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  1. #21
    Kerrar
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    Diqka duhet te sqarohet.

    Pa lejen e SHBA'se nuk mund te publikohet asgje. Jemi balle te nje propogande te re Amerikane, qe si qellim e ka te dobesoj marredheniet ne mes shteteve arabe dhe iranit, ne mes azerbajxhanit dhe turqise, turqise dhe iranit etj.

    Ne media thojne qe SHBA'ja nuk mundi te ndalonte kete, por ke jeni duke mashtruar ? A nuk ishte Amerika qe ne emer te Pentagonit brenda 1 minute ka blere te gjitha botimet e librit te nje Gjenerali Amerikan ne Agfanistan ?

    Me sa u dal ne shitje, per 1 minut te gjitha i blejti pentagoni, per mos te nxjerr ne pah se qfare krime nga ushtaret amerikan jane bere ne afganistan...

  2. #22
    EAGLE warrior Maska e MafiaWarz
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    Top Sekretet e SHBA nė Wikileaks

    (E plotėsuar)

    Ahmadinexhad njė “Hitler”, Sarkozy “mbreti lakuriq”

    Presidenti i Iranit Mahmoud Ahmadinexhad ėshtė cilėsuar si njė “Hitler” i kohėve modern. Gjithnjė referuar dokumenteve sekrete tė Wikileaks tė publikuara tė dielėn nga faqja e famshme dhe qė flasin pėr sekretet e Shteteve tė Bashkuara. Muamar Gedafi, i tėrhequr pas infermiereve bjonde, Hamid Karzai, udhėhiqet nga paranoja, Nikolas Sarkozi, mbreti lakuriq dhe Silvio Berluskoni, organizatori i “festave tė egra”.

    Ky ėshtė shkrimi nė kopėrtinėn e sė pėrjavėshmes gjermane Der Spiegel e cila pretendon se ky ėshtė kėndvėshtrimi amerikan pėr disa nga liderėt botėrorė nė dokumentet e Wikileaks qė pritet tė publikohen sė shpejti.

    SHBA tė frikėsuara nga afrimi Berluskoni-Putin

    Njė alencė intriguese. Tė tillė e kanė cilėsuar zyrtarėt amerikane nė Itali afrimin mes dy prej personazheve tė njohura tė politikės botėrore. Diplomatėt amerikanė nė Romė kanė raportuar nė vitin 2009 pėr atė ēka e cilėsuan marrėdhėnie tė jashtėzakonshme mes kryeministrit rus Vladimir V. Putin dhe kryeministrit Italian Silvio Berlusconi. Manjati Italian i medias dhe i pushtetshmi Putin sipas diplomatėve amerikanė kanė shkėmbyer dhurata tė majme pėrveēse kanė nėnshtruar njė sėrė marrėveshjes pėr energjinė. Diplomatėt nėnvizuan se Berlusconi duket se vazhdimisht po shndėrrohet nė njė gojė tė Putinit nė Evropė.

    Mbreti i Arabisė i kėrkoi SHBA-ve tė sulmojnė Iranin

    Mbreti i Arabisė Sauditė Abdullah i ka kėrkuar vijimėsisht Shteteve tė Bashkura tė Amerikės sė sulmojnė Iranin pėr tė shkatėrruar projektin nuclear.

    Duke ju referuar njė takimi sekret mes sekretarit amerikan David Petraeus nė prill tė vitit 2008, ambasadori i Arabisė Saudite nė Uashington Adel Al-Jubeir thotė se “ai ju kėrkon ju qė ti prisni kokėn gjarprit”.

    Nė dokumente thuhet gjithashtu se njė alarm ėshtė dhėnė nga sekretari amerikan i mbrojtjes Robert Gates qė nė muajin shkurt pėr rrezikun e pėrhapjes sė fenomenit nuklear pas njė sulm tė mundshėm tė Izraelit nė lindjen e mesme.

    Korrupsioni, zv.presidenti afgan drejt Arabisė me 52 milion USD

    Dyshime tė forta pėr korrupsion nė qeverinė afgane.

    Teksa zėvendės/presidenti i Afganistanit po udhėtonte drejt Emirateve tė Bashkuara Arab vitin e shkuar rezulton se autoritetet lokale qė ishin tė angazhuara me luftėn ndaj drogės zbuluan se ai kishte me vete njė sasi prej 52 milion dollarėsh CASH. Njė zyrtar amerikan nė ambasadėn nė Kabul sic raporton ne dokumente Wikileaks e cilėsoi kėtė shumė si tejet tė madhe dhe hodhi dyshime pėr faktin se si Ahmed Zia Massoud ishte lejuar tė mbante me vete kaq para pa treguar burimin e tyre apo destinacionin.

    BE plan sekret pėr tė bojkotuar ceremoninė e Ahmadinexhad

    Ambasadorėt e Bashkimit Evropian nė Teheran sė bashku mėsohet se kishin rėnė dakord tė bojkotonin ceremoninė e inaugurimit tė Presidentit Ahmadinexhad pas zgjedhjes sė tij nė vitin

    2009. Sipas dokumenteve tė Wikileaks njė zyrtar francez i tha njė zyrtari amerikan nė Paris se “ėshtė shumė e vėshtirė tė mbahet sekreti teksa 27 vende janė tė pėrfshirė por ne do tė pėrpiqeni ta bėjmė”. Nė kėtė eveniment pranoi tė thyente marrėveshjen vetėm pėrfaqėsuesi i Suedisė, vendi qė mbante presidencėn e radhės sė Bashkimit Evropian. Ambasadat e tjera dėrguan pėrfaqėsues tė niveleve tė ulėta. Shtetet e Bashkuara tė Amerikės vet nuk kanė njė ambasador nė Teheran qė kur u prishėn marrėdhėniet diplomatike nė vitin 1979.

    SHBA pėrgjoi Ban Ki-Moon e pėrfaqėsuesit e Rusisė nė OKB

    Uashingtoni ka drejtuar njė fushatė tė shėrbimeve sekrete me objektiv kreun e Kombeve tė Bashkuara Ban Ki-moon dhe pėrfaqėsuesve tė Kinės, Rusisė, Francės dhe Britanisė nė Kombet e Bashkuara. Njė direktivė e klasifikuar ėshtė dhėnė pėr agjentėt amerikane dhe sipas dokumenteve sekrete tė Wikileaks pikėsynimi ishin detajet teknike pėrfshirė passvvordet, kodet personale. Gjithashtu nėn shenjestėr tė shėrbimeve sekrete amerikane kanė qenė numrat e kartave tė kreditit, adresat e e-maileve, telefonat, fakest e kėtyre personazheve tė hierarkisė sė Kombeve tė Bashkuara. Nė kėtė operacion janė pėrfshirė FBI, CIA dhe shėrbimet e tjera inteligjente brenda Shteteve tė Bashkuara tė Amerikės.

    Sipas dokumenteve tė bėra publike nga VVikileaks, shėrbimet amerikane tė zbulimit kanė pėrdorur agjentė tė tyre tė cilėt janė dėrguar nė shumė takime legale nė vende tė ndryshme tė botės duke u paraqitur si diplomatė.

    Megjithatė sqarohet se jo tė gjithė diplomatėt janė agjentė.

    Qeveria kineze udhėhoqi sulmin ndaj Google

    Shėrbimi diplomatik amerikan dhe shėrbimet e inteligjencės siē zbuln Ėikileaks kanė patur dyshime tė forta se autoritetet kineze kanė orkestruar njė fushatė sulmi nė kompiutera me objekt Google dhe qeveritė perėndimore. “Google ishte pjesė e njė fushate sulmi kompiuterik nga operativė tė qeverisė dhe ekspertėsh tė informatikės tė rekrutuar nga qeveria kineze”, thuhet nė dokumentet sekrete tė SHBA-ve. Njėkohėsisht mendohet se operativėt kinezė kanė ndėrhyrė nė kompiutera nė Shteteve e Bashkuara tė Amerikės, vendet aleate. Sulmi synonte edhe infiltrimin tek dizidentėt kinez dhe llogaritė e tyre nė “gmail”.

    SHBA, Sllovenisė: Njė takim me Obamėn nėse merrni njė tė burgosur nga Guantanamo

    Pazare pėr tė zbrazur burgun e Guantanamos. Dokumentet e zbuluara nė internet nė Wikileaks thonė se diplomatėt amerikanė kanė bėrė presion ndaj vendeve tė huaja pėr tė shpėndarė tė burgosur tė Guantanamos bazuar nė njė postulat tė Departamentit tė Shtetit “Le tė bėjmė njė marrėveshje”. Sllovenisė raportohet se i ėshtė ofruar dhėnia e njė tė burgosuri nga Guantanamo nė kėmbim tė njė takimi me Presidentin Barack Obama ndėrsa republikės sė Kiribatit i janė ofruar shumė tė majme miliona dollarėsh pėr tė marrė tė burgosur me origjinė kinezė. Sipas kėtyre dokumenteve thuhet se amerikanėt i sugjeruan Belgjikės se nėse do tė pranonte disa tė burgosur nga Guantanamo do ta kishte mė tė lehtė dhe mė pa kosto tė rriste fuqinė e saj brenda Evropės.
    Praises due to the most high, Allah

    Praises due to the most fly, Prada

    Baby, I'm magic, ta-dah

  3. #23
    Curva Sud Milano Maska e niku-nyc
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    Tallet Amerika me kto shkrime gazetash nga ambasadoret dhe te gjith kujtjon se keto me verte kan qen "top secret" ose inteligjenca Amerikane eshte kaq e pa-afte, qe ti lejoj keto gjera te dalin hapur.

    Akoma nuk e dini qe cdo gje eshte loje e CIA's te tallet me te gjith.

    Inteligjenca dhe top secret te verteta jan cfare ndodhi ne luften e ftohte me nendecet, teknollogjia ne hapsire per spiunim etj.



    Te ishin aq budallenj Amerikanet te leshonin sekretet, ky vend nuk do ishte asnjehere i madh.
    Il Club Pił Titolato Al Mondo

  4. #24
    MR. BEAN - Laden Maska e the admiral
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    Citim Postuar mė parė nga niku-nyc Lexo Postimin
    Tallet Amerika me kto shkrime gazetash nga ambasadoret dhe te gjith kujtjon se keto me verte kan qen "top secret" ose inteligjenca Amerikane eshte kaq e pa-afte, qe ti lejoj keto gjera te dalin hapur.

    Akoma nuk e dini qe cdo gje eshte loje e CIA's te tallet me te gjith.

    Inteligjenca dhe top secret te verteta jan cfare ndodhi ne luften e ftohte me nendecet, teknollogjia ne hapsire per spiunim etj.



    Te ishin aq budallenj Amerikanet te leshonin sekretet, ky vend nuk do ishte asnjehere i madh.
    po c'lidhje ka me inteligjencen kjo??? ketu po flitet per "vjedhjen" e ca mesazheve te rendomta kryesisht nisur dipllomatikeve amerikane neper bote......

    po aq e paafte ishte inteligjenca amerikane te lejonte te dilnin ato file-t sekrete per vrasjen e civileve nga ushtaret amerikane???
    a thua edhe per ato raste e ka bere me qellim amerika???
    a thua edhe ne ato raste CIA po tallej me te gjithe???

    p.s. ato file-t e vjedhur nuk jane ato TOP SECRET qe permend ti.
    ato jane thjeshte mesazhe... ndersa ato qe u vodhen para nje muaji ishin raporte lufte.

    p.s. 2. bah! kjo CIA po tallet me tere boten, vetem me ty jo.
    Ndryshuar pėr herė tė fundit nga the admiral : 29-11-2010 mė 14:02
    Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam

  5. #25
    MR. BEAN - Laden Maska e the admiral
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    berlusconi eshte cilesuar si dora e djathte e putin-it ne europe...
    si nje njeri i paafte per te qeverisur.
    "ndoshta festat e shumta nuk i lene kohe te mjaftueshme per te pushuar" - eshte thene......

    hahahaha!!!
    Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam

  6. #26
    Curva Sud Milano Maska e niku-nyc
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    Eh, mahnituni me perrallat e CIA's dhe shkrimet e ambasadoreve si shkrimtare qe kane ata ne komedi ne late night show...

    Tallet inteligjenca Amerikane me boten gjasme sikur u ka dhen botes ate informacione vetem sa per ti mbushur mendjen dhe syte, sepse ka plot qe mahniten edhe me nje kokerr ulliri, sikur tua japesh...dhe u mahniten me ne fund te shkretet



    E cuditshme qe asnjeri nuk flet per sekretet e Rusise apo Kines!
    Il Club Pił Titolato Al Mondo

  7. #27
    Erga omnes Maska e fisniku-student
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    Wikileaks: Amerika detyroi qeverinė tė pranojė protokollet EULEX - Serbi


    Web faqja Wikileaks ka rėnė nga funksioni, ndėrsa mbi 250 000 dokumente, nė mesin e tė cilave edhe 668 pėr Kosovėn janė publikuar tashmė. Ato i referohen raportimeve tė diplomatėve pėr Departamentin e Shtetit.

    Edhe pse qasja ėshtė e pamundur, Indeksonline duke gjurmar ka arritur tė nxjerr njė pjesė tė njė dokumenti sekret me shifrėn PARIS 00001254 002 OF 004, ku i referohet bisedės se Jean-David Levitte, diplomat francez, tani kėshilltar i Sarkozys me Asistent-sekretarin amerikan, Philp Gordon, ku i referohet protokolleve tė nėnshkruara ndėrmjet EULEX-it dhe qeverisė serbe.

    Wednesday, 16 September 2009, 07:34
    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 001254
    NOFORN
    SIPDIS
    EO 12958 DECL: 09/16/2018
    TAGS PREL, PARM, KNNP, BH, SM, MK, GR, FR
    SUBJECT: A/S GORDON'S MEETINGS WITH POLICY-MAKERS IN PARIS:
    A TOUR D'HORIZON OF EUROPE AND AFGHANISTAN
    Classified By: Ambassador Charles Rivkin, for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

    Citat nga raporti: 16 Shtator 2009, takimi i Gordonit me diplomatėt francezė nė Paris mė 11 Shtator 2009. Ėshtė diskutuar pėr shumė ēėshtje, kjo ėshtė pjesa pėr Kosovėn:

    “Levitte ka vėnė nė pah se EULEX-i ka probleme diplomatike me qeverinė e Kosovės dhe me publikun pas nėnshkrimit tė dy marrėveshjeve protokollare me Serbinė. Ata (EULEX-i), shpresojnė ta mbajnė Kosovėn e qetė, teksa ajo po ecė drejt zgjedhjeve komunale (2009). Asisteni i Sekretares, Gordon ka thėnė se kosovarėt duhet tė pranojnė protokollet, por duhet tė shpjegohet nė mėnyrė tė qartė se ato janė marrėveshje teknike qė nuk kanė asnjė ndikim nė statusin e pavarėsisė sė Kosovės. Levitte gjithashtu kritikoi ministrin e jashtėm serb Jeremic, duke thėnė se ai nuk po bėn asgjė qė tė inkurajojė pjesėmarrjen e serbėve nė qeverinė e Kosovės. Levitte vuri nė pah se Jeremici “bėn premtime tė mėdha” sa herė qė vjen nė Francė, por nuk i mbanė ato. Levitte nuk e takon mė atė dhe nuk konsideron se ai ėshtė “fytyra moderne e Beogradit” qė pretendon se ėshtė”. /indeksonline/
    "Idea ėshtė Kėshilltari mė i mirė i Veprės"

  8. #28
    Hands up! Maska e Jack Watson
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    Interesante kjo, qėllimet e Turqisė nė Ballkan.

    http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable...0ANKARA87.html
    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 ANKARA 000087

    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2020
    TAGS: PREL TU
    SUBJECT: WHAT LIES BENEATH ANKARA'S NEW FOREIGN POLICY

    REF: A. 09 ANKARA 1717
    ¶B. 09 ISTANBUL 466
    ¶C. 09 ANKARA 1561 (EXDIS)

    Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

    INTRODUCTION/COMMENT
    --------------------

    ¶1. (C) There is much talk in chanceries and in the
    international media these days about Turkey's new, highly
    activist foreign policy, which unquestionably represents a
    transition not only from prior governments, but also from the
    AKP regime before the Gaza/Davos events, and before the
    ascent of Ahmet Davutoglu as Foreign Minister in April. Some
    commentaries are upbeat, but others, including many experts
    and editorial writers in the US, have expressed concern. The
    ruling AKP foreign policy is driven by both a desire to be
    more independently activist, and by a more Islamic
    orientation. Frankly, rational national interest,
    particularly trade opportunities and stability
    considerations, also drives Turkey's new slant. Major
    challenges with us in the coming months include the direction
    of Turkish-Israeli relations, the fate of the Protocols with
    Armenia, and the Turkish posture vis--vis Iran.

    ¶2. (C) Does all this mean that the country is becoming more
    focused on the Islamist world and its Muslim tradition in its
    foreign policy? Absolutely. Does it mean that it is
    "abandoning" or wants to abandon its traditional Western
    orientation and willingness to cooperate with us? Absolutely
    not. At the end of the day we will have to live with a Turkey
    whose population is propelling much of what we see. This
    calls for a more issue-by-issue approach, and recognition
    that Turkey will often go its own way. In any case, sooner
    or later we will no longer have to deal with the current cast
    of political leaders, with their special yen for destructive
    drama and - rhetoric. But we see no one better on the
    horizon, and Turkey will remain a complicated blend of world
    class "Western" institutions, competencies, and orientation,
    and Middle Eastern culture and religion. END INTRODUCTION.

    COMPONENTS OF POLICY
    --------------------

    "The Traditional Western"

    ¶3. (C) Turkish policy today is a mix of "traditional Western"
    orientation, attitudes and interests, and two new elements,
    linked with new operational philosophies: "zero conflicts"
    and "neo-Ottomanism." The traditional still represents the
    core of Turkish foreign policy, and is centered on
    cooperation and integration with the West. Its core is NATO,
    the customs union with the EU, and most significantly, the EU
    accession effort. This all began with the Ottoman effort to
    emulate the European great powers, and was propelled
    powerfully forward by Ataturk. Nevertheless the country was
    on the sidelines in World War II. It was only the threat of
    the USSR, and the dominance (and outstretched hand) of the
    US, that led to the "Turkey we know": tough combat partner
    in Korea, major NATO ally, US anchor in the Middle East.
    Much of this continues.

    ¶4. (C) Europe is by far Turkey's most important economic
    partner in terms of investment and trade. The EU accounts for
    42 percent of Turkey,s total trade, while the US accounts
    for a bit less than 5 percent. While the US is much less
    important in terms of trade statistics, it remains important
    in various sectors (e.g.energy, aviation, military), and in
    various ways. NATO is essential to and much respected by

    ANKARA 00000087 002 OF 006


    Turkey. (Note: The fact that "only" about one-third of the
    Turkish population in one poll see NATO as important to
    Turkey's security is actually a plus; on any poll Turks
    usually are overwhelmingly negative about any foreign
    engagement or relationship. But we should not be too
    sanguine here since support for NATO has been halved over the
    past decade. End Note) The military is armed by the US, and
    Turkey recognizes that many fires in its back yard -- from
    Iraq to Afghanistan and Pakistan -- can only be solved by
    close cooperation with and acceptance of US and NATO
    leadership. Finally, even AKP leaders know that much of
    their allure or "wasta" in the Middle East and elsewhere
    stems from their privileged position in key Western clubs.
    This traditional orientation may be shaken, or reduced, but
    as it has both significant buy-in by elites of all
    philosophies, and many concrete advantages, Turkey will not
    abandon it.

    "Zero Problems with Turkey's Neighbors"

    ¶5. (C) But this Turkey is trying to "post-modernize" itself.
    One major area of AKP effort has been to resolve problems
    with Turkey's immediate "near abroad." This effort stands in
    contrast with the "traditional" Turkish policy of letting
    these frozen conflicts fester, and is much more compatible
    with US and European interests. The list of Turkish
    initiatives under the AKP is impressive: accepting the Annan
    Plan in 2004 to resolve Cyprus, continuing the 1999
    rapprochement with Greece, the opening to Armenia culminating
    in the signing of recognition protocols, warming and
    productive relations with both Baghdad and Erbil (the latter
    complemented by significant reforms in Turkey's relations
    with its own Kurdish population). The signature
    accomplishment of this policy is the wooing of Syria. While
    this road to Damascus in fact was paved by Syria's
    accommodation of prior Turkish governments' demands
    (relinquishing claims on Turkey's Hatay province, expelling
    Ocalan), it is touted by the Turks as a game-changer. As
    noted below, they have leveraged it to tackle a number of
    regional problems, from Lebanon to Iran.

    ¶6. (C) While this new approach is to be applauded, there is a
    fly in its ointment. Little of true practical and final
    accomplishment has been achieved. Cyprus is still split
    (albeit the fault, at least in terms of the Annan plan, lies
    more with the Greek Cypriots and the EU); tensions with
    Greece in the Aegean continue; the Protocols with Armenia
    have not been ratified due to Turkish concerns about
    Nagorno-Karabakh; Iraq's instability and the KRG's
    unwillingness to do more against the PKK raise questions
    about the sustainability of Turkey's constructive Iraq
    policy; the rapprochement with Syria has not really produced
    any Syrian "flip" away from Iran. Granted, Turkey is dealing
    with some of the world's most difficult actors, and facing
    stiff opposition at home to making more concessions, but the
    proof of this pudding is yet to be seen.

    "Neo Ottomanism"

    ¶7. (C) The idea of Turkey using its cultural and religious
    links to the Middle East to the advantage of both Turkish
    interests and regional stability is not new with the AKP, but
    has been given much more priority by it, in part because of
    the Islamic orientation of much of the party, including
    leaders Erdogan, Gul, and Davutoglu. Moreover, the AKP's
    constant harping on its unique understanding of the region,
    and outreach to populations over the heads of conservative,
    pro-US governments, have led to accusations of
    "neo-Ottomanism." Rather than deny, Davutoglu has embraced
    this accusation. Himself the grandson of an Ottoman soldier

    ANKARA 00000087 003 OF 006


    who fought in Gaza, Davutoglu summed up the Davutoglu/AKP
    philosophy in an extraordinary speech in Sarajevo in late
    2009 (REF A). His thesis: the Balkans, Caucasus, and Middle
    East were all better off when under Ottoman control or
    influence; peace and progress prevailed. Alas the region has
    been ravaged by division and war ever since. (He was too
    clever to explicitly blame all that on the imperialist
    western powers, but came close). However, now Turkey is back,
    ready to lead -- or even unite. (Davutoglu: "We will
    re-establish this (Ottoman) Balkan").

    ¶8. (C) While this speech was given in the Balkans, most of
    its impact is in the Middle East. Davutoglu's theory is that
    most of the regimes there are both undemocratic and
    illegitimate. Turkey, building on the alleged admiration
    among Middle Eastern populations for its economic success and
    power, and willing to stand up for the interests of the
    people, reaches over the regimes to the "Arab street."
    Turkey's excoriating the Israelis over Gaza, culminating in
    the insulting treatment of President Peres by Erdogan at
    Davos in 2009, illustrates this trend. To capitalize on its
    rapport with the people, and supposed diplomatic expertise
    and Ottoman experience, Turkey has thrown itself into a
    half-dozen conflicts as a mediator. This has worked well, as
    noted above, with Iraq, and was quite successful in the
    Syrian-Israeli talks before Gaza. Turkey has also achieved
    some limited success on Lebanon and in bringing Saudi Arabia
    and Syria together. As noted below, however, this policy
    brings with it great frictions, not just with us and the
    Europeans but with many supposed beneficiaries of a return to
    Ottoman suzerainty. Furthermore, it has not achieved any
    single success of note.

    WHY THE CHANGE?
    ---------------

    ¶9. (C) Various factors explain the shifts we see in Turkish
    foreign policy beyond the personal views of the AKP
    leadership:

    -- Islamization: As reported REF B, religiosity has been
    increasing in Turkey in past years, just as has been seen in
    many other Muslim societies. The AKP is both a beneficiary
    of, and a stimulus for, this phenomenon. However, bitter
    opposition within Turkey against domestic "pro-Islamic"
    reforms (e.g., head scarves) has frustrated the AKP, and a
    more "Islamic" or "Middle Eastern" foreign policy offers an
    alternative sop for the AKP's devout base.

    -- Success: Despite its problems, Turkey over the past 50
    years has been a success story, rising to the 16th largest
    economy and membership in the G-20. This, along with its
    extraordinary security situation compared to all other
    regional states, and democratic system, encourage a more
    active -- and more independent -- leadership role in regional
    and even global affairs.

    -- Economics: one secret of Turkish success has been its
    trade and technology-led economic growth. This growth is in
    good part thanks to its customs union with the EU, by far its
    biggest export market, and resulting investment from the EU,
    as well as decades of technology transfer and educational
    assistance from the U.S. Nevertheless, with exports to the
    EU down due to the 2008-2009 crisis, Turkey is looking for
    new markets, particularly in the hydrocarbon rich Arab world,
    Iran, Russia, and Caucasus/Central Asia. They have money,
    and strong import demand, and Turkey is dependent on them for
    its oil and gas. These countries, however, (along with
    China-another Turkish export target) tend much more than the
    EU and North America to mix politics and trade. To some

    ANKARA 00000087 004 OF 006


    degree the West thus is taken for granted and economic
    priority is directed towards relations with the Middle East
    and "Eurasia."

    -- Civilians ascendant: Erdogan's political success -
    together with a number of messy scandals resulting in public
    investigation - has meant that the Turkish General Staff now
    plays a much smaller role in defining Turkey's foreign
    policy. Turkey's support to NATO is still strong, but it now
    lacks the suspicion of Russia which the cold-war instinct of
    General Staff brought to the mix.

    -- EU disillusionment: Both popular and elite Turkish
    opinion has recently grown much more pessimistic about
    eventual EU membership -- or even its value. The reasons for
    this are complex, but include the shifting mood in Europe
    towards Islam, the replacement of "pro-Turkey" leaders in
    France and Germany by Sarkozy and Merkel, both decidedly cool
    towards Turkey's EU membership, and a sense in Turkey of
    distance from and lack of sympathy for Europe.

    -- Relativization of the Western anchor. An op-ed in the
    Financial Times by Gideon Rechman on January 4 noted
    correctly the tendency of the "young giants" -- South Africa,
    Brazil, India, and Turkey -- to pursue Third Worldish
    policies and rhetoric even while benefitting enormously from
    the globalized trade and international security created and
    maintained by the "West." That certainly characterizes
    Turkey. With the end of the cold war, relative success in
    the struggle with the PKK, and the "taming" of Syria, Iraq,
    and (at least from Turkey's point of view) Iran, Turkey's
    need for NATO and U.S. security is reduced. Its dependence
    on Western trade, investment, technology transfer and
    educational exchange remains critical, but is regarded as a
    "free good" that Turkey deserves and does not have to expend
    effort for. Relations with its various new friends in the
    North-East-South or on the other hand require effort which is
    facilitated by some downplaying of Turkey's Western anchor.

    DAVUTOGLU DISCONTENTS
    ---------------------

    ¶10. (C) The AKP's new approach to international affairs
    receives mixed reviews inside and outside Turkey. It is not
    a major factor in the AKP's relative popularity, but several
    elements of it (unfortunately, those we are least happy with)
    do appeal to voters. Criticism of Israel post-Gaza is
    overwhelmingly popular, and the relatively soft Turkish
    position on Iran -- a country about which many Turks are
    skeptical -- is presumably helpful with a narrow, but for
    Erdogan's electoral fate important, group of Islamic voters
    associated with former PM Erbakan.

    ¶11. (C) Nevertheless, many in Turkey's large westernized
    elite see the Islamic Outreach as a complement to the alleged
    AKP plan to Islamize Turkish society, and complain bitterly
    about their country's losing its western moorings. The
    Nationalist segment in Turkey, mobilized most by the
    Nationalist Action Party (MHP), sees the AKP's compromises on
    Armenia, the KRG in northern Iraq, Cyprus, etc, as a betrayal
    of diaspora "Turks" (the Iraqi Turkomen, Azeris, Turkish
    Cypriots, etc) and charges that the AKP is trying to replace
    the Republic's organizing principle of "Turkism" with the
    broader Islamic "Umma." The Republican People's Party (CHP),
    the lead opposition party, attacks AKP foreign policy
    relatively ineffectively with a mix of MHP-like nationalist
    rhetoric and "abandoning the west" criticism.

    ¶12. (C) But it is in the EU that the Erdogan foreign policy
    of late has run into the heaviest of sailing. To some degree

    ANKARA 00000087 005 OF 006


    European angst at Turkey's "new direction" is viewed as an
    excuse to pummel Turkey to score domestic points among
    anti-foreigner elements. But there is real concern in
    Europe, made manifest by the Rasmussen NATO SecGen issue last
    April. Europeans were furious with Turkey's presentng itself
    as the "Islamic" voice or conscience in NATO, having
    consulted with Middle Eastern States before talking to its
    NATO allies. Extrapolating that behavior into the even more
    diversity-intolerant EU is a nightmare. Erdogan's foreign
    (and domestic) policy orientation conjures up not just a
    clash of Christianity and Islam, but the spectre of a "meld"
    of Europe and the Middle East, and of Europe's secularlism
    with oriental religiosity. Davutoglu and others argue that
    Turkey's "success" as a coming Middle East power makes it
    more attractive to the EU -- giving Europe a new foreign
    policy "market" through Turkey. While some in Europe appear
    interested in this idea, ironically including Turkey EU
    membership skeptic France, this does not seem to carry much
    weight in most European capitals, let alone populations.

    ¶13. (C) Finally, not all of the ex-Ottomans look with
    fondness on their past under the Pashas, or yearn for
    Turkey's return. Reaction among many in the Balkans to
    Davutoglu's Sarejevo speech (REF A) was quite strong. In the
    Middle East itself, the Arab street might applaud Turkey's
    populistic and essentially cost-free support for more radical
    elements, but it's not particularly appreciated by rulers
    (although Turkey seems to have made some progress with Syria,
    brokered a rapprochement between President Bashir and Saudi
    King Abdullah, and has had some role in resolving the Lebanon
    cabinet stalemate). Sooner or later, though, Turkey will
    have to produce results, take risks, commit real resources,
    and take hard decisions to augment a policy now consisting
    mainly of popular slogans, ceaseless trips, and innumerable
    signatures on MOUs of little importance. The experience with
    Iran, which despite significant Turkish verbal support and
    wooing, appears uninterested in granting Turkey any
    concessions, or agreeing to a Turkish lead in mediation
    efforts, is telling.

    THE PROBLEM FOR THE US
    ----------------------

    ¶14. (C) Turkey's new foreign policy is a mixed bag for us.
    Having regional heavyweights take on burdens, thereby
    relieving us, has long been a desired goal of US policy, but
    it comes with a certain loss of control. Nevertheless, on a
    whole host of key issues of supreme importance to us --
    Afghanistan and Pakistan, cooperation in and on Iraq, NATO
    efforts (although a leading Turkish role in Missile Defense
    will not be easy) -- Turkey is a crucial ally, and our use of
    Incirlik, Habur gate, and Turkish airspace for our Iraq and
    Afghanistan operations is indispensible. Its "zero
    conflicts" initiatives, which have moved Turkey forward on
    more of the key bilateral spats -- Cyprus, Greece, Kurds,
    Northern Iraq, Armenia -- than we have seen with any other
    Turkish government, also support U.S. interests.

    ¶15. (C) Nevertheless, these latter issues illustrate two
    problems. At least in Turkish eyes, on this complex of
    issues the US , especially the media, interest groups, and
    Congress, default to a "blame Turkey" posture regardless of
    whatever it does. Second, Turkey has repeatedly run into
    trouble actually consummating these various openings -- the
    Armenian protocols being the best example, but continued
    overflights of Greek islands and domestic opposition to the
    Kurdish opening are also relevant. What we fear is that this
    inability to bring to conclusion foreign policy initiatives
    will affect not just the above, but most Turkish policy,
    given the over-extension of Davutoglu and his team, and a

    ANKARA 00000087 006 OF 006


    tendency to substitute rhetoric for long term investment of
    diplomatic, military, and assistance capital. (Fortunately,
    Afghanistan/Pakistan and Iraq are the two major exceptions to
    this tendency.)

    ¶16. (C) The greatest potential strategic problem for the US,
    however, and the one that has some of the commentators
    howling, is the Turks neo-Ottoman posturing around the Middle
    East and Balkans. This "back to the past" attitude so clear
    in Davutoglu's Sarajevo speech, combined with the Turks'
    tendency to execute it through alliances with more Islamic or
    more worrisome local actors, constantly creates new problems.
    Part of this is structural. Despite their success and
    relative power, the Turks really can't compete on equal terms
    with either the US or regional "leaders" (EU in the Balkans,
    Russia in the Caucasus/Black Sea, Saudis, Egyptians and even
    Iranians in the ME). With Rolls Royce ambitions but Rover
    resources, to cut themselves in on the action the Turks have
    to "cheat" by finding an underdog (this also plays to
    Erdogan's own worldview), a Siladjcic, Mish'al, or
    Ahmadinejad, who will be happy to have the Turks take up his
    cause. The Turks then attempt to ram through revisions to at
    least the reigning "Western" position to the favor of their
    guy. Given, again, the questioning of Western policy and
    motives by much of the Turkish public and the AKP, such an
    approach provides a relatively low cost and popular tool to
    demonstrate influence, power, and the "we're back" slogan.

    ¶17. (C) This has been, so far, manageable, if at times high
    maintenance, in the Balkans and Mideast, although the damage
    to Israeli-Turkish relations remains serious. If the Turks
    are genuine in their desire to draw Syria away from Iran, and
    if they begin achieving real success rather than telephone
    books worth of questionable protocols, then that will be of
    benefit to us all. But with Iran itself it is a different
    story. REF C describes the background to the Turkish
    relationship with Iran, one more complicated than with their
    ex-Ottoman Arab and other subjects. Trade/hydrocarbon
    interests, Turkish aversion to sanctions stemming from the
    first Gulf War, Erdogan's vocal "third worldism" and certain
    domestic political considerations all push Turkey in the
    wrong direction. Unlike with many of the other issues,
    however, Turkey will have to stand and be counted on Iran, in
    the Security Council, with MD, and in implementation of UN or
    US sanctions. This will have a profound effect on relations
    second only to the fate of the Armenian protocols over the
    next year.
    Jeffrey

    "Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s
    gov.gov/wiki/Portalurkey"
    Life's too short to remove USB safely.

  9. #29
    i/e regjistruar
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    Ketu eshte e qaret se parap ketyre qendron cia amerikane dhe febia , politika Amerikan per te ardhmen dhe kishe te kaluaren,,keto jane politikat amerikane dhe keto lidhen krysishte per shtetet arabe dhe iranin,se kines nje mbret i ka kerkuar amerikanve ta sulmojen iranin,,,lidhje ka edhe me turqin,dhe shume vende islamik,,dhe ruse kjo nje dite do te del ne pa

  10. #30
    kuku Maska e brooklyn2007
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    Di njeri te me thote, keto dokumentat kane ndalur se shpalluri online apo po vazhdojne?. Me sa shikoj une shpallja e dokumentave kane mbetur tek 226/251287

    http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/
    ABCĒDDhEĖFGGjHIJKLLlMNNjOPQRRrSShTThUVXXhYZZh (Alfabeti Shqip, 36 gėrma)

  11. #31
    Perjashtuar
    Anėtarėsuar
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    Ncncnc..


    Oh njerez s'di qysh nuk e kuptoni.
    Une e kam kuptuar qe moti Amerika luan me ndjenjat e njerezve.

  12. #32
    Perjashtuar
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    Hehehe..

    Edhe nje gjo Albin Kurti qe moti ka thene se: Eulex made in Serbia.

  13. #33
    Curva Sud Milano Maska e niku-nyc
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    E gjith kjo WikiLeak eshte nje loje e CIA's dhe inteligjences Amerikane per te treguar se ku ndodhet bota me Iranin, Koren e Veriut dhe Kinen.

    Doli hapur qe nga Turqia e deri tek Arabia Saudite qe asnjeri nuk e do me sy Iranin. Sa me shume Irani te behet rrezik per stabilitetit ne rajon aq me shume vendet Arabe do jen per rrezimin e Ahmadinexhan dhe cmendurise qe manaxhon qeverine e tyre.

    Gjithashtu doli dhe Kina ne veshtiresi tashti me Koren e Veriut dhe nje rrezim i regjimit te shokut Kim dhe nje Kore e bashkuar do te thot qe Amerika do vej trupa mu ne kufirin Kinez.

    Kujtoni ju se Amerikes i plasi by*** dhe se jan te shqetesuar qe jan tallur me Putin, Berluskoni dhe te tjeret, apo per dokumenta te thjeshta qe kan dal?


    E gjith loja behet per te nxjer ca budalliqe nga ambasadoret per te nxjer hapur qe Irani dhe Korea e Veriut kan shkembyer predha dhe teknollogji nukleare.
    Tashti fillon programi ne Evrope per mbrojtjen kunder raketave qe e fut dhe Rusine ne veshtiresi dhe Kinen me ardhjen e forcave detare Amerikane mu ne ujrat e tyre mbas tensionit qe ndodhi ne ishullin Jugore.



    Por te pakten me ne fund keto gjera i mbushin syrin atyre qe mahniten me perrallat dhe qe genjehen si femije qe hajn akullore per here te pare...keto gjera qe dan dal jan cfare bejn cdo admbasadore qe ka me qindra vite qe raporte te tilla shkruen dhe behen publike. Ketu nuk ka asgje te re.

    Mendoj se ne te ardhmen do ket me shume te tjera, por sidoqoft inteligjenca Amerikane dhe pse dolen keto WikiLeaks eshte nje loje inteligjence qe i sherben Amerikes ne te ardhmen.
    Il Club Pił Titolato Al Mondo

  14. #34
    Super Moderatore Maska e shigjeta
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    Wikileaks, 822 dokumente sekrete pėr Shqipėrinė

    Bomba", Wikileaks, trondit edhe Shqipėrinė. Sipas verifikimeve tė bėra janė 822 file, apo dokumente sekrete. Sipas tė pėrditėshmes gjermane Der Shpigel dokumentet sekrete pėr vendin tonė (file) nisin nga viti 1997 deri mė 2010. Gazeta prestigjioze ka bėrė klasifikimin tė 452 fileve qė lidhen me Shqipėrinė, prej tė cilave 1 ėshtė klasifikuar Noforn, tejet sekret edhe pėr aleatėt, 8 janė sekret, dy janė Cofidential Noforn, 147 konfidenciale, 169 janė pėr pėrdorim tė brendshėm dhe 125 Unclassififeld. Ende nuk janė bėrė tė ditura se ēfarė pėrmbajnė kėto materiale por thuhet se pjesėn mė tė madhe tė tyre do e zėnė marrėdhėniet kufitare me Shqipėrinė dhe Greqinė. Ndėrkohė dosje sekrete ka edhe pėr Kosovėn e cila ka 1320 dokumente sekrete, Greqia 1758 dokumente sekrete, Maqedonia 783, ndėrsa Turqia mban rekord nė rajon dhe listohet e dyta nė botė pėr sasinė e dokumenteve sekrete pas Irakut me 11086 dokumente sekrete. Siē del nga klasifikimi i vendeve tė pėrfshira nė "Hiroshimėn" Wikileaks, Iraku mban vendin e parė me 15365 dosje sekrete.

    Reagimi
    Pas njoftimeve tė para pėr publikimin e dokumenteve secrete amerikane, Gazeta Shqitare komunikoi me zv.ambasadoren e SHBA nė Tiranė, znj. Deborah Jones, e cila deklaroi se e konsideron tė rrezikshme pėr mijėra njerėz publikimin e tyre.
    Znj. Xhons, sot dolėn nė internet njoftime lidhur me dokumente sekrete tė ambasadave amerikane, dėrguar Departamentit tė Shtetit. Ka informacione pėr Shqipėrinė nė to?
    Nuk kemi asnjė koment lidhur me informacione qė pėrfshijnė zyrtarė tė Shqipėrisė nė informacionet, tė cilat kanė dalė sė fundmi nė sajtin e Wikileaks. Ne jemi njė institucion zyrtar, ndėrkohė qė informacionet nė fjalė kanė dalė nga njė njė burim jozyrtar.
    Si i komentoni, atėhere, publikimet e Wikileaks, qė do tė dalin nesėr nė faqet e para tė disa gazetavė mė tė mėdha botėrore?
    Mund tė them vetėm se ato do tė rrezikojnė jetėt e mijėra njerėzve, amerikanė dhe joamerikanė.
    Nė njė ndėr njoftimet e para, thuhet se administrata e SHBA ka bėrė presione, qė tė pranojnė nė vendet e tyre tė burgosur tė Guantanamos. Keni njė reagim lidhur me kėtė?
    Nuk kemi asnjė lloj komenti lidhur me kėtė informacion.

    Hackersat
    Wikileaks, faqja e internetit qė po trondit qeveritė mė tė mėdha botėrore pėr shkak tė publikimit tė dokumenteve sekrete, njoftoi dje se ėshtė nėn sulm tė vazhdueshėm, por se kjo nuk do ta pengojė nė publikimin e materialeve amerikane tė klasifikuara. Mesazhi ėshtė dhėnė pėrmes rrjetit social 'Twitter', vetėm disa orė para publikimit masiv tė dokumenteve. Wikileaks ka insistuar se gazetat spanjolle, franceze, gjermane, britanike por edhe amerikane, qė kishin planifikuar tė publikonin informacionet tė dielėn nė mbrėmje, do ta bėjnė kėtė edhe nėse bie uebsajti i Wikileaks. "El Pais, Le Monde, Spiegel, Guardian dhe New York Times, do tė publikojnė shumė dokumente tė ambasadave amerikane sot (dje)", thuhet nė mesazh. Wikileaks zakonisht shkon offline pak orė para publikimit tė dokumenteve sekrete pėr t'u dhėnė kohė ngarkimit tė tyre. Por, ditėn e djeshme nė internet qarkullonin hipoteza tė ndryshme, nga ajo e mbingarkesės pėr shkak tė klikimeve tė shumta dhe deri tek ajo e njė sulmi tė mundshėm tė hackerave, hipoteza kėto qė gjithsesi mbeten pėr t'u vėrtetuar. Mė herėt, shefi i Wikileaks, Julian Asange tha se dokumentet do tė mbulojnė ēėshtje madhore tė ēdo vendi nė botė. Dalja e fundit e tij ka qenė me anė tė njė video-konference nė Aman tė Jordanisė. "Nuk mund tė jem aty me ju dhe jam i detyruar tė adresoj kėtė mesazh me anė tė kėsaj videoje. Jordania nuk ėshtė vendi perfekt kur ke CIA-n qė tė ėshtė vėnė pas", - deklaroi Assange nė videon e tij pėr gazetarėt investigativė nė Jordani. Dokumentet "top secret" tė Wikileaks pritet tė nxjerrin fakte tė forta nė lidhje me marrėdhėniet mes Tiranės dhe Athinės dhe pėr paktin ujor mes dy vendeve, i cili u rrėzua pak muaj mė parė nga Gjykata Kushtetuese nė Tiranė.

    Pakti detar
    Nė dokumentet sekrete tė Wikileaks qė parashikohet tė publikohen sė shpejti, pėrfshihet edhe Shqipėria dhe konkretisht nė marrėdhėniet diplomatike me Greqinė. Dokumentet pritet tė nxjerrin fakte tė forta nė lidhje me marrėdhėniet mes Tiranės dhe Athinės dhe pėr paktin ujor mes dy vendeve, qė u rrėzua pak muaj mė parė nga Gjykata Kushtetuese nė Tiranė. Sipas mediave greke dhe shqiptare, nė dokumente pėrfshihen edhe dosjet sekrete tė marrėdhėnieve mes Greqisė dhe disa shteteve tė tjera. Siē bėjnė tė ditura, ministri i Jashtėm grek, Dimitris Droutsas ka kėrkuar sqarime se si kanė pėrfunduar nė duart e SHBA-sė informacione tė klasifikuara si "top sekret" nga qeveria greke. Marrėveshja e ujėrave mes dy vende u denoncua fillimisht nė "Gazetėn Shqiptare", qė ēoi mė pas dhe nė rrėzimin e kėsaj marrėveshjeje nga Gjykata Kushtetuese.

    Gazeta Shqiptare
    Mos shkruaj gjė kur je me nerva, sepse, ndėrsa plaga e gjuhės ėshtė mė e keqe se e shpatės, mendo ē’ka mund tė jetė ajo e pendės

  15. #35
    Super Moderatore Maska e shigjeta
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    Kosova nė Wikileaks

    Ballkani ėshtė njė nga rajonet e pėrmendura nė numrin e dokumentave sekrete diplomatike amerikane tė publikuara nga Wikileaks.

    Gazeta britanike The Guardian, e cila ėshtė njė nga pesė mediat botėrore qė ka marrė dokumentat e plota nga Wikileaks, boton informacione lidhur me njė takim tė ndihmės-sekretarit amerikan tė Shtetit Philip Gordon me kėshilltari diplomatik tė presidentit francez Jean-David Levitte.

    Pėr Ballkanin mesazhi vė nė dukje se ndihmės serkretari amerikan Gordon ka inkurajuar pėrfshirjen e vendeve ballkanike nė Bashkimin Evropian.

    Sipas mesazhit zoti Gordon ka shprehur shpresėn se zgjedhjet nė Gjermani do ta lejojnė "qeverinė e re gjermane tė jetė mė e hapur ndaj zgjerimit tė BE-sė pėr tė pėrfshirė edhe vendet ballkanike.

    "Parisi dėshiron qė dera e zgjerimit tė mbetet e hapur, edhe nėse procesi i anėtarėsimit do tė dojė kohė tė kryhet," shkruhet nė mesazh.

    Shqetėsimet pėr Kosovėn

    Zoti Gordon, sipas mesazhit diplomatik, ka diskutuar me zyrtarėt e lartė francezė lidhur me zhvillimet e pritshme nė Ballkan, pėrfshirė Kosovėn e Serbinė.

    Mesazhi i publikuar nėnvizon shqetėsimin e kėshilltarit presidencial francez Levitte se "EULEX-i ka probleme diplomatike me qeverinė dhe publikun kosovar pas nėnshkrimit tė dy protokolleve teknike me Serbinė".

    "Ata (EULEX) po pėrpiqen tė garantojnė ruajtjen e qetėsisė ndėrsa Kosova shkon drejt zgjedhjeve vendore," shkruhet nė mesazh.

    "A/S Gordon vuri nė duke se kosovarėt do tė duhet tė pranojnė protokollet, por se duhet shpjeguar qartė se kėto janė marrėveshje teknike qė nuk kanė ndikim nė statusin e pavarur tė Kosovės," thotė mesazhi i botuar nga gazeta The Guardian.

    Nė mesazh thuhet gjithashtu se kėshilltari francez Levitte kishte mendime kritike ndaj ministrit tė jashtėm serb Vuk Jeremiq duke thėnė se "ai nuk po bėn asgjė pėr tė inkurajuar kthimin e serbėve apo pjesėmarrjen nė qeverinė e Kosovės".

    "Levitte vuri nė dukje se Jeremiq 'bėn premtime tė mėdha' sa herė qė vjen nė Francė, por nuk i plotėson ato.

    "Levitte nuk takohet mė me tė (Jeremiqin) dhe nuk e konsideron tė jetė 'fytyra moderne e Beogradit' qė ai pretendon se ėshtė," thuhet nė mesazhin diplomatik amerikan tė publikuar nga Wikileaks.

    Debati greko-maqedonas

    Dokumenat e publikuara zbulojnė edhe elemente tė bisedimeve lidhur me debatin midis Greqisė dhe Maqedonisė pėr ēėshtjen e emrit tė kėsaj tė fundit.

    "Ai (Gordon) shprehu shpresėn se bashkėsia ndėrkombėtare do tė mund ta bindė Maqedoninė tė braktisė idenė e njė referendumi dhe ta bėjė Greqinė tė heqė dorė nga domosdoshmėria pėr tė ndryshuar pasaportat, atėhere pėrparim mund tė bėhet," thuhet nė mesazh.

    Nga ajo qė shkruan gazeta, kėshilltari francez ka shprehur optimizėm se qeveria e re e Greqisė do tė ishte mė e fortė dhe se do tė ishte mė elastike rreth problemit me Maqedoninė pėr emrin.

    Korrespondenti i BBC-sė nė Maqedoni thotė se autoritetet atje nuk kanė reaguar ende ndaj publikimeve tė Wikileaks.

    Ambasada e SHBA-ve nė Shkup i tha BBC-sė se "politika e Departamentit Amerikan tė Shtetit ėshtė qė mos tė komentojė mbi ēėshtjen e dokumenteve qė prezantohen nė publik pa leje".

    Ambasada amerikane vuri nė dukje, megjithatė, se publikimi i tyre ėshtė "njė tentim i pa pėrgjegjshėm pėr tė shkaktuar kaos dhe pėr tė destabilizuar sigurinė globale".

    BBC
    Mos shkruaj gjė kur je me nerva, sepse, ndėrsa plaga e gjuhės ėshtė mė e keqe se e shpatės, mendo ē’ka mund tė jetė ajo e pendės

  16. #36
    Perjashtuar Maska e Dito
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    Ne Bahēen time
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    Shume e arrire loja psikologjike e cias

  17. #37
    gone Maska e INFINITY©
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    Falenderuar 1 herė nė 1 postim
    Citim Postuar mė parė nga Dito Lexo Postimin
    Shume e arrire loja psikologjike e cias
    lol

    Po ec mbushi mendjen ketyre qe mendojne se Obamen e Hillary-n nuk po i ze gjumi naten se po nxjerr WikiLeaks dokumente demtuese per Ameriken. Ehhhhhhhhh....

  18. #38
    EAGLE warrior Maska e MafiaWarz
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    Citim Postuar mė parė nga INFINITY© Lexo Postimin
    lol

    Po ec mbushi mendjen ketyre qe mendojne se Obamen e Hillary-n nuk po i ze gjumi naten se po nxjerr WikiLeaks dokumente demtuese per Ameriken. Ehhhhhhhhh....
    Ksaj pune i thojne, as nuk ki fakte qe se ka bo Amerika , as nuk ki fakte qe e ka bo Amerika ky eshte qellimi pra , secili njeri te kete 10000 parashikime por askush te mos kete fakte per nje te drejte.
    Praises due to the most high, Allah

    Praises due to the most fly, Prada

    Baby, I'm magic, ta-dah

  19. #39
    Hands up! Maska e Jack Watson
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    Citim Postuar mė parė nga brooklyn2007 Lexo Postimin
    Di njeri te me thote, keto dokumentat kane ndalur se shpalluri online apo po vazhdojne?. Me sa shikoj une shpallja e dokumentave kane mbetur tek 226/251287

    http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/
    shko ne google dhe shėno tekstualisht:

    Kodi:
    albania site:cablegate.wikileaks.org
    ...dhe tė dalin artikujt kur pėrmendet Shqipėria nė faqen zyrtare tė Wikileaks. Deri tani vetėm njė herė pėrmendet, nja 300 dokumente kanė dalė nga 250 mijė qė pretendo Wki.
    Life's too short to remove USB safely.

  20. #40
    -
    Anėtarėsuar
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    OK qe eshte nje dore e forte pas w.leaksit kjo eshte e qarte. Po andej nga "behari" ka per t`i dale tymi kesaj pune. Tani jemi akoma ne tymnaje. Ishalla na del per mbare.

    Gjithsesi mbase na del per mire kjo puna e ujerave me Greqine. Jo se nuk e dime, po kur ke provat konkrete nga pale te treta qendiset mire puna.
    -

Faqja 2 prej 13 FillimFillim 123412 ... FunditFundit

Ruaj Lidhjet

Regullat e Postimit

  • Ju nuk mund tė hapni tema tė reja.
  • Ju nuk mund tė postoni nė tema.
  • Ju nuk mund tė bashkėngjitni skedarė.
  • Ju nuk mund tė ndryshoni postimet tuaja.
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