krijimin e Komitetit "Shqiperia e Lire".

    Dhjete dite me pare, me 26 gusht 1949 ne France, ai i'a kishte dale me shume mund te bashkonte me ne fund nen cadren e tij, pjesen derrmuese te partive dhe fraksioneve te emigracionit shqiptar ne perendim. Vec programit dhe qellimeve te Komitetit, Frasheri prezantoi ne Paris, edhe emrat e njerezve kryesore qe do te punonin me te: Abaz Kupi, Abaz Ermenji, Muharrem Bajraktari, Sahit Kryeziu, Nuci Kota, etj.

    Nga ambasada shqiptare ne France, shefi i saj Behar Shtylla njoftonte Ministrine e Jashtme ne Tirane se "AFP dha lajmin e shkurter dhe te zbutur per krijimin e Komitetit "Shqiperia e Lire". Gazeta franceze prestigjioze "Le Monde", i dha cuditerisht publicitetin me te madh ketij lajmi duke shkruar se "Fuqite Perendimore e priten me simpati kete komitet". Kryeministri i Greqise, Diomedes u shpreh se "po te kete Shqiperia nje regjim te tille perfaqesues, atehere jemi gati te bashkepunojme ashtu si duhet dhe me qellime shume miqesore".

    Por, emigracioni politik shqiptar nuk ishte i gjithi i bashkuar ne kete pike, pasi skema e komplotit linte ne hije ish Mbretin Ahmet Zogu. Kjo shihet qarte po ti referohesh nje lajmi te transmetuar pas 4 ditesh nga keto zhvillime, nga agjensia zyrtare franceze e lajmeve AFP. Ajo botoi nje deklarate te Zogut, i cili u shpreh se "nuk e njohim Komitetin "Shqiperia e Lire". Pas 7 prillit 1939, une jam i vetmi autoritet legjitim i shqiptareve".

    Por, kjo nuk e pengoi aspak Mid'hat Frasherin te vazhdonte misionin qe kishte marre persiper. Pas Frances, ai shkoi ne Angli. Zv/ Ministri i luftes i qeverise angleze, Xhuliano Emeri,- njeriu i caktuar per zbatimin konkret te operacionit kunder Shqiperise,- i keshilloi anetaret e Komitetit se "ju, ndofta, pritni cdo gje nga te huajt. Duhet t'i merrni vete inisiativat. Duhet te tregoni nje vullnet ne rrugen tuaj, t'i terhiqni miqte e medhenj atje ku e lypin interesat e vendit tuaj fisnik".

    E pasi perfundoi dhe turin britanik, Mid'hat Frasheri u nis drejt SHBA, per te vendosur ne Nee York, e per te qendruar ne seline e perhershme te Komitetit "Shqiperia e Lire".

    Takimin e pare ne SHBA, kreret e tij, e zhvilluan me Kryetarin e Komitetit "Evropa e Lire", Xhosef Gree. Ky organizem i financuar nga CIA, ishte autorizuar nga Departamenti Amerikan i Shtetit, te mbante lidhjet e rregullta me Komitetin e shqiptareve, i konsideruar "si i pari forum ne rolin e nje qeverie demokratike ne mergim".

    Madje "Amerikanet i kane njohur Komitetit "Shqiperia e Lire", edhe te drejten e ngritjes se flamurit kombetar, ne zyre",- thuhej nje nje raport sekret diplomatik te nisur ato dite nga Nee Yorku, drejt Ministrise se Jashtme ne Shqiperi.

    "LIQENI I VAJKALIT"

    Levizjet e perendimit per te organizuar emigracionin antikomunist shqiptar, nuk kaluan pa u vene re nga emisaret e Tiranes. Ambasadori Behar Shtylla, nga Parisi njoftoi qeverine se "Xhuliano Emeri, anglezi qe ka qene gjate luftes me Bazin e Canes (Abaz Kupin), ka vajtur ne Rome per te organizuar kriminelet rreth Zogut dhe mundesisht t'i infiltroje ata ne Shqiperi".

    Prej permbajtjes se ketij mesazhi, me shume se kaq mesohet se Tirana nuk ishte ende ne dijeni te prishjes se Kupit me Zogun ne ate kohe dhe per afrimin e tij me Mid'hat Frasherin. Kjo inkoherence vihet re edhe rreth faktit se Enver Hoxha ende nuk ishte ne dijeni ne kete kohe, se Mbreti Zog po mbahej larg planit qe synonte rrezimin e tij dhe shkeputjen e Shqiperise nga kampi socialist.

    Po te vazhdojme t'i referohemi Nikolas Beathel, "ana ushtarake e operacioneve te ketij plani filloi te zbatohet ne tetor 1949 kur grupet e para te agjenteve britanike te armatosur, zbarkuan ne territorin shqiptar". Ndersa Sigurimi i Shtetit, u vu ne dijeni per kete fakt, nepermjet "nje prej burimeve te rrjetit sekret shqiptar jashte vendit, ne fundin e vitit 1949 dhe fillim te vitit 1950. Informacionet per grupet e rendesishme, arriten ne mars- prill te vitit 1950".

    Intensiteti i bandave diversante qe hynin ne territorin shqiptar gjate kesaj kohe, sa vinte dhe po shtohej. Sipas ish shefit te SHIK Irakli Kocollari, "nga fillimi i vitit 1951 deri ne fund te '52, ne Shqiperi u derguan ilegalisht permes kufirit tokesor, zbarkimit nga deti dhe desantimit nga ajri, 233 grupe te armatosura spiunazhi, ne te cilat u aktivizuan 892 vete".

    Me 23 mars 1952, Sigurimi i Shtetit u njoftua se kanalet e tij te zbulimit ne Nee York, Kajro dhe Rome se "... pergatitet nje bande me mision teper te rendesishem dhe sekret, qe do te perdoret ne drejtim te Shqiperise me njerez te perzgjedhur dhe nder me te besuarit e anglezeve dhe amerikaneve".

    Dhe nuk do te kalonte nje muaj, kur me 30 prill 1952, Ministria e Brendshme u njoftua per kalimin e kufirit nga nje grup diversantesh ne zonen e Korces. Ndersa me 5 maj, nje aeroplan jo larg prej andej, kishte kryer fluturime te uleta. Pas disa ditesh, me 18 maj, ishte njoftuar per levizje ilegale te nje grupi, ne rrethin e Matit. Ndersa dokumenta te tjera tregojne se te nesermen ministria e Mbrojtjes shqiptare, kishte njoftuar se "...ishin kapur sinjale te koduara te nje transmetimi me radio, gati ne verilindje te Shqiperise".

    Ne kete menyre ata kishin rene ne gjurmet e bandes se Zenel Shehut. Pas arrestimit te te cilit, Sigurimi nisi nje operacion, qe me pas mori permasat e nje loje spiunazhi nen emrin e koduar "Liqeni i Vajkalit".

    Ne kete kohe, agjensia prestigjioze e lajmeve REUTERS njoftone me 12 maj 1952 se "ekzistenca e regjimit shqiptar tanime eshte ceshtje javesh". Ndersa me 30 maj AFP lajmeronte se "guerilet po luftojne me vendosmeri". Radio "Greqia e Lire" kishte emetuar me 20 prill lajmin se "ne Shqiperi jane formuar njesi te posacme ushtarake te perbera nga parashutiste greke dhe emigrante".

    Por operacioni "Liqeni i Vajkalit", ne qender te te cilit ishte nje radioloje e Sigurimit te Shtetit, vazhdonte te terhiqte nje e nga nje sebashku, thuajse te gjitha fijet e padukshme te operacioneve ushtarake qe pergatiteshin ne Malte, ishullin tjeter Palagia ne detin Egje, apo ne afersi te 3 qyteteve te Gjermanise Perendimore: Munchen, Heidelberg dhe Frankfurt. I arrestuari Zenel Shehu, njeri prej kapove te bandave shqiptare, i komunikonte qendres me radio, te gjitha mesazhet e skenarit te Sigurimit te Shtetit. Per rrjedhoje, sipas statistikave, rreth 300 prej atyre qe desantuan gjate kesaj kohe, u vrane ne perpjekje me forcat shqiptare te ndjekjes, apo u pushkatuan pas gjyqeve.

    Grupi i fundit zbarkoi ne Shqiperi, daton ne 1 majin e 1953. Ne krye te tij ishte Hamit Matjani, padyshim me i famshmi nder te gjithe desantet shqiptare te asaj periudhe. Arrestimi i tij, shenoi edhe fundin e operacioneve ushtarake te drejtuara nga CIA dhe MI-6 kunder qeverise komuniste te Hoxhes. Edhe Matjani ra ne gracken e radiolojes se Sigurimit, e realizuar nepermjet ish desanteve te kapur me pare Zenel Shehu e Xhaferr Mema.

    Ne fundin e vitit 1953, Radio Tirana filloi transmetimin e drejtperdrejte te nje procesi gjyqesor publik, kunder grupit te agjenteve te stervitur nga anglo- amerikanet. Pra gjithcka ishte bere e njohur, duke shkaktuar buje te madhe dhe duke u botuar cdo dite ne te gjitha gazetat shqiptare te asaj kohe.

    DESHTIMI I PARALAJMERUAR

    Sipas ish Drejtorit te CIA-s Eilliam Colby, "operacioni deshtoi, sepse autoritetet shqiptare, kishin infiltruar ne organizatat e emigranteve dhe lokalizonin vendodhjen e shumices se grupeve pothuajse qe ne kohen kur ata zbarkonin nga deti ose hidheshin me parashute".

    Tradhetia e Filbit nuk ishte e vetmja shenje e rrjedhjes se sekretit rreth operacioneve ne Shqiperi. Sipas Sherbimeve Sekrete Perendimore, kishte rrjedhje informacioni edhe nga ambjentet e Komiteteve te emigracionit shqiptar ne Rome, ku personeli i Ambasades Shqiptare atje ishte shume aktiv. Po ashtu edhe ne Athine.

    Deshtimin ndoshta e ka pershpejtuar edhe vdekja e papritur ne 3 tetorin e 1949, e kreut te "qeverise shqiptare ne mergim", Mid'hat Frasheri. Sipas Beathelit, rreth kesaj vdekje ende te mistershme "ekziston edhe nje variant i vrasjes (shkaktimit te infarktit nepermjet ilaceve apo nepermjet gazit nga agjentet e KGB-se).

    Kim Filbi, agjent i dyfishte, i cili kishte qene ne Londer ne shtator te vitit 1949, kur Mid'hat Frasheri e koleget e tjere te Komitetit "Shqiperia e Lire" ishin atje, mendohet se kishte njoftuar nderkohe agjentet e KGB-se ne Nee York qe te vepronin mbi Mid'hat Frasherin, ashtu sic kishin vepruar edhe mbi disa personalitete te tjera antikomuniste te Lindjes, si Stepan Bandera, Lev Rebet, Georgi Markov etj. Mid'hat Frasheri u gjend i vdekur sic supozohej nga nje atak zemre, atehere kur Kim Filbi udhetonte per ne Nee York me anijen "Coronia".

    Sipas Gabriel Partosh "nje nga mesimet e nxjerra nga fiaskoja shqiptare e CIA-s, ishte konkluzioni i vyer se te kaloje thjesht nga frenimi- nga ndihma qe u jepej regjimeve perendimore per te mbijetuar- te zbrapsja e komunizmit, njera nga slloganet amerikane te viteve '50, ishte dicka tejet e veshtire".

    Por ekziston edhe nje teze e fundit per shkaqet e "fiaskos se CIA dhe MI- 6", per rrezimin e regjimit te Enver Hoxhes ne Shqiperi. Per Reginald Hibbert,- ish oficer i misioneve angleze ne Shqiperi gjate luftes,- "ishte nje shprese e humbur te mendoje se pasuesit e merguar te nacionalisteve, te cilet kishin deshtuar me 1944, do te mundnin, pasi te sterviteshin nga Smajli dhe te depertonin ne Shqiperi, te ishin ne gjendje te ngrinin njerez kunder sundimit te hekurt te Partise Komuniste Shqiptare, pas 6 vjetesh dhune sociale drakoniane".

    Po t'i referohesh fjalimit te fundit te Kryeministrit britanik Toni Bler, "nuk eshte hera e pare qe organet inteligjente britanike dhe CIA-s amerikane, bashkepunojne ne operacione teper sekrete. Ne vitin 1948, vetem nje vit para fillimit te zbatimit ne terren te operacionit komplotist per rrezimin e Enver Hoxhes, CIA ka shperndare shuma te medha parash per te financuar zgjedhjet ne vendin fqinj. Por, ne Shqiperi ishte hera e pare qe infiltroheshin sabotatoret e armatosur pa miratimin e Kongresit Amerikan e Presidentit te asaj kohe Herri Truman dhe parlamentit britanik e Kryeministrit Klement Atli,- tha Toni Bler duke shtuar se "ashtu si Kim Filmi, nje nga kokat e spiunazhit nderkombetar, ka ende te tjere".

  2. #2
    Warranted Maska e Qerim
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    Une mendoj se me kete Toni Bler ka dashe me thene se ata kane bere te gjitha c`eshte e mundur te na shpetonin nga Dulla.

    Une mendoj se ata, pra italianet,anglezet,amerikanet etj mund te benin me shume, kur e shikonin se nje pupull po vuan, qe mos them me shume se ndoshta ata edhe e kane perkrahur regjimin.

  3. #3
    Promete (i lidhur) Maska e Kryeplaku
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    Nuk ekzistonte asnje komplot anglo-amerikan kundra Enverit! Keto "komplote" ishin shpikje te Enverit per te na mbushur mendjen se ekzistonin shume "armiq" jashte vendit dhe shume "tradhetar" brenda vendit. Sot per mendimin tim perbejne pjese te propagandes filo-amerikane.

    Amerika nuk kishte asnje mundesi te nderhynte ne punet e brendeshme te nje vendi qe kishte nenshkruajtur Traktatin e Varshaves. Zonat e mbikeqyrjes (amerikane ose sovjetike) ishin ndare qe me Traktatin e Jaltes. Ne punet e brendeshme te Shqiperise kishte te drejte tu ngatronte vetem Bashkimi Sovjetik, peredrisa Shqiperia u njoh si vend i Bllokut Lindor.

  4. #4
    Dash...me kembore Maska e Toro
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    Kryeplak, mos u bej qesharak. Mund te jesh antiamerikan, e drejta jote, po mos na fol dengla se tregon injorancen tende ne fushen e historise. Nuk eshte gabim apo turp te jesh injorant ne dicka, turp eshte ta reklamosh ate. Une psh jam injorant per kimi....nuk mund te shkruaj dot per formula kimike.

    Marreveshja e Jaltes, sa per dijeni, nuk e kishte fare ne refene Shqiperine. As qe permendet fare. I ishte lene Jugosllavise , te behej republika e saj e shtate. Kur Titoja i hodhi vckla Stalinit, i kaloi zones se influences sovjetike.
    Traktati i Varshaves u krijua ne 1955, kurse nderhyrja (komploti) anglo-amerikan per te cilin behet fjale me siper ishte gjate viteve 1949- 1953 dhe perkon ne periudhen kohore qe fillon me shkeputjen e Shqiperise nga prangat jugosllave me shprese se do te kalonte me hir apo me pahir drejt Perendimit dhe mbaron me vdekjen e Stalinit dhe ardhjen e Hrushovit ne fuqi ne BRSS.

    SHBA dhe Anglia te mbeshtetura nga te gjitha shtetet perendimore pas 1945 me fillimin e Luftes se Ftohte i dhane prioritet ndaljes , izolimit dhe perhapjes se zones sovjetike ne Evropen Lindore duke iu permbajtur germe per germe Marreveshjes se Jaltes. Keshtu pra , amerikanet, CIA nderhyri ne Itali ne zgjedhjet e 1948 qe te mos vinin ne fuqi komunistet sepse Italia i perkiste zones anglo-amerikane te influences, por nuk bene asgje per Cekosllovakine, ku ne 1948 komunistet hypen ne pushtet edhe pse humben zgjedhjet ne kete vit. Cekia i perkiste ruseve dhe amerikanet qendruan larg si ne 1948 ashtu dhe ne 1968 ne "Pranveren e Prages".
    Ne Shqiperi nuk kishin asnje marreveshje midis tyre dhe ruseve perse mos te nderhynin nepermjet sherbimeve sekrete. Nderhyrja ushtarake u perjashtua sepse mudn te kthente luften e ftohte ne nje lufte te nxehte dhe u linte argumente sovjetikeve te benin te njejten gje ne zonat te tjera qe nuk perfshiheshin ne marreveshjen e Jaltes, por qe faktikisht ishin shtete demokratike ose diktatoriale jokomuniste.
    Stalini ishte nje diktator i madh dhe i tmerrshem, por si strateg ushtarak ishte nje zero me xhufke dhe kishte frike Ameriken dhe Perendimin. I trembej nje kryqezate te re antisovjetike dhe per kete arsye deri ne 1954 ( pas vdekjes se tij, ardhjes se Hrushovit ne fuqi) BRSS nuk dha asnje ndihme , nuk nderhyri aspak ne punet e brendshme te shteteve te tjera per te perhapur zonen sovjetike te influences. Hrushovi megjithese denoi stalinizmin, ishte ekspansionist. Pas ardhjes se tij ne fuqi, BRSS nderhyri ne Vietnam ( ku terhoqi fillimisht francezet dhe me pas amerikanet ne nje lufte dekadash), ne Guatemala ku financoi dhe armatosi komunistet dhe majtistet, ne Kuba, Kili etj. Pervec Kubes dhe Vietnamit te Veriut,( ku Kastro nje muaj para se te hynte ne Havana deklaroi ne televizionin amerikan se ai do te mbante marredhenie te mira dhe miqesore me SHBA, do respektonte pronen private dhe interesat e investitoreve amerikane ne Kuba dhe se do te lejonte zgjedhje te lira- prandaj u la nga amerikanet te hypte ne fuqi) nderhyrja sovjetike deshtoi si pasoje e kunderveprimeve te CIA-s. E anasjellta ndodhi ne Shqiperi ne vitet 1949-53. CIA deshtoi sepse nderhyri KGB-ja dhe agjenti i saj Filbi, jo se nderhyri ushtria sovjetike ne Shqiperi.
    Perpjekje anglo-amerikane per rrezim te qeverise se Hoxhes ka pasur gjate viteve 1949-1953, te pelqen ty apo jo si antiamerikan qe je. Eshte fakt historik i pamohueshem. Deshmitare okulare te atyre ngjarjeve si te njeres pale ashtu te pales tjeter ka akoma gjalle dhe deshmojne per nje gje te tille. Sesa rezultative ishte nderhyrja e CIA-s dhe se si e perdori Enveri "karamelen" e komplotit te CIA-s edhe pas 1953 per te justifikuar terrorin mbi popullin kjo eshte nje ceshtje tjeter qe nuk ka lidhje me temen qe po flasim.
    "Who is John Galt?"

  5. #5
    xumparja
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    He was the son of another intelligence officer - a man betrayed by Kim Philby himself, one of the poor bastards who'd parachuted into Albania into the waiting arms of a KGB reception committee.

    Tom Clancy "Red Rabbit" faqe 12, Berkley books August 2003
    Qetesi!
    Shoket lexojne!

  6. #6
    xumparja
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    Bethell, Nicholas. Betrayed. New York: Times Books, 1984. 206 pages.
    The British and CIA involvement in Albania from 1949-1953 was not the first covert operation of the Cold War. In Italy, for example, the CIA passed out money to influence the 1948 elections. But Albania was the first time that armed saboteurs were infiltrated into a sovereign country during peacetime, without the approval of Congress, Parliament, Prime Minister Clement Attlee, or President Harry Truman. This book by Nicholas Bethell, a Conservative member of the House of Lords who lives in London, is the story of this paramilitary operation, which was an unmitigated disaster.
    The major problem was that Kim Philby, MI6's joint commander of the mission based in Washington, was a Soviet mole who betrayed some of the operations from the start. The CIA prefers that we believe this was the only problem, and as of 1982 still refused to confirm that the invasion took place. But Bethell makes a strong case that there were other difficulties: "Poor planning, faulty equipment, ineptitude, the unforeseen strength and violence of the Communist forces in Albania, and the decision to go ahead with the operation despite the warning signals, led to the deaths of thousands."
    ISBN 0-8129-1188-1
    Qetesi!
    Shoket lexojne!

  7. #7
    i/e regjistruar Maska e D&G Feminine
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    [QUOTE]Postuar m par nga Kryeplaku
    [B]Nuk ekzistonte asnje komplot anglo-amerikan kundra Enverit! Keto "komplote" ishin shpikje te Enverit per te na mbushur mendjen se ekzistonin shume "armiq" jashte vendit dhe shume "tradhetar" brenda vendit. Sot per mendimin tim perbejne pjese te propagandes filo-amerikane.

    lol

    Po mire mo kryeplak te pakten mer mundimin te lexosh artikullin me siper ose artikujt e tjere te Klanit ne lidhje me kete.

    Ne fakt ishte e cuditshme sesi Anglia dhe Usa kishin mbajtur shpresa qe kthimi i Shqiperise ne vend jo-komunist do te sherbente si efekt domino per komplet lindjen. Akoma me e cuditshme eshte qe E. Hoxha s'ia paska futur dhe aq kot per armiqte imperialisto-revizioniste. Kur i lexova keto artikuj para ca ditesh te Korrieri, megjithe keqardhjen qe nuk patem fatin ta permbysnim Hoxhen, me duket e habitshme kompetenca dhe inteligjenca e sigurimit shqiptar.

  8. #8
    Shpirt i Lir
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    Postuar m par nga D&G Feminine

    Kur i lexova keto artikuj para ca ditesh te Korrieri, megjithe keqardhjen qe nuk patem fatin ta permbysnim Hoxhen, me duket e habitshme kompetenca dhe inteligjenca e sigurimit shqiptar.
    Cfare ka ketu per t'u habitur? N.q.s te japin te gatshme informacionet se ku, si e kush do te zbarkoje ne filan vend, dhe nje fshatar i thjesht me cifte ne krahe do te dinte te zinte "rob" "armiqte e popullit".

    Philby ka qene strumbullari i mos-suksesit te anglo-amerikaneve dhe shqiptareve. Ndersa Enveri diti te korrte suksesin duke shpallur me te madhe "suksesin" e makines se tij vrasese te ashtuquajtur Sigurimi i Shtetit Shqiptar ne "dobi" te kauzes mizore komuniste shqiptare.

    Pyetje.
    Nese Shqiperia pas Luftes se Dyte Boterore konsiderohej si nje vend qe eshte cliruar vete nga trupat naziste, a kishte mundesi ky shtet ne baze te kesaj llogjike te mos i atashohej linjes komuniste?
    D.m.th. neqoftese ne Shqiperi zbarkonin me sukses njerez te stervitur, sic dhe ndodhi, dhe binin ne kontakt me njerez ne vend, duke arritur te organizonin nje levizje anti-komuniste, sidomos ne Veriun e vendit, i cili ne ate kohe ishte dhe ne levizje e siper ne kete drejtim, a mund te mendohej Shqiperia si nje vend komplet nen suazen sovjetike?


    P.s.
    Kryeplak, propagande filo-amerikane a quaje si te duash, Kim Philby ka jetuar e vepruar in persona kundra interesave anglo-amerikane dhe eshte vertetuar se ka qene agjent sovjetik. Prandaj boll me shabllone anti-amerikane.

  9. #9
    Promete (i lidhur) Maska e Kryeplaku
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    perSHENDETje
    Sa shpejt hidheni te akuzoni te tjeret per anti-amerikan jeni me te vertet te cudicem, pse keshtu...kur nuk bie ndakort me disa ngjarje duhet te jesh anti-amerikan? Po disa prej jush qe thone qe Shqiperine e krijoi SHBA, nderkohe qe ne traktatin e njohjes se Shqiperise (Firence 1913) SHBA nuk merte pjese fare, mos duhet t'ju them une juve anti-Shqiptare???? Nejse...

    Toro i di datat e traktateve mire, nuk kam nevoje per sqarime kam hapur edhe teme te Forumi Historia Boterore ku mund te ndreqesh gabimet e tua. Saper Stalinin e kam shkruajtur ne ate teme - Ngarjet e Shekullit 20- qe e donte Shqiperine Republike te 7 te Jugosllavise( ky eshte edhe shkaku qe Ushtria e Kuqe nuk zbriti ne Tirane sepse zbritja ishte simbolike per clirimin e kryeqyteteve por Stalini me clirimin e Beogradit e quajti se tashme Tirana ishte ceshtje e Titos) dhe se menjehere mbasi e ktheu pllaken Tito, Stalini e perkrahu Shqiperine. Ju mos harroni se fuqite perendimore ishin te parat (para Stalinit akoma) qe e njohen qeverine e Enverit si qeveri te ligjshme, qe ne vitin 1944 me shprehje te vet Corcillit. Une nuk u referova apostafat te ngjarja qe pershkruajti Albo- meqe me refeve datat Toro- une u refeva te trillimet e pergjithshme reth ketij "clirimit per te cilin rinte pa gjum Presidenti i SHBAs". Toro nuk kuptova ca ndryshimi kishte nese Stalini na qunte Jugosllavi ose Shqiperi, po ne bllokun lindor nuk ishim? Nejse... nuk keni faj qe nuk me kuptoni se i shifni gjerat midis emisioneve te huaja reth agjentures etj.- mbase disave prej jush do i dukej e njejta gje nese ne vend te Vietnamit SHBA t'i bente lufte Hungarise, per mua kjo mund te conte ne Luften e Trete Boterore, e njejta gje mund te ndodhte edhe nese ne vend te Afganistanit BS te godiste Turqine. A e dini ca vrisnin Amerikanet ne Vietnam? Komunista! po si pra nuk u pergjigjnin Sovjetiket? Kishin frike SHBAn? Jo me shume sesa SHBA kishte frike BS! Pse pra nuk e benin? Sepse nuk i interesonte, nuk i interesonte edhe sikur mos ngelej edhe nje i gjalle ne Vietnam, cdo gje ishte ndar! Ne vitin 1962 vajti te prishej kjo "ndarje", kur Kuba u furnizua me predha sovjetike dhe gati sa nuk plasi Lufta e Trete- po te lexoni me mire reth psikologjise ne te cilen bazohej Lufta e Ftohte mbase do me kuptoni ndonje dite, jo per gje por kam dhene dhe provime universitare per Luften e Ftohte.
    falemiNDERit

  10. #10
    Warranted Maska e Qerim
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    Deshtimi i rrezimit te pushtetit te Enver Hoxhes, nje nga deshtimet Me te medha te sherbineve argjenturore angleze...


    Na u shtua ne katalog edhe nje "ME" tjeter.

    Kemi qene vendi "Me" i varfer i Evropes.
    Per ne u be lufta "Me" e madhe ne Evrope, pas Luftes se Dyte Boterore.
    Jemi vendi "Me" i copetuar ne Evrope.

    Nuk e di si do shkoje puna me ne shqiptaret...
    Fotografit e Bashkngjitura Fotografit e Bashkngjitura  

  11. #11
    Shpirt i Lir
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    ... menjehere mbasi e ktheu pllaken Tito, Stalini e perkrahu Shqiperine...
    Kryeplak,
    besoj ne leksionet e provimet qe ke marre a dhene mbi Luften e Ftohte, diku theksohet dhe ftohja e marredhenieve midis Titos e Stalinit nga fundi i jetes se ketij te fundit, e mbi perpjekjet qe Jugosllavia bente per t'u shkeputur nga ndikimi sovjetik e dale si nje shtet "asnjeanes" ne kuptimin e te mos qenit koke e kembe nen zuazen sovjetike.
    Pikerisht ne kete kohe kemi dhe intensifikimin e marredhenieve midis sovjetikeve e byrose politike shqiptare, ku delegatet sovjetike prane Enverit kerkonin shkeputjen e Shqiperise nga ndikimi jugosllav duke u premtuar ndihma ekonomike, qe nuk vonuan te vinin.

    Pra, Stalini e "perkrahu" [lexo: e bleu] Shqiperine jo nga pasioni per te, por per t'ju kundervene politikes jugosllave per krijimin e nje zone te "mevehtesuar" nga ai rus ne Evropen Lindore apo Ballkan. Kujto bisedimet mes jugosllaveve-rumuneve-bullgareve-shqiptareve ne kete periudhe dhe do te shikosh se sa na ka ndihmuar BRSS ne ato kohra...

  12. #12
    Promete (i lidhur) Maska e Kryeplaku
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    Une nuk thash se na ndihmoi BS ose jo, ajo qe thash eshte se nese BS u ngatronte ne punet e brendeshme te Shqiperise ose i hapte lufte Shqiperise nuk do behej buje, prandaj e quaj dhe shume "guxim budallai" sjelljen e Enverit ndaj BS kur hypi Krucshovi ne qeveri, sidomos me daljen nga Traktati i Varshaves ne 1967 (nese e mbaj mend mire), se e pame si perfunduan Cekia me Hungarine (u zaptuan nga Sovjetiket kur deshen ti largohen traktatit). Sic duket Shqiperise nuk i vihej e njejta rendesi nga Moska. Por kjo gje nuk do te thote aspak se SHBA kishte te drejten te ndryshonte ngjarjet ne Shqiperi, sepse kjo "fitore" e SHBAs do ishte e barabarte me "humbje" te BS por dhe BS edhe SHBA nuk lejonin kurre uljen e potences se tyre. Keshtu SHBA nese ka bere me shume luftra se BS, gjate asaj kohe, nuk do te thote se ishte "me e forte" por e kunderta, SHBA i bente keto luftra (Vietnam, Kore e Jugut) dhe keto puce shteti per te mos lejuar qe shtete te garnizonit kapitalist te kalonin ne garnizonin komunist, te njejten gje bente dhe BS (Ceki, Hungari).
    Pra per mendimin tim nese ekzistonin komplote kundra Enverit nuk mund te ishin kurre komplote anglo-amerikane, mund te ishin komplote sovjetike ose komplote shqiptare dmth. disa Shqiptar u mundonin te sillnin nje regjim tjeter pa perzierjen e Londres ose te Uashingtonit.

  13. #13
    Dash...me kembore Maska e Toro
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    Kryeplak,
    Per student te shkencave politike apo te historise, njohurite i ke te kufizuara. Po ta them hapur pa dorashka. Ja perse:

    1) Enveri nuk kishte "guxim budallai"....Thjesht dicka me teper se ty...Qe nderhyrja ne 1948 dhe ne 1968 ne Cekosllovaki dhe ajo e 1956 ne Hungari nuk kishte te bente se keto shtete donin te dilnin nga Traktati i Varshaves, por sepse kerkonin te dilnin nga sfera sovjetike e influences dhe te denonconin sistemin komunist. Cekia dhe Hungaria ishin dy shtete ish aleate ose territore te Rajhut te Trete gjerman dhe per pushtimin e tyre ishin vrare me qindra mijera ushtare ruse. Detyrimisht jo vetem BRSS por cilido shtet te ishte ne vend te tij , pavaresisht nga ideologjia, do te rivendoste pushtimin me dhune sic u be ne keto vende.
    Ne Shqiperi nuk kishte shkelur kembe e asnje ushtari rus, detyrimisht BS nuk mund te nderhynte ushtarakisht. Pavaresisht nga budallalleku i Enverit, i cili e dinte shume mire se Hrushovi nuk mund te rrezikonte reputacionin e nje superfuqie dhe te nje sistemi ideologjik per te nenshtruar nje alabak e nje rrugac si Enver Hoxha. Megjithate, Enveri nuk ia ndau popullit kete 'hollesi" , por e la te trembej ( pyet babane apo moshataret e tij si i kane mbushur breket 99% e popullsise ne SHqiperi diten qe iken rusen nga frika se mos iu kthehej mendja dhe fillonin luften!), por e perdori per te konsoliduar pushtetin e tij absolut. Sigurisht "ariu rus" ( Hrushovi) nuk mund te merrej me nje "morr" shqiptar ( Enverin)!

    2)Ne se BRSS nderhynte ushtarakisht ne Shqiperi ne 1960 sepse Hrushovi denoncoi stalinizmin dhe Enveri donte ta mbante akoma, sigurisht do te behej jo buje ne bote, por hataja. Dhe i humburi ne kete rast do te ishte BRSS. Ashtu sic humbi dhe besimin e partive komuniste perendimore pas 1968 me invazionin ne Cekosllovaki. Kthimi i vijes partiake ( devijimi nga rruga zyrtare e Moskes), denoncimi si dhe denimi i invazionit sovjetik ne Ceki ne 1968 bene qe partite komuniste spanjolle, italiane, franceze ( 3 me te medhate ne Evropen Perendimore) te humbisnin rreth 70% te elektoratit te tyre...Elektorat te cilin nuk arriten ta mbanin as pasi "revizionuan" ne "Eurokomunizem"!...Dhe kjo thjesht si pasoje e nderhyrjes ne Cekosllovaki.

    3)Mbas 1945, si BRSS ashtu dhe SHBA kane zhvilluar pothuajse, mos ekzagjeroj te them te njejtin numer lufterash. Sepse dihej fare mire njera pale mbeshteste te majten, e tjetra te djathten. Dhe kudo ku e majta kerkonte te vinte ne pushtet, mbrapa tij ishte BRSS. Nuk mund te me permendesh vetem Cekine dhe Hungarine, por edhe konfliktin anglo-franko-egjiptian per kanalin e Suezit ne 1956 ku dihet fare mire se egjiptianet u nxiten dhe u financuan nga ruset per te nisur konfliktin, pikerisht per te terhequr vemendjen e opinionin nderkombetar nga ngjarjet ne Hungari ne 1956. Ne konfliktin korean kishin dore dhe ruset si dhe kinezet. Ruset ndihmuan me arme, para dhe keshilltare, kinezet me arme dhe me njerez ( 200 mije kineze u vrane ne konfliktin korean). Ne Vietnam po ashtu. Ne Ameriken Latine, diktatoret qe "vendoste" SHBA ishin kunderpergjigje, kunder-reaksion i financimeve dhe ndihmave te ekstremisteve te majte qe bente BRSS. Ne Angola ishin sovjetiket qe financonin me para, arme dhe keshilltare komunistet qe nisen konfliktin. Ne konfliktin arabo-izraelit qe pati brenda 25 vjeteve 3 luftera ( 1948, 1967, 1973) ishin ruset ata qe nxisnin, armatosnin dhe financonin Egjiptin, Sirine dhe Jordanine kunder Izraelit qe ndihmohej nga SHBA.

    Pra komplote ka pasur si nga nje ane ashtu dhe nga ana tjeter....

    3)
    "Who is John Galt?"

  14. #14
    xumparja
    Antarsuar
    12-10-2002
    Vendndodhja
    SHBA
    Mosha
    29
    Postime
    573
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    0
    0 falenderime n 0 postime
    As originally published in The Atlantic Monthly, February 1985



    Why the Soviets might want to invade Albania: a scenario
    by Robert Ducci


    WHATEVER ITS MERITS in other regards, Marxism-Leninism often increases the longevity of those of its subjects who are enjoying the actual exercise of unlimited political power. We have all been reminded of this phenomenon in recent years, when we have attended on our television screens the numerous Red Square funerals of members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) politburo, whose earthly lives had been concluded at ages ranging between seventy and eighty-five. The statutes of the CPSU still prescribe that a good Bolshevik never retires from the fight for World Revolution to which he dedicated himself in his youth.


    The same is true in Eastern European countries subjugated by the USSR. Once their original "old Bolshevik" leaders had been executed, under Stalin's orders, in the early fifties, or kicked out for their counter-revolutionary faux pas, in the sixties and seventies, the rule was faithfully applied throughout Eastern Europe -- consider Janos Kadar, of Hungary, Gustav Husak, of Czechoslovakia, and Nicolae Ceausescu, of Romania -- but never with greater success than in the case of the two Communist rebel leaders Marshal Tito and Enver Hoxha (pronounced Hodja). Tito ruled Yugoslavia for almost forty years. Hoxha, who founded and who was named the leader of the Communist Party of Albania in 1941, still enjoys this position. His absolute rule over Albania has successfully resisted many attacks from inside his own party. (The plotters have usually been found dead; the most famous of them, Mehmet Shehu, had been Hoxha's best friend and perennial Number 2 for thirty-five years.) More over, Hoxha has been able to thwart successive attempts against his life or his power engendered by the Yugoslavs and the Russians. The hands of the apostles Marx and Lenin must really have been upon his head.

    Return to Albania: Enigma of the Balkans
    But, alas, no man -- not even a confirmed Bolshevik -- is immortal. One day death will summon Hoxha, and neither his astuteness nor his cruelty will suffice to drive it from his sickbed. There will be general mourning on the part of the Albanian people, and some of it will even be sincere. Fires will burn on the mountains and old muskets will be fired in the valleys; his corpse will be mummified and buried in state, much as Stalin's was (Hoxha is the most obdurate of Stalin's admirers). Then the tumult and the shouting will fade, and the tiny Balkan country will tread on toward an uncertain future.

    Since the end of the Second World War, Albania has made headlines only three times: when the Yugoslav suzerains were replaced by the Russians; when the latter were superseded by the Chinese; when the Chinese were drily thanked for their help and asked to leave. In the past fifteen years very few people in the West have been conscious of the existence, in the southeast of Europe, of this country, which for all intents and purposes might be Tibet. Closed in upon itself, it has practically no communication with the surrounding world except through a small group of trusted officials; has no diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom, the United States, or the USSR; provides scant possibilities for its people to know what is going on in the outside world; allows very little foreign tourism and makes it practically impossible for Albanians to travel abroad. Nobody -- not even diplomats in the capital, Tiran, who are so reduced in number that they often find it difficult to organize a foursome around a bridge table -- knows what really happens in Albania. Was Defense Minister Beqir Balluku executed in 1975, because he was a Soviet (a Yugoslav, an American) spy? Did Mehmet Shehu commit suicide, or was he deliberately killed upon orders from high up? Everyone's answer to these and to almost all vital questions is, We honestly do not know. The interest raised among connoisseurs by one of these occurrences quickly dies down: the map of Europe no longer seems to include the small country where in the fifteenth century the hero Skanderbeg led the revolt against the Turks and whence the Ottoman Empire drew its most bellicose janissaries and many of its grand viziers and pashas.


    Nevertheless, let's take a look at the map. Albania is a rugged country slightly bigger than Wales, bordered on the north by Montenegro and Kosovo (in Yugoslavia), on the east by Macedonia, on the south by Epirus (in Greece), and on the west by the Adriatic Sea. The Yugoslav province of Kosovo contains more than a million Albanians: no wonder the government of Tiran considers it "unredeemed. " Macedonia, inhabited by Serbians, Bulgarians, Turks, and other ethnic groups, has traditionally been disputed by Balkan countries; the Soviet Union, unanointed successor of Holy Russia, continues to harbor hopes of annexing it to faithful Bulgaria, so as to introduce a wedge between heretical Yugoslavia and NATO Greece. Epirus also, sacred to the manes of Achilles and Pyrrhus, was and might again become a bone of contention between Albania and Greece. Neither Serbia nor Greece, the two main Balkan rivals for hegemony over Albania before the First World War and between the wars, was able to ensure Epirus for itself alone, the reason being that Italy would not allow it. "And now, Zog, how long will it take you to sell yourself to the Italians?" asked Nikola Pasic, the old prime minister of Serbia, in 1925, having finished counting the gold sovereigns thanks to which Prince Ahmed Zogu (later King Zog) was to bring Albania over to Belgrade's side. The answer given by history is, a year and a half. Italy had not allowed the Austro-Hungarian Empire to establish itself firmly at the lower end of the Adriatic, nor was it going to permit anything of the kind to Yugoslavia or Greece.


    Why was Italy interested in assuring an Albanian principality under her control or, finally, in establishing a union between the two countries in the person of the head of the reigning family of the King of Savoy (Victor Emmanuel III, the emperor of Ethiopia and the king of Albania during most of the Second World War)? If we take another look at the map, we will see that in the days of naval supremacy freedom of navigation in the Adriatic Sea as far as Venice and Trieste was contingent on the possession, or at least on the control, of both the Italian and Albanian shores of the Strait of Otranto, which connects the Ionian Sea to the Adriatic. It was therefore a principle of Italian foreign policy to make sure that Albania did not fall into the hands of a strong adversary power.


    After 1945 this principle became void. Albania, abandoned by the Fascists at the end of 1943 and by the Nazis in 1944, entered Stalin's empire. Albania was a lonely outpost after Tito's revolt; Stalin's successors didn't know what to do with it. Italy had other problems to cope with, and in any case its political class had been vaccinated against intrusion into Balkan affairs. Now and then there were fleeting rumors about the installation of a base for Soviet submarines in the bay of Vlor. Before the sixties there was in fact practically no Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean. Meanwhile, Hoxha expelled the Russians and called in the Chinese. After that episode came to an end and relations with the USSR improved, the government in Tiran still consistently withheld naval and air force facilities from the Soviet Union and every other country. The country is blockfrei, refusing contacts with both the Warsaw and the NATO bloc. It even declines to be counted among the nonaligned countries of the world, or among the neutral countries of Europe (Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, Finland, and Malta); it refused to take part in the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and is not a signatory of the Helsinki Final Act. Albania lives in self-imposed isolation: its people are too proud to surrender, too poor to arouse covetous glances, too valiant for any aggression against them to be worth the candle. Albania is perhaps the last example of the eighteenth-century Kleinstaaterei, like Weimar and Parma; or the first application of Schumacher's "Small is beautiful" to the international field; or in the realm of poetry the Dukedom of Illyria, where Viola loves Orsino who loves Olivia who loves Viola, until everything is rearranged in the concluding scene. Except . . .


    EXCEPT FOR WHAT might happen after Hoxha's demise -- though one must grant that, being only seventy-six, he could survive for several more years. Nevertheless, his advanced age is a good reason for observers of the Balkan scene to begin wondering, and probably planning, about what will happen when he abandons the helm. There is no way of predicting what the political state of affairs in Albania will be after Hoxha's death. Has his succession already been discussed in the Tiran politburo, or -- as seems more likely -- is the reigning chieftain wary of putting this item on the agenda? By letting it be known on whose shoulders his mantle is to fall, a dictator easily builds up a rival and possibly his murderer. May one therefore assume that since there is a large Hoxha faction in the politburo (no doubt about that), this majority faction will assert itself by electing Comrade X as secretary-general of the Party? This scenario is admissible, but it has one flaw: Hoxha has destroyed all his rivals, and thus it could happen that no one of his supporters in the Party's higher ranks will be big enough to fill the tyrant's boots. The apparently unanimous Hoxhaphiles might therefore rapidly divide themselves into two or more rival groups, each under a minor baron; and since Albanian society is still structured on contending clans, the political struggle might be doubled by clan strife. According to this scenario the political scene in Albania would be unstable for a number of years, a state of affairs that could encourage foreign interference, as we shall see.


    Suppose that Hoxha's succession were to follow swiftly and in an orderly manner: there might still be cause for trouble. Whoever picks up Hoxha's baton will for a time inevitably be rather weak and exposed. To maintain the status quo would be his best course at first. Whatever official propaganda may say when it invents CIA plots and commandos, Tiran leaders know only too well that the United States has no reason to destabilize Albania. The Yugoslavs are already having a hard job stifling the discontent of the Albanian minority in Kosovo and would not wish to annex its mother country. As long as Belgrade wants to protect itself from Soviet encroachment, it will remain interested in Albanian stability. The Tiran leadership will therefore concentrate on the risk of Soviet intrusiveness. Is there a genuine likelihood of Soviet intervention in the small Balkan republic -- political, military, or both?


    In my opinion, the answer to this question is yes,
    for reasons that are durable in both the short and the long term. It is easy to see what advantages the USSR would reap from the return of the prodigal son to the Warsaw Pact (Albania was the only member that got out of the Pact of its own free will and without suffering reprisals). The re-establishment of Soviet influence in Albania would enable Moscow to exert pressure on Yugoslavia by encouraging Albanian irredentism toward Kosovo and umpiring the two parties' claims. Greece's allegiance to NATO, already enfeebled by her conflict with Turkey and by Andreas Papandreou's inclination toward non-alignment, would be further weakened. The long-coveted Albanian ports (Durrs, Vlor, and Sarand) might be opened to the Soviet Mediterranean fleet, which could use them for overhauling, refitting, onshore leaves, supplies, and other purposes for which it does not have facilities in the Mediterranean except, to a very small extent, at Latakia, in Syria. The annexation of Albania would, furthermore, allow Soviet forces to establish electronic surveillance over much of the Mediterranean region, including central and southern Italy and its islands, and mainland Greece and its islands. Reconnaissance and attack planes could be based at modernized airports with underground hangars: the defense plans of Allied Forces South (NATO's southern command) would have to be substantially modified. Finally, only extreme measures by NATO would prevent the USSR from installing tactical nuclear missiles targeted upon Italy, Yugoslavia, and Greece. These three countries are now threatened by the SS-20 and other missiles, but the deployment of shorter-range and therefore faster missiles in Albania would add one more difficulty to the complex problem of deterring threats to the already ill-defended region of southeast Europe.


    The advantages that the Soviet Union might reap from bringing Albania back into the Warsaw Pact are so evident that the matter must have received close study by the Soviet Defense Council and by the Central Committee. The risk of kindling a very serious crisis with the West has certainly loomed large in such a review. Taking action on Albania might appear to be a very bold decision, on the order of Khrushchev's decision to install missiles in Cuba. The potential benefits, though, would probably outweigh the difficulties. Foremost among the latter is the lack of contiguity between Albania and Bulgaria: the use of land forces, at least initially, would have to be ruled out. But parachutist and airborne troops might easily capture the Adriatic ports, with a view to sealing up Albania against a possible landing of NATO forces; the airports could also be captured by surprise, and a line of airborne logistical supply established in a relatively short time.


    I shall not indulge in further war games, at which I am not at all competent. I shall instead try to draw a possible political scenario for justifying Operation Albania.


    IN A SPEECH at the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in New Delhi, the late Indira Gandhi made an arresting pronouncement that her country might well come to regret one day. "It is perfectly in order," she said, "for the government of a country to ask for the help of an allied or brotherly country." What she had in mind, of course, was Afghanistan: she thus tried to legitimize Soviet armed intervention in that unlucky country, and in one stroke legitimized other military aggressions by the Soviet Union against "brotherly" countries, such as Hungary and Czechoslovakia. It was possibly the best homage to the memory of Leonid Brezhnev, who invented the doctrine of "brotherly aid" that carries his name.


    This time-honored doctrine will continue to be the pretext for Soviet military intervention abroad. A Socialist country is usually described as being about to lose its independence and revolutionary heritage owing to the maneuvers of a gang of traitors to the proletariat in conspiracy with Western imperialists. A few insurgent heroes rise against this hideous plot and ask the Soviet Union to help them defeat it, a request that Moscow generously honors, in the spirit of revolutionary internationalism. Moral protests and diplomatic condemnations are scorned as sheer interference in the internal affairs of the Socialist bloc.


    In our scenario the Soviet planners have now reached a point where two of the main elements of Operation Albania have passed the test of feasibility: an airborne expedition against Albania would be a rather minor job for the Soviet army and air force, and a plan to destabilize the men and political groups who inherit power in Tiran after Hoxha's death could easily be put together. Some small faction that has been denied participation in power could be encouraged to appeal to Moscow for brotherly aid. Or, better still, the ruling group itself could defy the opposition by requesting the protection of Big Brother so as to continue ruling in his name. This second possibility might be better, but Soviet political planners might well prefer generating the occasion to waiting for it.


    The overriding standard of judgment about Operation Albania has to be the degree of military risk. Not, of course, the risk that the invading army might incur owing to the resistance of Albanian patriots (there would certainly be few of them at the start, though in time their numbers would probably grow) but the supreme risk of detonating an East-West crisis of major proportions. The men in the Kremlin are willing to take calculated risks: they had correctly reckoned that when the sclerotic Brezhnev gave the green light to the invasion of Afghanistan, there would be no reaction from the West other than verbal, because geography ruled out a Western military intervention of any kind. But Albania is in the Mediterranean area, close to NATO forces. An evaluation of the risk must therefore take into account the possibility of a military reaction from Italy, from Greece, from the U.S. Sixth Fleet, or from NATO as a whole. What kind of reaction should the Kremlin expect from each of these?


    Italy's reaction to a Soviet surprise invasion of Albania would range from extreme anxiety among the knowledgeable minority to acute embarrassment in political circles and timorous indifference among the masses. The Italian Foreign Office would rapidly mobilize its diplomats abroad to ascertain how the allied governments evaluated the event and how they intended to react, but Italy's leaders would find it difficult to elaborate a practical proposal to be put to the NATO allies. Italian politicians would not have to worry about the possibility of violent demonstrations by the Communist Party or the trade unions: the prospect of Soviet forces permanently stationed a hundred miles off southern Italy would not fill those organizations with bliss. But the people would be spiritually unprepared to meet force with force, having been kept in the dark about the risk of a confrontation with the USSR in the Balkans (or, for that matter, in North Africa). Rome would therefore stay put, waiting for a lead from Washington and other allied capitals.


    Greece's strategic position would change even more radically than Italy's, and the Greek government would be seriously upset. Warsaw Pact pressure, already felt along the Bulgarian border, would now spread to the formerly peaceful Albanian frontier. In the beginning Athens would mold its posture on Belgrade's, and while it would prick up its ears at noises coming from Turkey, it would probably counsel prudence and restraint, putting its confidence in rumors that the Soviet troops would be withdrawn once they had completed their fraternal duty or that Moscow was about to offer a Soviet-Greek non-aggression treaty.


    I have mentioned the U.S. Sixth Fleet because it is the foundation of U.S. power in the Mediterranean. Supported by the Mediterranean NATO countries, and supplied by their ports and airports, the Sixth Fleet is a remarkable engine of war. But whether by itself it could sustain a military operation substantially more meaningful than the two that it carried out in recent years against Qaddafi's Libya must remain open to doubt. Certainly one or two big aircraft carriers could take a position in the Ionian Sea or in the Gulf of Taranto; AWAC planes flying over the Adriatic could gauge the extent of the Soviet penetration. Could such a limited show of force dissuade Moscow from completing its airborne expedition and cause it to call back its Antonov planes and its parachutists, as Khrushchev called back his ships because of Kennedy's ultimatum? Probably the answer is no, and therefore another step would have to be taken, and the problem put by Washington into NATO's lap.


    NATO is of course a convenient cover for what is in reality a juxtaposition of the political will of several sovereign states. Past experience has shown that it is difficult for the organization as such to reach a collective decision that might trigger a large war, unless there is direct aggression against one of its members. For a number of years military advisers have urged the Atlantic alliance to protect not only its member states (which it has done successfully) but also the vital interests of the alliance in areas outside the geographical and juridical limits of NATO (limits that encompass North America, Western Europe with the exception of the neutral and non-aligned countries, and the Mediterranean basin with the exception of the Near East and North Africa). Nothing came of those proposals. The difficulties in defining the vital interests and the areas proved too great. In 1973 the European allied governments, except Portugal, declined to provide air bases and other facilities to American forces engaged in saving the skin of Israel -- and, a few days later, that of Egypt. In retrospect, the gutlessness of the West at the time of the Cuban expeditions in Angola (1975) and Ethiopia (1978) proves the stupidity of its leaders as well as the lack of political education of its peoples. The large majority of them blissfully ignored where Luanda and Addis Ababa are and the fact that Cuban "liberators" made it impossible for Angolans and Ethiopians to choose the amity and the aid of the West if they so wanted. It would have been difficult to persuade the electorate in Copenhagen or Amsterdam to countenance a military operation in those "distant countries of which they knew nothing." And though Tiran and Albania are closer to, say, Norway than to the two African countries mentioned above, the northern members of NATO, among others, would be likely to adopt a concerned attitude but one that stopped short of concrete action.


    The debate in the Atlantic Council, in Brussels, would therefore be concluded with pious words, or with the tacit charge to the United States -- possibly in conjunction with Italy -- to act to the best of its ability, judgment, and political authority to obtain the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Albania. (The unhappy precedent of Afghanistan should be kept in mind but not taken as a pattern. The West had no possibility of access to that region, whereas it is in close physical contact with the Balkans.) Everything would thus be thrown back on the ability of the American President to carry Congress with him, in his attempt to confront the Soviets with a credible posture and program signaling that either. . . or. . . Time would unfortunately be very short, and the planners in Moscow -- reviewing the limited choices open to the President -- might well conclude that it was already too late for him to instruct the Sixth Fleet and the Rapid Deployment Force to land troops on the Albanian seaboard with a view to ensuring at least some territorial pawns and pre-empting a total occupation of the country by the Soviet Army.


    Such a pessimistic evaluation on our side, and such an optimistic one on the opposite side, would be precluded if the U.S. government and NATO Supreme Headquarters had a contingency plan ready, political and military, to manage a crisis of this type and magnitude. Neither this writer nor probably any of his readers is privy to U.S. and NATO secrets. It is known only that the theoretical study of crisis management has progressed considerably in the West. It is dearly to be hoped that precise application of this doctrine is available to manage crises that might occur in certain delicate sectors of the world. Moreover, if it were known or credible that a contingency plan existed to cope quickly with events like the Albanian scenario I have just described, this would by itself act as a deterrent or at least would introduce doubts into the Soviet leaders which might restrain their hand.


    LET US NEVERTHELESS, toutes fins utiles, paint with dark colors events as they might further develop. The sequence now becomes more and more speculative. Every conjecture is predicated on two independent unknown quantities: When will the crisis start? and What will then be the overall ratio of forces in the two camps, particularly in the nuclear field? Let us assume that no nuclear ultimatum is given to demand the withdrawal of Soviet forces; that no foothold on the Albanian territory was seized when circumstances were still favorable; that no Soviet transport plane has been shot down so as to induce Moscow to pause for reflection. The West would still have cards up its sleeves (it would have reached a high degree of readiness, it could sink Soviet warships and transports with no great risk of reprisals; the mounting of a future landing operation would be in progress), but the value of those cards would diminish with the passing of days. After a week or two Soviet order would be established in most of Albania, except the mountainous areas. The Tiran government would solemnly thank Moscow for its brotherly aid. "Proofs" of the imperialist plot and prisoners purported to have been "subversive commandos" would be produced. The Security Council of the United Nations would vote to condemn the Soviet Union by a slight majority, but the resolution would be nullified by a Soviet veto. Well-disposed or simply naive journalists of the Western world would periodically spread the news that Soviet troops were about to embark in Durrs to return home. Official Moscow sources would now and then promise an end to the occupation. Some army units might even be withdrawn gradually, however, naval and air bases would receive Russian "advisers"; eventually U.S. reconnaissance satellites would discover missile silos in the process of being built on the Albanian hills. Americans would vigorously protest in Moscow. They would receive the answer that there are no mutually agreed-upon limits or constraints to the deployment either of the two blocs of intermediate nuclear weapons, and that in any case short-range nuclear missiles in Albania were meant to make up for Cruise missiles deployed in Sicily.


    The profound change in the strategic situation in the Balkans and the Mediterranean sector would not stop with the deployment of short-range missiles aimed at most of Italy, Yugoslavia, and Greece. There would be a cascade of political consequences that do not need much fantasy to be imagined. After some time the question of Macedonia would be raised; incidents and riots would be encouraged in the Yugoslav Macedonian Republic, and these would be followed by military maneuvers all along the borders of Yugoslavia under the high command of the Warsaw Pact. No concrete aid would be forthcoming from the non-aligned countries or from NATO. It would make no difference which formula was adopted, an "independent" Macedonia or a Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation (a 1947 invention of Georgi Dimitrov, which Stalin vetoed for his own reasons). Safe overland lines of communication and transport between Bulgaria and Albania would, in some way, be established and maintained.


    While putting Macedonia to good use, the Kremlin would move the other half of the pincers, Kosovo, to squeeze further concessions from Yugoslavia. In return for Soviet restraint of uprisings of the Albanian minority, Belgrade would be requested to open its naval and air bases to the Soviet forces. This do ut des would be heartily supported by Serbian chauvinists, because it would save the Serbian minority in Kosovo from being expelled from the land where it has lived since the Middle Ages. By now the rope would be firmly around Yugoslavia's neck, and the end of its non-alignment would be in sight. Thus the whole of the Balkans would have become part of the Eastern empire led by Moscow. Greece and perhaps Turkey might find it advisable to search for some accommodation with it, and would probably withdraw from NATO and declare neutrality.


    What should this writer, who is an Italian, prophesy about the political repercussions in his own country of this theoretical sequence of events? Once the rape of Albania had been consummated, there would probably be a political swing toward resistance and preparedness. Some political parties that had been uneasy about the presence of Cruise missiles in Sicily would insist that they be deployed -- on the condition, however, that some or all of the missiles were targeted upon the Soviet silos in Albania. Other groups, on the contrary, would ask that negotiations with the Soviets be opened immediately regarding the simultaneous withdrawal of nuclear missiles from Albania and Sicily. Voices would be more frequently heard -- among them, the enthusiastic voice of Mr. Mintoff, from Malra -- in favor of making the Mediterranean a nuclear-free zone. A deep silence in Israel and in Libya would kill that suggestion for the time being.


    The Yugoslav crisis, coming after the Albanian coup, would visibly preoccupy responsible circles in Italy, while leaving the common people largely indifferent. Isn't Yugoslavia a more or less artificial creation? And aren't the Macedonian people mostly Bulgarians? But once Yugoslavia fell under Soviet influence, there would be a rapid change both in political circles and among the better-informed members of the public. The consequences would be serious.


    Which image of Europe would in fact be present in the eyes of sensible observers in the Peninsula? For more than a third of a century Italy's security and its parliamentary democracy have been preserved by the Atlantic alliance as well as by slow progress toward European unification. No prompt decision, no courageous move, would, however, have come from NATO or from the EEC in the Albanian-Yugoslav crisis. The whole eastern flank of Italy, from Trieste to Syracuse, would stand exposed and barely defensible. If the pseudo-neutrality of Greece and the pact of mutual assistance between Libya and the USSR were taken into account along with the presence of Soviet forces on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean, the arc of potentially hostile nations encircling Italy would weigh somberly on its future. Could the U.S. Sixth Fleet continue to be based in Gaeta and Maddalena or would it seek calmer waters farther west? And would lines of communication with the Suez Canal remain secure, once Egypt began feeling itself cut off from the center of Western power?


    The next scene could be embroidered differently by different novelists. The middle-of-the-road chiefs of the Italian Communist Party would be ejected and replaced by people closer to Moscow. Neutralist temptations would be rising in the Socialist Party and in the left wing of the Catholic Party, and they would not lack for rationalization from radical intellectuals. To salvage what might still be salvaged, cool heads and prudent hands would start charting a new course, away from the alliance and the EEC, toward the non-aligned world.


    We may safely stop here: history is not a mathematical theorem, though it often resembles one. I personally would prefer to have recourse in conclusion to quotations from three great men.


    The first is from Paul-Henri Spaak: "Who wills certain things also wills their consequences: if he does nor like the consequences he should oppose the things from which they originate."


    The second is what the wise Chou En-lai told his NATO visitors (including the Italian Foreign Minister Giacomo Medici and this author) at the beginning of the seventies, which can be summarized as follows: "The Soviets will not attack you in the German plains: they will hypnotize your mind and soul with that menace. They will then be free to carry out a strategy of successive wide-range encirclements of Europe. The first, through Angola and Mozambique, will threaten your supply lines with the Eastern Hemisphere. A second ring will then be established, foreclosing the West from the Ethiopian high plateau, Aden, and Afghanistan, and possibly Iran and the Persian Gulf. Your influence on India will be reduced very close to zero; Pakistan will find itself in a difficult situation. While cashing in on all that, the Soviet leaders will begin to construct a third encircling ring. This time they will aim at putting under their control the Balkan peninsula and the Eastern Mediterranean. If that happens, the West as we know it will be finished. Shortly before that happens you will witness an improvement in Soviet-Chinese relations: slow and cautious, but irresistible. You will remember that we never liked Stalin, but neither did we object to his pact with Hitler. The survival of his people is the first responsibility of a leader. Later on, the struggle may be resumed under better conditions."


    The third quotation is from Dante: "Poca favilla gran fiamma seconda," a little spark may cause a great fire. It could be an appropriate conclusion to a meditation on the future of Albania.




    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Copyright 1985 by Roberto Ducci. All rights reserved.
    The Atlantic Monthly; February 1985; Volume 255, No. 2; pages 16-26.
    Ndryshuar pr her t fundit nga Fringo : 10-03-2004 m 00:03
    Qetesi!
    Shoket lexojne!

  15. #15
    Promete (i lidhur) Maska e Kryeplaku
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    Falenderuar 1 her n 1 postim
    Tjeter gje komploti tjeter mbeshtetja ushtarake e prapaskenes, e cila kishte per qellim zhvillimin e nje levizjeje qe kishte filluar nga vet vendalit ose keqesimin e influences se kundershtarit dhe kjo ndihme ishte perhere e varfer dhe jo e dukshme, mbase kishte per qellim qe te kalonin ne nje fare menyre interesat e superfuqise ne ate shtete por pa shkaktuar renjen e qeverise ose afrimin e saj ne bllokun e vet. Saper Suezin , Republikat Socialiste te Bashkuara Sovjetike nuk kishin dore fare, kete e di e gjithe bota. Ajo ishte pasoje e politikes se Naserit qe donte te shteteronte burimet pasurore, thjesht Naseri qe ne fillim te udheheqjes se tij (1952) ju drejtua per ndihme teknologjike RSBS dhe ndoqi politike socialiste, kjo nuk do te thote se BS e shtyu Naserin ne kete gje qe interesonte mbi te gjithe popullin egjyptian. Dhe e dime shume mire se Lufta e Suezit mbaroi pas nderhyrjes se dy superfuqive, per shkakun se nuk donin qe kjo krize te shkaktonte nje krize me te madhe ku mund te ngatroheshin edhe vet superfuqite. Dhe ti Toro duhet ta dish se Naseri ishte krijuesi i "levizjes te asnjanesve" dmth. ndiqte politike te pavarur nga dy superfuqite. Saper Hungarine edhe Cekosllovakine e kishin pohuar vet se donin te largoheshin nga Traktati, se Traktati i Varshaves perbente karemin ligjor per kete varje nga BS, biles Hungaria kishte shtruar edhe kerkese per t'u larguar.

    Argumente te forta per te mohuar ato qe thua ti jane Lufta Civile e Greqise, ku gjate L2B Komunistet Greke ishin 80% ose me shume te forcave luftarake dhe mbasi mbaroi lufta kur deshen te marin pushtetin u shpartalluan nga forcat nacionaliste dhe forcat angleze, dhe nuk kishin asnje ndihme nga BS, sepse sic duket Greqia ishte destinuar ti perkiste Bllokut Kapitalist. Jane edhe luftrat e tjera civile qe u bene ne te gjithe Europen menjehere pas L2B, dhe e pame se ne disa vende ku Komunistat ishin shumica (psh. Greqi) erdhen ne fuqi nacionalistat kurse ne vende te tjera (Cekosllovaki, Hungari, Rumani, Bullgari etj.) ku Nacinalistat ishin shumica erdhen ne fuqi Komunistat. Kjo gje nuk ndryshoi deri me fundin e Luftes se Ftohte.

  16. #16
    Warranted Maska e Qerim
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    Kim Filbi

    Edhe une jam dakort me Kryeplakun se nuk ka patur nje komplot amerikano-anglez ndaj Shqiperise dhe se e gjitha kjo eshte propagande.

    Historija me Kim Filbin eshte e njejta histori e vjeter e Kalit te Trojes.Ne te gjithe boten u hap fjala se greket e pushtuan Trojen nepermjet nje KALI kur ne fakt ishin rrethanat socio-ekonomike qe shkaktuan renien e Trojes.

  17. #17
    Lieutenant Maska e tom pullings
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    Citim Postuar m par nga Qerim
    Edhe une jam dakort me Kryeplakun se nuk ka patur nje komplot amerikano-anglez ndaj Shqiperise dhe se e gjitha kjo eshte propagande.

    Historija me Kim Filbin eshte e njejta histori e vjeter e Kalit te Trojes.Ne te gjithe boten u hap fjala se greket e pushtuan Trojen nepermjet nje KALI kur ne fakt ishin rrethanat socio-ekonomike qe shkaktuan renien e Trojes.

    Lord Nicholas Bethell ka skruajtur nje liber qe hedh drite mbi kete erresire qe shtyn ne gabime gjykimi si ai i Qerimit. Libri, ne titullin origjinal, eshte :

    Bethell, Nicholas, THE GREAT BETRAYAL: THE UNTOLD STORY OF KIM PHILBY'S BIGGEST COUP.

    Une e kam lexuar ne perkthimin italian: LA MISSIONE TRADITA.

    Faktet dhe njohurite e Bethellit jane te pakundershtueshem. Philby, personazh i rendesishem i Intelligence Service - it anglez (pra jo Sherbimit Sekret amerikan si del nga postimi i pare i kesaj teme), informoi KGB-ne dhe kjo Sigurimin shqiptar qe kapi, vrau e shtyu ne deshtim tentativat qe te vritej Enveri.

    Keto jane fakte qe nuk mund te mohoen. Tersi eshte qe nuk kemi nje kerkim shkencor-historik tjeter perve atij te Lord Bethellit.
    IGNOSCE MI DOMINE, QUIA DALMATA SUM!

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Ruaj Lidhjet

Regullat e Postimit

  • Ju nuk mund t hapni tema t reja.
  • Ju nuk mund t postoni n tema.
  • Ju nuk mund t bashkngjitni skedar.
  • Ju nuk mund t ndryshoni postimet tuaja.
  •